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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to determine whether or not psychological type 
plays a role in why some individuals are more likely than others to give up their 
childhood religious beliefs and become atheists.  In order to do this, the psychological
type profile of 10,515 atheist church-leavers (2,677 females and 7,838 males) was 
compared to the psychological type profile of 2,326 continuing churchgoers  (1,137 
females and 1,189 males).  The results indicated that a preference for the thinking-
perceiving (TP) combination was over-represented in the atheist sample by a factor of 
2.14 for the females and 1.89 for the males.  Both of these results were found to be 
statistically very highly significant (p < .001).  A binary logistic regression analysis 
also found that a preference for the TP combination was a stronger predictor of 
atheism than intellect, years of church, church experience, and the father-child 
relationship.  Finally, it was determined that individuals who use the term “atheist” as 
their primary self-descriptor have the same worldview-level beliefs as those who use 
the terms “humanist”, “freethinker”, and “skeptic”.
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INTRODUCTION
As a field of study, the psychology of religion has existed for at least one 
hundred years, its starting point usually taken to be the publication of The Varieties of 
Religious Experience by William James in 1902 (Spilka, Hood, Hunsberger & 
Gorsuch, 2003).  However, it has only been within the last ten years that a psychology
of nonreligion has begun to emerge.  Prior to 2005, there was very little psychological
research available on topics such as atheism, agnosticism and secular humanism.  In 
fact, when Hunsberger & Altemeyer (2006) wrote Atheists: A groundbreaking study 
of America's nonbelievers, they claimed to have published the “first scientific study of
active atheists” (back cover).  Things have changed.  As Bullivant and Lee (2012) 
write, “it has become something of a cliché to begin social-scientific studies of non-
religion, secularity, atheism, and related topics by bewailing the dearth of previous 
research... however, that is becoming – finally and increasingly – an inaccurate 
description of this field of research, certainly if one looks at its very recent history and
contemporary activity” (p. 19).  There are now two major centers of research focused 
exclusively on the study of nonreligion: the Institute for the Study of Secularism in 
Society and Culture (ISSSC) at Trinity College in Hartford, CT, established in 2005; 
and the Nonreligion and Secularity Research Network (NSRN) at Oxford and 
Cambridge in the United Kingdom, established in 2008.  In 2012, the ISSSC and the 
NSRN launched the first peer-reviewed journal dedicated to the topic, Secularism and
Nonreligion.  Because of these initiatives and the work of independent psychologists 
at other institutions around the globe, there is now a sizeable and rapidly-growing 
body of research related to the psychological study of nonreligion.
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The current academic interest in the subject of nonreligion has coincided with 
the rise of the “new atheism”.  The “new atheism” is a contemporary movement that 
began mid-way through the previous decade with the publication of four books by 
four prominent atheists: The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason 
by American neuroscientist Sam Harris in 2004; Breaking the Spell: Religion as a 
Natural Phenomenon by American philosopher Daniel Dennet in 2006; The God 
Delusion by British biologist Richard Dawkins in 2006; and God Is Not Great: How 
Religion Poisons Everything by British journalist Christopher Hitchens in 2007.  After
the publication of these books, discussions about atheism became commonplace in 
popular media (e.g. - Berkowitz, 2007; Gottlieb, 2007).  Although the number of 
atheists had been growing in English-speaking countries for decades, it was not until 
the birth of the new atheist movement that a major atheist subculture began to emerge.
Atheist voices quickly moved from the sidelines to front and center on the public 
stage.  It was this shift in the greater culture that led to the relatively sudden interest in
atheism and nonreligion within academia.
At the same time that certain researchers within the field of the psychology of 
religion were building a body of research related to nonreligion, other researchers in 
the same field were building a different body of research – one that combined 
religious research with psychological type theory.  Originating in the work of Swiss 
psychologist Carl Jung (1875-1961), psychological type theory is a model of human 
personality that is based on the assumption that certain personality preferences are 
innate.  Over the last ten years, numerous empirical studies have focused on how 
differences in psychological type preferences may relate to differences in religious 
attitudes and behaviours.  As of 2015, there is now a sizeable body of research on 
psychological type theory and religion.  However, there has been no direct research on
psychological type theory and nonreligion.  It is thus the goal of the current project to 
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take two very recent streams of research within the field of the psychology of religion 
– the stream related to nonreligion and the stream related to psychological type theory
– and combine them for the first time in order to explore the interplay between 
psychological type and atheism.
According to the 2008 American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS), most
atheists in the United States were members of Christian churches as children and 
“deconverted” as adults (Kosmin & Keysar, 2009).  This leads to the question: Why 
do some individuals leave church and become atheists upon reaching adulthood 
whereas others stay and remain theists?  To date, explanations offered by conservative
Christians have included selfishness (Stroebel, 1998), arrogance (D’Souza, 2007), 
anger at God (Novotni & Petersen, 2001), and poor father-child relationships (Vitz, 
1999) while explanations from within academia have included low religious emphasis
during childhood (Hunsberger & Brown, 1984), deliberation in the pursuit of truth 
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1997), and higher intelligence (Nyborg, 2009).  However, 
until recently, very little attention has been paid to whether or not innate personality 
differences might play a role and no attention has been paid to whether or not 
psychological type in particular might play a role.
The primary research question for this project will therefore be: Which 
psychological types are over-represented among atheist church-leavers, as compared 
to those who continue to attend church, and what might this reveal about why certain 
individuals are more likely than others to give up their childhood religious beliefs and 
become atheists?  The answer to this question will contribute both to the growing 
body of research on the psychology of nonreligion as well as the growing body of 
research on how psychological type theory provides insight into religious differences.
In addition to testing the potential link between psychological type and 
atheism, the current project will also test existing theories related to the psychology of
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atheism in general.  The second research question will therefore be:  Is there evidence 
to support any of the other major theories about why certain individuals are more 
likely than others to give up their childhood religious beliefs and to become atheists?  
The seven theories that will be tested will be those of selfishness, arrogance, anger at 
God, poor father-child relationships, lower religious emphasis during childhood, 
deliberation in the pursuit of truth, and higher intelligence.
A third and final area of research will also be incorporated into the current 
project.  Since the psychology of nonreligion is such a new field, there is still some 
debate over terminology.  This project will therefore test to see whether or not the 
term “atheist” can be used interchangeably with other terms such as “humanist”, 
“freethinker”, and “skeptic” when it comes to what a person believes.  The third 
research question will thus be:  Do atheists share a common worldview or do the 
different terms used by atheists for self-description reflect major differences in 
worldview-level beliefs? 
This thesis will be divided into two sections.  The first section (chapters one 
through five) will be a literature review.  Chapter one will begin by reviewing the 
literature on what it means to be an atheist.  Various ways of understanding the term 
“atheist” will be explored as well as other related terms such as “agnostic”, 
“secularist”, “humanist”, “freethinker” and “skeptic”.  The chapter will conclude by 
providing a brief history of atheism as well as information on contemporary issues 
and statistics.  Chapter two will seek to understand what atheists believe by 
introducing the topic of worldview.  The concept of worldview will be explored from 
philosophical, religious, psychological, and interdisciplinary viewpoints and then the 
worldview-level beliefs of atheists will be surveyed.  Chapter three will focus on the 
seven existing theories on why certain individuals become atheists.  This will include 
four theories from  conservative Christian sources (selfishness, arrogance, anger at 
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God and poor father-child relationships) and three theories from academic sources 
(lower religious emphasis during childhood, deliberation in the pursuit of truth, and 
higher intelligence).  Chapter four will introduce the concept of psychological type 
and survey its history and applications.  It will also address criticisms of the theory 
and issues related to reliability and validity.  Chapter five, the final chapter in the 
literature review section, will review the numerous empirical studies that have used 
psychological type theory and other models of personality within the realm of 
religious research.
The second of the two sections will describe the new empirical study that was 
conducted in order to explore the three research questions.  Chapter six will describe 
the research methodology and provide information on the procedure, ethical 
considerations, measures, and participants.  Chapter seven will report the results 
related to psychological type.  Chapter eight will report the results related to the seven
theories discussed in chapter three, and finally, chapter nine will report the results 
related to worldview-level beliefs.  Finally, the Conclusion will summarize the key 
outcomes of the project and give suggestions for future research.
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1 WHAT IS AN ATHEIST?
The primary purpose of this research project is to explore the reasons why 
certain people who were raised in religious environments as children become atheists 
as adults, while others do not.  The first task will be to carefully outline what is meant 
by the word atheist and therefore, in chapter one, the definition of atheism and other 
related terms such agnosticism, secularism, humanism, freethought, and skepticism 
will be explored in depth.  A brief history of atheism, as well as information on 
contemporary issues and statistics, will also be provided.
1.1 Atheist terminology
1.1.1 Basic definition of atheism
Etymologically, the word atheism is derived from ancient Greek and is 
comprised of three parts: the prefix “a” which means “without”, the root “theos” 
which means “god”, and the suffix “ism” which means “belief in”.  Thus, atheism 
literally means “without a belief in a god.”  This is noticeably different from the 
common everyday understanding of the word as “the belief that God does not exist” 
and many atheist writers have been quick to point this out.  According to Dan Barker, 
co-president of the Freedom from Religion Foundation, “Basic atheism is not a belief.
It is the lack of belief. There is a difference between believing there is no god and not 
believing there is a god—both are atheistic, though popular usage has ignored the 
latter” (1992, p. 99).  Antony Flew, once one of Britain’s most prominent atheists, 
makes the same point in his widely-read essay “The Presumption of Atheism” where 
he writes:
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Whereas nowadays the usual meaning of “atheist” in English is “someone who
asserts there is no such being as God,” I want the word to be understood not 
positively but negatively. I want the originally Greek prefix “a” to be read in 
the same way in “atheist” as it customarily is read in such other Greco-English
words as “amoral,” “atypical,” and “asymmetrical.” In this interpretation an 
atheist becomes: not someone who positively asserts the non-existence of 
God; but someone who is simply not a theist (1984, p. 14).
Similar arguments are made by George H. Smith and Michael Martin in two of
the most important treatises on atheism in the late twentieth century.  In Atheism: The 
case against God, Smith (1974) writes, “Atheism, in its basic form, is not a belief: it 
is the absence of belief. An atheist is not primarily a person who believes that a god 
does not exist; rather, he does not believe in the existence of a god” (p. 7, emphasis in 
original).  Likewise, in Atheism: A philosophical justification, Martin (1990) writes:
If you look up “atheism” in a dictionary, you will probably find it defined as 
the belief that there is no God. Certainly, many people understand atheism this 
way. Yet many atheists do not, and this is not what the term means if one 
considers it from the point of view of its Greek roots. In Greek “a” means 
“without” or “not” and “theos” means “god.” From this standpoint an atheist 
would simply be someone without a belief in God, not necessarily someone 
who believes that God does not exist. According to its Greek roots, then, 
atheism is a negative view, characterized by the absence of belief in God (p. 
463).
There are two reasons why the more technical definition of atheism advocated 
above is important. First, it recognizes and includes many different types of atheists.  
As Smith (1974) writes:
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There are many reasons why one may not believe in the existence of a god: 
one may never have encountered the concept of god before, or one may 
consider the idea of a supernatural being to be absurd, or one may think that 
there is no evidence to support the belief in a god. But regardless of the 
reason, if one does not believe in the existence of a god, one is an atheist (p. 
8).
The second reason is that it does away with the possibility of any middle 
ground between theism and atheism.  Smith (1974) explains, “In this context, theism 
and atheism exhaust all alternatives with regard to belief in a god: one is either theist 
or an atheist; there is no other choice. One either accepts the proposition ‘god exists’ 
as true, or one does not... there is no third option or middle ground” (p. 8).  This 
second reason is particularly important when it comes to understanding agnosticism, 
which will be discussed in Section 1.1.4 below.
Thus, for the purposes of this paper, based on the etymological roots of the 
word atheism, and the arguments made by the writers quoted above, the basic 
definition of the term atheist will be taken as being, “one without a belief in a god.”  
This means that, at a basic level, atheism must not be understood as being a 
worldview.  On this point, Smith (1974) warns, “to view atheism as a way of life, 
whether beneficial or harmful, is false and misleading” (p. 21).  However, being that 
this basic definition is too broad for the specific research questions that will be 
addressed later, a more refined definition will be explored in the next two sections.  In
addition to this, in Chapter 2, it will be demonstrated that this more refined type of 
atheism, while not a worldview in its own right, is in fact strongly aligned with a 
particular set of worldview-level beliefs.
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1.1.2 Positive versus negative atheism
The terms positive and negative atheism were first introduced by Antony Flew 
in “The Presumption of Atheism” (1984, p. 14) and then reused in Michael Martin’s 
Atheism: A philosophical justification (1990, p. 464).  Flew (1984) introduced the 
terms in an effort to distingush between the commonplace definition of an atheist as 
being “one who believes that God does not exist” and the more technical definition of 
“one without a belief in God.”  He suggested that the former be called a “positive 
atheist” because such a person makes a positive assertion (by believing that God does 
not exist) and the latter be called a “negative atheist” because such a person is defined
instead by his or her lack of belief. 
According to this typology, all positive atheists would also be negative 
atheists. However, not all negative atheists would be positive atheists. Thus, as Martin
(1990) writes, “positive atheism is a special case of negative atheism” (p. 464).  Most 
individuals considered to be atheists under the commonplace definition of the word 
would fit under the umbrella of positive atheism.  However, negative atheism would 
include a much more diverse set of beliefs.  Those who have never heard of the 
concept of a god (including very young children), those who consider the concept to 
be absurd, as well as those who simply do not care to think about the question would 
all be considered negative atheists.  In addition to such individuals, most agnostics 
would also fit under the umbrella of negative atheism (see Section 1.1.4 below for a 
more detailed discussion of agnosticism).
Other terms have been used to divide atheists into similar categories.  These 
have included strong versus weak atheism, hard versus soft atheism, and theoretical 
versus pragmatic atheism.  All make the exact same distinction and each set of terms 
can be considered to be synonymous with positive versus negative atheism.
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Although the terms introduced by Flew (1984) and Martin (1990) are of 
benefit for distinguishing the common understanding of the word atheist from the 
more technical definition, they will not actually serve as useful concepts for the 
present project.  As already mentioned, defining atheists as including all those who 
would fit under the technical definition (i.e. all negative atheists) would be too broad. 
On the other hand, defining atheists as including only those who could be considered 
positive atheists would be too narrow.  Therefore, a different typology is required.  
For this, a slightly older set of terms will prove useful.
1.1.3 Implicit versus explicit atheism
Whereas the terms positive versus negative atheism focus on whether or not 
one’s position is based on a belief or a lack of belief, the terms “implicit” versus 
“explicit” atheism focus instead on whether or not one’s position is consciously held 
or unconsciously held.  They were first introduced in G. H. Smith’s Atheism: The case
against God (1974) where implicit atheism is defined as, “the absence of theistic 
belief without a conscious rejection of it” (p. 13) and explicit atheism as, “the absence
of theistic belief due to a conscious rejection of it” (p. 13).  It is clear from Smith’s 
use of the phrase, “the absence of theistic belief,” that both implicit and explicit 
atheism are viewed from the standpoint of negative atheism. 
Smith (1974) goes on to explain that, “an implicit atheist is a person who does 
not believe in a god but who has not explicitly rejected or denied the truth of theism” 
(p. 13-14).  Implicit atheism therefore includes those who have never heard the 
concept of a god (referred to by Zuckerman (2010) as “anthropological atheists”), 
children who are not yet old enough to grasp the concept, those with learning 
difficulties, those who are truly undecided on the issue, and those who simply do not 
care (sometimes referred to as apatheists, based on the word apathy).  On the other 
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hand, Smith writes that, “an explicit atheist is one who rejects belief in a god. This 
deliberate rejection of theism presupposes familiarity with theistic beliefs” (p. 17, 
emphasis in original). Hence, explicit atheism includes all positive atheists but it also 
includes many agnostics, particular those who have looked at the evidence for the 
existence of God and have made a conscious decision to reject belief in God even 
though they have not made a conscious decision to adopt positive atheism.  Thus, 
explicit atheism is a broader concept than positive atheism yet also narrower than 
negative atheism (see Figure 1 below).  
Because the present project focuses on individuals who grew up in theistic 
environments but then at some point made a deliberate decision to reject theism 
(whether from the standpoint of negative atheism or positive atheism), the term 
explicit atheist will serve as an ideal concept for the type of atheist this project will 
focus on. However, because explicit atheists use a variety of different labels to 
Figure 1: Types of atheists
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describe themselves beyond just “atheist”, it will be necessary to look at other related 
terms, the first and foremost of which is the term agnostic.
1.1.4 Agnosticism
In common use, the word agnostic is usually understood to mean a person who
is neither a theist nor an atheist.  In other words, an agnostic is someone who is either 
not sure whether or not God exists or someone who prefers not to commit to either 
side due to the fact that he or she feels that the question is unanswerable.  However, as
argued above, if atheism is understood in the more technical, “negative” sense, there 
can be no middle ground between theism and atheism.  If someone lacks a belief in 
God, he or she is by default an atheist.  Hence, all agnostics under the common 
understanding of the word would also be atheists.
In fact, the history of the term agnostic shows that the the word was never 
meant to be a statement of one’s position with regard to belief in God.  According to 
Smith (1974), the term was coined by Thomas Huxley in 1869 when, as a member of 
the British-based Metaphysical Society, he felt unable to describe himself using any 
existing term (pp. 8-9).  Twenty years later, he described for the first time in writing 
what he meant by the word:
Agnosticism, in fact, is not a creed, but a method, the essence of which lies in 
the rigorous application of a single principle... Positively the principle may be 
expressed: In matters of the intellect, follow your reason as far as it will take 
you, without regard to any other consideration. And negatively: In matters of 
the intellect, do not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not 
demonstrated or demonstrable (Huxley, 1889, online).
It is thus clear that in the original meaning of word, an agnostic is simply 
someone whose epistemology is based on science and reason rather than faith or 
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conjecture.  In this sense, it is synonymous with the terms “freethinker” (see Section 
1.2.4), “skeptic” (see Section 1.2.5), and “rationalist” (see Section 2.2.6) and need not
be used in contrast with the word atheist.
Etymologically, the word comes from ancient Greek and literally means “one 
without knowledge” (the prefix “a” meaning “without” and the root “gnosis” meaning
knowledge”).  This is important because knowledge is a slightly different concept 
than belief.  According to  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, belief is, “the 
attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as 
true” whereas knowledge is, “a species of belief—specifically, justified true belief” 
(Schwitzgebel, 2011, online).  Therefore, it is possible to believe (or not believe) in 
something, independent of whether or not one claims to have certain knowledge about
it.  This means that there are four possible ways to combine atheism and theism with 
agnosticism and its counterpart gnosticism (not to be confused with the ancient 
religion Gnosticism), as demonstrated in Figure 2 below. For example, it is actually 
possible to be both an agnostic and a theist. Such a person would believe in God but 
not claim that his or her belief was based on certain, demonstrable knowledge.
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Richard Dawkins makes a similar point about the distinction between 
knowledge and belief in The God Delusion but places the possible positions on the 
following scale of 1-7 instead:
1. Strong theist. 100 per cent probability of God. In the words of C.G. Jung: “I 
do not believe, I know.”
2. De facto theist. Very high probability but short of 100 per cent. “I don't know 
for certain, but I strongly believe in God and live my life on the assumption 
that he is there.”
3. Leaning towards theism. Higher than 50 per cent but not very high. “I am very
uncertain, but I am inclined to believe in God.”
4. Completely impartial. Exactly 50 per cent. “God's existence and non-existence
are exactly equiprobable.”
5. Leaning towards Agnosticism. Lower than 50 per cent but not very low. “I do 
not know whether God exists but I'm inclined to be skeptical.”
Figure 2: Belief versus knowledge with regard to the existence of
God.
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND ATHEISM 15
6. De facto atheist. Very low probability, but short of zero. “I don't know for 
certain but I think God is very improbable, and I live my life on the 
assumption that he is not there.”
7. Strong atheist. “I know there is no God, with the same conviction as Jung 
knows there is one.” (Dawkin, 2006, p. 50)
According to the above paradigm, only positions 1 and 7 could be considered 
gnostic with everything else being forms of agnosticism (2-3 being forms of agnostic 
theism, 5-6 being forms of agnostic atheism, and 4 being the truly non-committed 
position).
In the current project, based on the above discussion, agnostics will not be 
considered as inhabiting a middle ground between atheism and theism.  Rather, it will 
be understood that if an individual has made a deliberate choice not to be a theist, he 
or she is by default an explicit atheist.  Likewise, agnostics that still possess a belief in
God, regardless of how tenuous that belief might be, will be considered to be theists.
1.1.5 A brief note on the term “theism”
It has been established that an atheist is any individual who is not a theist and 
that an explicit atheist is anyone who deliberately rejects theism (regardless of 
whether he or she is a positive atheist or an agnostic).  Since the term atheism is 
inherently connected to its opposing term theism, it will be useful at this point to 
clarify what is meant by theism.  Generally speaking, theism is a belief in the 
existence of a god (singular) or gods (plural).  However, in a Western context, it is 
usually understood to mean the belief in God with a capital G, i.e. the personal, 
monotheistic God of the three Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) that
created the universe and continues to intervene in its affairs.  Since this project centers
on those who grew up in Christian churches, it will be assumed from this point 
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forward that any reference to theism will be a reference to the specific type of theism 
common in the West, namely Abrahamic monotheism.
1.2 Other terms related to atheism
There are many individuals who fit under the umbrella of explicit atheism but 
use neither the term atheist nor the term agnostic to describe themselves.  It is thus 
necessary to look at several more terms commonly used by explicit atheists in the 
current milieu.
1.2.1 Nonreligion
The term “nonreligious” is perhaps the most general term used by atheists and 
other individuals who do not associate themselves with religion and/or a belief in 
God.  Lois Lee, founding director of the Nonreligion and Secularity Research 
Network, has recently suggested that it be used as the overarching master concept for 
the emerging field of study focused on atheism, humanism, and other related areas 
(Lee, 2012).  Her argument is that it is a broader term than atheist, which is only 
useful in cultures where god-centered worldviews dominate, and that it carries a less 
negative connotation than the earlier term irreligious.  In Lee (2012), she defines non-
religion as, “anything which is primarily defined by a relationship of difference to 
religion” (p. 131, emphasis in original).  She contrasts this with the secular (see 
Section 1.2.2), which she defines as, “something for which religion is not the primary 
reference point” (p. 135).  
Although the term “nonreligious” is indeed useful as a master concept for the 
emerging field of Nonreligion Studies (under which the present study certainly falls), 
it does not actually serve as a useful term when it comes to describing the type of 
individual that the present study is focusing on.  Since the current project is centered 
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on those who grew up within the context of a god-centered worldview, the term 
atheist (and in particular explicit atheist) is, in this case, the better choice.
1.2.2 Secularism
The term “secularism” was coined by the prominent British atheist George 
Jacob Holyoake in the mid-nineteenth century (Holyoake, 1896/2011, ebook, 
Preface).  He defined it as, “a code of duty pertaining to this life, founded on 
considerations purely human, and intended mainly for those who find theology 
indefinite or inadequate, unreliable or unbelievable” (Holyoake, 1896/2011, ebook, 
ch. 7).  However, in the twenty-first century, it has come to represent the view that 
certain things—most importantly, the government—should be kept separate from the 
influence of religion (Grayling, 2007, p. 32).  The adjective “secular” has thus come 
to describe anything that is not connected to religion.  For example, a secular 
organization is understood to be any organization that is not directly controlled or 
operated by a religious body.  Likewise, the United States federal government is said 
to be secular in that it rests on the notion of church/state separation.
It is important to note that, under the current definition of the word “secular,” 
it is possible for religious individuals to be secularists and to support the idea of 
secularism.  It is for this reason that Lee (2012) advocates the use of the term 
“nonreligion” as the master concept when it comes to the study of atheism, 
humanism, and other related constructs, instead of the term secularism or “the 
secular”.  She suggests that scholars move away from an understanding of secularism 
that derides, excludes, or marginalizes religion and instead rally around an 
understanding that is based on the secular being anything for which religion is not the 
primary reference point (p. 136).
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Based on the above understanding, the term secular will not prove useful for 
the purpose of the present study.  The one exception to this will be the use of the term 
together with humanism, which will be discussed in the next section.
1.2.3 Humanism
The English term “humanism” has its roots in the Italian word umanista, 
which according to Mann (1996), “was used in fifteenth century Italian academic 
jargon, to describe a teacher or student of classical literature and the arts associated 
with it, including that of rhetoric” (p. 1).  Mann goes on to write that, “only in the 
nineteenth century, however, and probably for the first time in Germany in 1809, is 
the attribute transformed into a substantive: humanism, standing for the devotion to 
the literatures of ancient Greece and Rome, and the humane values that may be 
derived from them” (pp. 1-2). This original usage of the term is now referred to as 
Renaissance humanism and can be applied to anyone who, in the spirit of the 
Renaissance, believes in the importance of a broad-based, civic-minded education.
In the twenty-first century however, humanism has come to refer to a 
philosophy and movement that go beyond simply the revival of classical learning.  It 
now represents a complete worldview or lifestance and is usually associated with 
explicit atheism.  According to the American Humanist Association (2003), 
“humanism is a progressive philosophy of life that, without supernaturalism, affirms 
our ability and responsibility to lead ethical lives of personal fulfilment that aspire to 
the greater good of humanity” (online).  The worldview of humanism will be covered 
in greater detail in Chapter 2 but here, it will be useful to briefly trace the origins of 
the movement as well as its evolution towards the now dominant secular version.
Modern humanism has its roots in the Ethical Culture movement, which in 
turn can be traced to the founding of the New York Society for Ethical Culture by 
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Felix Adler in 1876.  Adler’s goal was to initiate a new movement through which 
individuals could express their religious convictions through humane actions rather 
than mere church or synagogue attendance (New York Society for Ethical Culture, 
n.d., online).  In the years to follow, similar “ethical societies” were formed in other 
American cities as well as in the United Kingdom.  In 1896, the Union of Ethical 
Societies, the predecessor body of the British Humanist Association, was formed in 
London by Simon Coit, a former aide to Adler.  Originally, these ethical societies 
often served as “church-like” organizations complete with a minister and weekly 
meetings.  However, as time passed, these church-like elements were eventually 
phased out in favour of a more secular organizational model.
This transition from religious humanism to secular humanism can also be seen 
in the various manifestos published by the American Humanist Association, which 
had its origins in 1927 as the Humanist Fellowship at the University of Chicago.  The 
original manifesto, now referred to as the Humanist Manifesto I, was published in 
1933 and its signatories included a rabbi and numerous ministers, most of whom were
Unitarians.  The term “religious humanism” is used throughout and it is clear that the 
intent of the document is to redefine religion rather than replace it.  For example, 
point seven of the manifesto reads, “Religion consists of those actions, purposes, and 
experiences which are humanly significant. Nothing human is alien to the religious. It 
includes labor, art, science, philosophy, love friendship, recreation—all that is in its 
degree expressive of intelligently satisfying human living. The distinction between the
sacred and the secular can no longer be maintained” (American Humanist 
Association, 1973a, online).  In contrast, the use of the adjective religious in front of 
humanism is dropped in the Humanist Manifesto II, published forty years later in 
1973.  The overall intent is also noticeably different, as evidence by the following 
paragraph: “Some humanists believe we should reinterpret traditional religions and 
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reinvest them with meanings appropriate to the current situation. Such redefinitions, 
however, often perpetuate old dependencies and escapisms; they easily become 
obscurantist, impeding the free use of the intellect. We need, instead, radically new 
human purposes and goals” (American Humanist Association, 1973b, online).  
Finally, it is worth noting that the current manifesto, the Humanist Manifesto III, 
published in 2003, does not include a single reference to religion and was signed 
primarily by nonreligious individuals.
Perhaps the most important figure when it comes to the secularization of the 
humanist movement is Paul Kurtz (1925-2012).  Referred to by many as the “father of
secular humanism,” he founded Prometheus Books (now the dominant atheist 
publishing house in the U.S.) in 1969, served as the editor of The Humanist (the 
flagship magazine of the American Humanist Association) from 1967-1978, and was 
one of the primary authors of the Humanist Manifesto II.  During his time with the 
American Humanist Association, he helped move the organization towards being 
more sharply critical of religion but eventually ended up establishing his own more 
explicitly non-religious humanist organization, the Council for Secular Humanism in 
1980 (Center for Inquiry, 2012, online).  From 1986-1994, he was also co-chair of the 
International Humanist and Ethical Union, an umbrella organization for humanist 
associations and ethical socieities from around the world.
When it comes to the current project, humanism is highly relevent, particularly
in its now dominant secular form.  Although not all atheists are comfortable with the 
label humanist and not all humanists are comfortable with the label atheist, the two 
groups share much in common and this will be explored in depth in Chapter 2.
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND ATHEISM 21
1.2.4 Freethought and rationalism
Before the term humanist became popular among those who oppose traditional
religion, the primary term used in English was “freethinker.”  Although it is still used 
today (for example, by the US-based Freedom From Religion Foundation), it is no 
longer the dominant term due to the popularity of other terms like humanist and 
skeptic (see next section) and the decreased stigma attached to using the word atheist. 
The terms “freethought” and “freethinking” came into common use at the beginning 
of the eighteenth century, following the 1713 publication of A discourse of 
freethinking, occasioned by the rise and growth of a sect called freethinkers by 
English philosopher Anthony Collins.  Whereas the term humanist focuses primarily 
on the foundation for one’s ethics, the term freethinker focuses instead on one’s 
epistemology.  Those who refer to themselves as freethinkers emphasize that beliefs 
should be formed based on science and reason as opposed to church authority and 
tradition.  According to the British philosopher Bertrand Russell:
What makes a freethinker is not his beliefs but the way in which he holds 
them.  If he holds them because his elders told him they were true when he 
was young, or if he holds them because if he did not he would be unhappy, his 
thought is not free; but if he holds them because, after careful thought he finds 
a balance of evidence in their favor, then his thought is free, however odd his 
conclusions may seem (1957, p. 3).
The period between the end of the U.S. Civil War and the beginning of World 
War I is often referred to by American historians as the golden age of freethought.  
According to Jacoby (2013), it was, “an era when immigration, industralization, and 
science, especially Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by means of natural 
selection, were challenging both religious orthodoxy and the supposedly simpler 
values of the nation’s rural Anglo-Saxon past” (p. 2).  According to Lundin (2007), 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND ATHEISM 22
the three defining voices of that age were orator Robert Ingersoll (nicknamed as “the 
Great Agnostic”), poet Walt Whitman, and author Mark Twain (p. 170).  All three men
were freethinkers and were critical of organized religion and literal interpretations of 
the bible.  
Another term related to freethinking is “rationalism.”  Although rationalism 
usually refers to philosophical rationalism (ie. the epistemological position that is held
in contrast to empiricism), it is also sometimes used as a synonym for freethinking.  
For example, one of the oldest freethought organizations in the U.K. goes by the name
the Rationalist Association (formerly the Rationalist Press Association).  The term is 
also used on many atheist websites together with the word freethinking to represent 
the idea of using science and reason to question religious dogma.
When it comes to the current project, it is expected that some atheists will 
choose to refer to themselves as freethinkers.  In this case, it will be necessary to 
collect additional information from such individuals about their position in terms of 
their belief or nonbelief in God.
1.2.5 Skepticism
Unlike the term “freethinker,” the label “skeptic” has only recently become 
popular among atheists.  Although not all skeptics are atheists, the three main skeptic 
organizations in the United States (the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry, the Skeptics 
Society, and the James Randi Educational Foundation) were all founded by atheists.  
Michael Shermer, founder of the Skeptics Society and one of the most well-known 
skeptics in the U.S., explains the term as follows:
Modern skepticism is embodied in the scientific method, that involves 
gathering data to formulate and test naturalistic explanations for natural 
phenomena. A claim becomes factual when it is confirmed to such an extent it 
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would be reasonable to offer temporary agreement. But all facts in science are 
provisional and subject to challenge, and therefore skepticism is a method 
leading to provisional conclusions. Some claims, such as water dowsing, ESP, 
and creationism, have been tested (and failed the tests) often enough that we 
can provisionally conclude that they are false. Other claims, such as hypnosis 
and chaos theory, have been tested but results are inconclusive so we must 
continue formulating and testing hypotheses and theories until we can reach a 
provisional conclusion. The key to skepticism is to continuously and 
vigorously apply the methods of science to navigate the treacherous straits 
between “know nothing” skepticism and “anything goes” credulity. (Shermer, 
1997, p. 16)
It is clear from the above description that modern skepticism is very similar to 
freethought in that it emphasizes the use of science and reason when it comes to the 
exploration of truth claims.  However, whereas freethinkers tend to focus on matters 
related to religious truth claims, skeptics usually focus on areas related to 
pseudoscience and the paranormal (e.g. - Bigfoot, ghosts, psychic powers, UFO’s, 
etc.)  It is also clear that modern skepticism is somewhat different from the 
philosophical skepticism rooted in ancient Greece.  The two main types of ancient 
Greek skepticism (Pyrrhonian skepticism and academic skeptism) were based on the 
idea, “nothing can be known, not even this” and tended to lead more often to the 
suspension of belief than to science-based conclusions.
When it comes to the current project, it is expected that some atheists will 
choose to refer to themselves as skeptics.  In this case, it will be necessary to collect 
additional information from such individuals about their position in terms of their 
belief or nonbelief in God.
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1.3 A brief history of atheism
In the previous section, some of the more recent developments in the history of
atheism were touched on while exploring the variety of terms used by atheists in the 
current milieu.  However, the history of atheism goes back much further than the 
popularization of terms such as humanism and freethought over the last two hundred 
years.  The next section will therefore look at the history of atheism in greater depth, 
starting with its roots in ancient history and even prehistory.
1.3.1 Atheism in the ancient world
Anthropologists generally agree that the contemporary study of tribal cultures, 
particularly those that still exist in near isolation, provides the best chance at 
understanding what human societies were like prior to the introduction of agriculture 
and permanent settlements.  One of the things that it is most often assumed about such
cultures is that they all share in common a belief in the supernatural.  While it is 
generally true that most tribal religions do possess some sort of belief in spirit entities,
souls or even a “Great Spirit”, there are exceptions.  In his much-acclaimed work The 
Story of Civilization, Will Durant writes about what he calls “primitive atheism”:
Certain Pygmy tribes of Africa had no observable cult or rites; they had no 
totem, no fetishes, and no gods; they buried their dead without ceremony, and 
seem to have paid no further attention to them; they lacked even 
superstitions... the Veddahs of Ceylon went no further than to admit the 
possibility of gods and immortal souls; but they offered no prayers or 
sacrifices. Asked about God they answered, as puzzled as the latest 
philosopher: “Is he on a rock? On a white-ant hill? On a tree? I never saw a 
god!” (1935/2011, ebook, ch. IV, sect. IV)
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In addition to these examples, Daniel Everett, a former missionary who spent 
many years with an Amazonian tribe known as the Pirahās, reported in Everett (2010) 
that that particular group had no concept of a supreme or creator god (p. 134) and that 
they had no interest in learning about Jesus once they found out that Everett had never
actually met him in the flesh (p. 266).  We therefore have examples from three 
different continents of tribal societies that could be labelled atheistic.  It is thus clear 
that atheism is by no means just a modern phenomenon.
When it comes to ancient civilizations, the two regions where atheist ideas 
first arose in opposition to the dominant theism of the day were Greece and India.  
Atheist thought in ancient Greece has its roots in the pre-Socratic philosophers, the 
first of whom was Thales of Miletus in the sixth century BCE.  Prior to the pre-
Socratics, the Greeks relied solely on their stories about the Olympian gods to explain
the world around them.  Western philosophy and science are said to have begun when 
Thales abandoned this traditional method and instead sought new ways of explaining 
natural phenomenon.  By the fifth century BCE, the sophist philosopher Protagoras 
felt bold enough to write, “Concerning the gods I am unable to discover whether they 
exist or not, or what they are like in form.”  This statement later led to the public 
burning of his books (Bremmer, 2007, p. 12-13).  Around the same time, Anaxagoras, 
who is usually credited with bringing philosophy to Athens, espoused the 
controversial idea that the sun was a “red-hot mass of metal” and the playrights 
Euripedes, Critias and Aristophanes began to toy with atheist ideas in their plays.  
However, it is Diagoras of Melos that most scholars label “the first atheist” (Van der 
Horst, 2006, p. 248).  According to Hecht (2004), “he revealed the secret rituals of the
Eleusian mystery religion to everyone and ‘thus made them ordinary,’ that is, he 
purposefully demystified a cherished secret rite, apparently to provoke his 
contemporaries into thought” (ebook, ch. 1). The result: he was indicted for profanity 
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and had to flee the city for his life.  But by then, the new ideas were taking hold.  
Among intellectuals, the Olympian gods faded into the background and the everyday 
world was understood in increasingly naturalist ways.  By the time the Atomist School
began to take hold, led by Democritus (460-370 BCE), several branches of philosophy 
were looking increasingly more like science.
Politically though, denying the gods in public was still a major taboo.  The 
most famous example of this is the trial of Athens’ greatest philosopher, Socrates, who
was sentenced to drink hemlock for corrupting youth and refusing to recognize the 
state-sponsored gods.  It was because of that trial that the word atheos (atheist) 
entered into the Greek language for the first time (Bremmer, 2007, p. 19).  According 
to Hecht (2004), “Socrates was indicted for atheism, but the wording of the 
indictment suggests that even his accusers did not think him particularly atheistic, just
disruptive and antitraditionalist” (ebook, ch. 1).  Hecht goes on to explain why the 
label “atheist” was used in his case:
Socrates challenged every last conception of life as he knew it, even the idea 
of having a conception of it. Piety, materialism, hunger for power, and 
competition were particular targets because of how they distracted people 
from reality. One must devote oneself to figuring out that one must live for the
good, for its own sake. It was a secular morality. Contemporaries did not know
what to call a thing like that – he questioned their every faith, their every way 
of life – so they called it atheism” (p. 12).
From that point on, the term atheist became an increasingly derogatory one.  
According to Bremmer (2007), by the beginning of the common era, “atheism had 
mainly become a label to be used against philosophical opponents but not to be taken 
too seriously” (p. 20).  In fact, in the early days of Christianity, the Christians were 
labelled atheists by the Romans and the Romans were labelled atheists by the 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND ATHEISM 27
Christians (p. 21). But as Christianity grew in scope and influence, atheism all but 
disappeared in the West, even as a minority view, until the eighteenth century.
In the ancient world, atheist views also developed in India.  Around the same 
time that Diagoras was getting people to question the existence of the gods in Greece, 
the Samkhya school of thought was starting to develop into a distinct philosophy in 
South Asia.  Today, Samkhya is considered to be one of the six orthodox schools of 
Hinduism.  But unlike the other orthodox schools, one of its main tenants is the denial
of god (Larson, 1998) and it is therefore seen as being a blatantly atheistic form of 
Hinduism.  Scholars sometimes also speak of Mimamsa, another one of the six 
orthodox schools, as being atheistic.  However, Mimamsa  is perhaps better classified 
as being agnostic in that it simply focuses on interpreting the Hindu scriptures, rather 
than on addressing questions relating to the existence of gods, which it believes are 
impossible to answer. 
Several other religious movements that developed in Ancient India are 
considered either atheistic, or at least nontheistic.  These include Jainism, Buddhism, 
and Carvaka, all three of which are considered by Hindus to be non-orthodox schools 
of philosophy.  In Jainism, the universe is eternal and there are no gods, although all 
living things are believed to posssess a non-physical soul.  In Buddhism, questions 
related to the existence of gods are simply viewed as being unanswerable and 
therefore unimportant (like in Mimamsa) but there is still an emphasis on 
reincarnation and escaping its cycle.  In Carvaka, there are no gods, no supernatural 
forces, no soul, no reincarnation, no afterlife, and no karma.  It is a completely 
materialist philosophy and thus the most atheistic of the three.  All of these 
movements have histories that go back at least 2000 years and therefore it is clear that
atheist thought in India has deep roots in ancient times.
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1.3.2 Atheism in the modern world
Although the Greeks planted the seeds of atheist thought in the West in the 
fifth century BCE, atheism all but disappeared in Europe during the Middle Ages due 
to the increasing dominance of Christianity.  In the Near East, there were a few 
Muslim philosophers, such as Ibn al-Rawandi (827-911), whose criticism and 
skepticism of religion were considered atheistic by his contemporaries but even in 
such cases, it never amounted to any kind of movement or major stream of thought.  It
was not until the eighteenth century Enlightenment in Europe that atheism started to 
become relatively common in intellectual circles and this was most certainly due to 
the shift towards modernity that occurred in the previous two centuries.
According to Hyman (2007), atheism and modernity are “inextricably linked” 
(p. 28), with atheism being an inescapable “feature or symptom” of modernity (p. 27).
Therefore, one must start with the father of modern philosophy, Rene Descartes 
(1596-1650), in order to  understand the roots of modern atheism.  Prior to Descartes, 
Western philosophy was dominated by the Scholasticism of St Thomas Aquinas 
(1225-1274) which emphasized the importance of divine revelation, as understood by 
church tradition, as the foundation for truth.  But with the Protestant Reformation 
questioning the validity of church tradition, there was a need for new epistemological 
foundations that could be used by Protestants and Catholics alike (Hyman, 2007, p. 
34). Descartes sought to establish these new foundations by questioning everything, 
even his own existence, and then starting from scratch using rational arguments alone.
It was from this motivation that he developed his famous proposition cogito ergo sum 
(“I think therefore I am”).  Although this statement was indeed an important one in 
that it offered a way to escape absolute skepticism, it was his use of logic and reason 
to get there that was most revolutionary.  As Hymen (2010) writes, “For all its gloss of
theological orthodoxy, Descartes’s method was marked, above all else, by its quest for
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certainty on the basis of reason” (p. 19).  This, in essence, is the defining aspect of 
modernity, which Hyman (2007) summarizes as the “desire for an all-encompassing 
mastery of reality by rational and/or scientific means” (p. 28).  Without knowing it, 
Descartes had opened the door to new ways of understanding God and the world.  He 
had shifted the starting point for all inquiry from God to the human ability to reason.
Although Descartes held on to a traditional concept of God at the same time as
his modern epistemology, other seventeenth century philosophers did not.  According 
to Hecht (2004), “the two great figures of atheism in the seventeenth century were 
Spinoza and Hobbes – although neither ever described himself as an atheist” (ebook, 
ch. 8).  Due to their unconventional views, both were labelled atheists by their peers.  
On the one hand, Spinoza was what we would call today a pantheist.  He believed 
that, “God and everything were the same. God’s thought did not make the world, God 
is his thought, and the God-thought is the world... God did not have purposes. Nature 
was self-causing and unfolded according to necessary law. There were no miracles” 
(Hecht, ebook, ch. 8, italics in original).  On the other hand, Hobbes was a strict 
materialist.  According to Hecht, “the truth about religion, as Hobbes explained it, is 
that it had been formed and sustained by people in power, to control their subjects... 
he argued against religion, and against any conception of God beyond the simplest 
statement that God exist, and many were unconvinced that he meant that” (ebook, ch. 
8).  
In the eighteenth century, we find the first self-described atheist philosopher, 
Denis Diderot (1713-1784), who was one of the chief editors of the French 
Encyclopédie.  By the time of Diderot, the Enlightenment was at its height and 
intellectuals throughout Europe were emphasizing science and reason over church 
tradition and biblical inerrancy.  Many contemporaries of Diderot, such as Voltaire 
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in France and the founding fathers Benjamin Franklin, 
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Thomas Paine, and Thomas Jefferson in America, were deists and were content to 
simply relegate God to the position of a passive Creator.  But Diderot went one step 
further.  His strict rationalism left no room for God at all.  According to Hymen 
(2010), Diderot:
reached his conclusions by further intensifying the insights of Descartes and 
[Sir Isaac] Newton – the very thinkers upon whom Christians depended as 
modern defenders of the faith. Descartes was thought to provide a defence of 
theism using the weapons of modern philosophy, while Newton was thought to
do so using those of modern science. Diderot’s contribution in this respect was
to show how clearly these weapons could turn out to be double-edged swords 
(p. 7).
In Diderot’s view, Descartes and Newton had the correct methodology but abandoned 
it whenever they turned from worldy matters toward theological matters.  In contrast, 
Diderot scrutinized God in the same way that he would anything else and was 
eventually unable to believe in God at all.
The Scotsman David Hume (1711-1776) was another important figure in 
eighteenth century atheism, although like Hobbes and Spinoza, he never used the term
to describe himself.  More of an agnostic, Hume fleshed out what an epistemology 
based on pure empiricism really looked like.  According to Hymen (2010), “he saw 
that if empiricism were adopted consistently, this would mean reasoning ‘merely from
the known phenomena, and [dropping] every arbitrary supposition or conjecture’. The
result was that one could have knowledge of nothing that was not derived from sense 
experience” (p. 32).  Because one could not obtain knowledge about God through the 
five senses, Hume felt that it was thus impossible to have any knowledge about God 
at all.  This was later addressed by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who famously 
differentiated between how a thing appears to us through our senses and the 
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inaccessible ding an sich (“thing in itself”) that can still be postulated through reason. 
Kant felt that the existence of God was one of those things that could not be 
postulated through empiricism but could still be postulated through reason.  Thus, the 
influence of Hume’s agnosticism on eighteenth century philosophy was somewhat 
curbed and it would be many more decades before atheistic views took stronger root 
within Western philosophy.
The nineteenth century saw atheism move from simply being a minority 
philosophical position to having a more practical influence on the world stage.  
Inspired by atheist philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach’s (1804-1872) idea that religion 
teaches us more about humans than it does about God, Karl Marx (1818-1883) 
famously penned The Communist Manifesto in 1848 and set the stage for the world’s 
first atheistic form of government.  Shortly thereafter, in 1859, the agnostic Charles 
Darwin (1809-1882) published his On the Origin of Species, which had a profound 
effect on humanity’s understanding of itself.  By the end of the  century, Sigmund 
Freud (1856-1939) was applying his atheistic views to psychology and Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1844-1900) had made his famous declaration, “God is dead.”  Whether or 
not Nietzsche actually felt that God did not exist was not the point.  The point was 
that, by the end of the nineteenth century, God no longer seemed relevant.
Of course, when it came to the beliefs of everyday folk, God was certainly still
relevant at the beginning of the twentieth century, as is still the case today.  However, 
when it came to philosophical and scientific circles, atheism indeed went from being a
minority position to being the majority position somewhere around the turn of the 
century.  Throughout the 1900’s, the analytic philosophy of Bertrand Russell (1872-
1970) dominated in English-speaking countries while the atheistic existentialism of 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) dominated in mainland Europe.  On top of this, a 1914 
study by James Leuba showed that about 60% of scientists in America had no belief 
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in God – a figure that remained steady throughout the twentieth century (Larson & 
Witham, 1997).  But perhaps the most famous American atheist of the twentieth 
century was neither a philosopher, nor a scientist.  Madalyn Murray O'Hair (1919-
1995) rose to prominence in the public sphere due to her role in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1963 decision to no longer allow school-sponsored Bible reading in public 
schools.  That same year she founded the organization American Atheists, which she 
led until her death.  Her role in championing the rights of nonbelievers and in 
encouraging atheists to band together in more structured ways set the stage for the 
new atheist movement of today.
1.3.3 Contemporary issues: New atheism and the brights movement
Starting in late 2006, atheism entered the public spotlight in an unprecedented 
way due the success of four books by four prominent atheists: The End of Faith: 
Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (2004), by American neuroscientist Sam 
Harris; Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (2006), by American 
philosopher Daniel Dennet; The God Delusion (2006), by British biologist Richard 
Dawkin; and God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (2007), by British 
journalist Christopher Hitchens.  Dawkin’s book was the most successful, selling over
2 million copies in English (richarddawkins.net).  In November of 2006, the American
magazine Wired ran a cover story by Gary Wolf using the phrase “the new atheism” 
and almost immediately, the terms “new atheist” and “new atheism” became 
buzzwords in the popular media.  By 2007, Harris, Dennett, Dawkins, and Hitchens 
were widely referred to as the primary voices of  twenty-first century atheism and had
earned the nickname “the four horsemen of the new atheism.”
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What is new about the new atheism is not the notion of atheism itself or the 
various ideas connected to it but rather the way in which it is communicated to the 
general public.  As Amarasingam (2010) explains:
although much of the new content of the new atheism may have past 
precedents, what is original is the new-found urgency in the message of 
atheism, as well as a kind of atheist social revival that their writings, lectures, 
and conferences have produced. In other words, the “new” atheism is not 
entirely about new ideas, but takes the form of a kind of evangelical revival 
and a repackaging of old ideas (p. 574, emphasis in original).
Three contemporary events played a role in causing the fervor of the new 
atheism.  According to Geertz and Markusson (2010), the most important of these 
events was the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and 
Washington, D.C.  Many atheist writers were quick to point out the role that religious 
belief played in the attacks and to use the tragedy as a warning for how dangerous 
such beliefs can be.  Second, it is important to recall the increasing influence that the 
Christian right had on American politics during the presidency of George W. Bush.  
Finally, the mid-2000s was a time when Internet use was exploding and new media 
such as blogs, podcasts, and social networking sites were in their infancy.  According 
to Cimino and Smith (2011), “in this context, the formation of an ‘atheist 
consciousness’ can be seen as a consequence of atheists’ heightened awareness of the 
increasing distance between their strongly held views and the views of the ‘majority,’ 
which is a product of diminishing distance due to increased access to the same 
experiential sphere” (p. 33).
Around the same time as the term “new atheism” entered popular usage, some 
atheists suggested that the word “bright” might be a good umbrella term for atheists, 
agnostics, humanists and others who do not hold a belief in the supernatural.  The 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND ATHEISM 34
idea, championed by both Dawkins and Dennett, was to start a movement similar to 
the gay rights movement and to use the term “bright” to replace “atheist” in the same 
way that the term “gay” replaced “homosexual” (Linneman & Clendenen, 2010, 
p.104).  However, the term has yet to catch on for two reasons.  Firstly, many theists 
find it insulting (e.g. - D’Souza, 2003): if atheists think they are “bright,” it follows 
that they must also think that theists are “dim.”  Secondly, whereas the word “gay” 
was already associated with homosexuality before becoming a politicized term in the 
1970’s, the word “bright” had no previous association with atheism (Linneman & 
Clendenen, 2010, p.105).  
Although the term “bright” did not end up catching on in the same way that 
the term gay did, what has caught on is the idea of “coming out” as atheist.  In the 
U.S. in particular, atheism still carries a major stigma, as evidenced by a study by 
Edgell, Gerteis and Hartmann (2006) which found that atheists ranked highest among 
minority groups that Americans found most suspicious.  The result of this stigma is 
that many atheists remain “closeted,” reluctant to tell others about their lack of belief. 
Starting in 2007, Richard Dawkins’ “Out Campaign” (www.outcampaign.org) has 
encouraged atheists to “come out” by openly talking to friends and family members 
about their atheism without feeling intimidated.
What will come next in the history of atheism is uncertain.  While many 
atheists are predicting (or at least hoping for) the eventual end of religion, some 
theists (e.g. - McGrath, 2006) are instead predicting the end of atheism, arguing that 
its recent surge in popularity is merely the “last hurrah” before its demise.  Hyman 
(2007) suggests that neither may be the case.  He writes:
There are some who argue that the eclipse of modernity means the eclipse of 
both modern theism and modern atheism... the way forward, they suggest, is 
not so much a return to premodern theism but, rather, to make innovative 
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attempts to think beyond or between theism and atheism... the future, it seems,
is open; perhaps more open than has been the case for some time (p. 44).
1.3.4 Contemporary statistics on atheism
It is difficult to obtain reliable statistics related to belief and nonbelief in God.  
As Zuckerman (2007) explains:
In totalitarian countries where atheism is governmentally promulgated and 
risks are present for citizens viewed as disloyal, individuals will be reluctant to
admit that they do believe in God. Conversely, in societies where religion is 
enforced by the government and risks are present for citizens viewed as 
unbelievers, individuals will be reluctant to admit that they don’t believe in 
Allah, regardless of whether anonymity is “guaranteed.” Even in democratic 
societies without government coercion, individuals often feel that it is 
necessary to say that they are religious, simply because such a response is 
socially desirable or culturally appropriate (p. 47).
Also complicating things is the fact, already discussed in this chapter, that there are a 
variety of terms that can be used by nonbelievers to describe themselves.  In surveys, 
freethinkers and humanists cannot necessarily be combined with atheists unless 
specific questions relating to belief in God are also asked.  Even more difficult are 
those who simply describe themselves as “nonreligious.”  Such people, often referred 
to as “nones” in religious indentification surveys, could be atheists but they also could
be theists who do not regularly attend a place of worship.  In citing statistics on 
atheism, it is thus important to focus only on surveys in which the word “atheist” is 
actually used or surveys in which there is a direct question relating to belief or 
nonbelief in God.
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Table 1, based on numerous studies cited in Zuckerman (2007), lists the 
percentage of atheists in a select number of countries.  Since different studies often 
produce different results, both the lowest reported figure as well as the highest 
reported figure have been included.
Table 1: Percentage of atheists by country
Country: Lowest reported figure:
%
Highest reported figure:
%
Japan
Sweden
France
Germany
64
46
43
41
65
85
54
49
Netherlands
United Kingdom
South Korea
Russia
39
31
30
24
44
44
52
48
Australia
New Zealand
Canada
Argentina
24
20
19
4
25
22
30
4
USA
Mexico
Brazil
Most of Africa & the Middle East
3
2
< 1
< 1
9
7
< 1
< 1
According to the above figures, the rates for atheism are quite high (ranging 
from 1/3 to 2/3 of the population) in Western Europe and in the more developed 
countries of East Asia, like Japan and South Korea.  In the British Commonwealth 
countries of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, the rates are lower but atheists still 
make up a sizeable minority (around 20-30%).  Conversely, atheism seems to be 
virtually non-existent in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, representing less 
than 1% of the population in those regions.  There were no reliable statistics available 
for China.
What is most noteable from the above statistics is the corelation between 
overall development and higher rates of atheism.  As Zuckerman (2007) writes, 
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“nations marked by high levels of organic atheism – such as Sweden or the 
Netherlands – are among the healthiest, wealthiest, best educated, and freest societies 
on earth” (p. 57).  However, he is also quick to point out that, “none of the above 
correlations demonstrate that high levels of organic atheism cause societal health... 
rather, societal health seems to cause widespread atheism” (p. 59, emphasis in 
original).  The one country that does not follow this pattern is the United States.  
Whereas the percentage of atheists in every other highly developed country is no less 
than 19% (with most Western countries having a much higher percentage than that), 
the percentage of atheists in the United States is below 10%, and perhaps even as low 
as 3%.  Norris and Inglehart (2004) argue that this may be due to the fact that the 
United States is, “one of the most unequal postindustrial societies” and as a result, 
many Americans face uncertainties such as the risk of unemployment, a lack of 
medical insurance, and a higher likelihood of being victims of crime (p. 108).
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the definition and history of atheism and other related concepts.
It was determined that, for the current project, the most appropriate categorization for 
those who were raised attending church but do not believe in God as adults is 
“explicit atheist.”  An explicit atheist was defined as, “anyone who lacks a belief in 
God due to a conscious rejection of that belief.”  By focusing on this 
conceptualization rather than on any one given term, both those who hold the 
“positive” position “God does not exist” as well as those who simply lack belief due 
to a deliberate agnosticism can be included in the same category.  It also allows 
individuals who self-describe using a variety of other terms (such as freethinker, 
humanist, skeptic, etc.) to be categorized together with atheists and agnostics based on
what they all share in common: a conscious rejection of belief in God.  The next 
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chapter will explore the belief system of explicit atheism in greater detail by 
introducing the concept of worldview.
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2 WHAT DO ATHEISTS BELIEVE?
Chapter one outlined the various terms related to atheism and provided a brief 
history of non-belief.  Chapter two will turn its attention to the concept of worldview 
in an effort to outline in greater detail what atheists believe.  Although it is important 
to note that atheism itself is not a worldview (see section 1.1.1), it will be argued that 
explicit atheists (hereafter  referred to simply as atheists) often share much in 
common with each other when it comes to their worldview-level beliefs.  Thus, it is 
not inaccurate to speak of an atheist worldview, so long as the phrase is understood to 
mean the worldview-level beliefs held by most atheists, rather than the worldview 
known as atheism.  This is important because atheists often use a variety of terms to 
describe themselves (such as humanist, freethinker, skeptic, etc.) but in the current 
project, will be viewed as a single group in order to compare them to religious 
individuals.
In this chapter, the concept of worldview will be explored from four different 
perspectives—philosophical, religious, psychological, and interdisciplinary—with the
interdisciplinary perspective selected as the paradigm from which the present project 
will operate.  This perspective will then be used to analyze the worldview-level 
beliefs held by atheists and demonstrate that the atheist worldview tends to be 
strongly aligned with the worldview of secular humanism.
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2.1 What is a worldview?
2.1.1 A view from philosophy
The term “worldview” comes from the German Weltanschauung, itself a 
portmanteau of the words Welt (world) and Anschauung (outlook or view).  According
to Naugle (2002), it was first used by Immanuel Kant in his 1790 work Critique of 
Judgement but only in passing and never as a fully-developed concept (p. 58).  
Instead, the first person to popularize the term and to develop a comprehensive theory
of worldviews was the nineteenth century German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey 
(Holmes, 1983; Hodges, 1998; Naugle, 2002).  In addition to his work on worldviews,
Dilthey is also known for highlighting the distinction between the natural sciences 
(physics, chemistry, etc.) and the “human” sciences (history, law, etc.) and for making 
significant contributions to the study of hermeneutics.
Dilthey's theory of worldviews is based on his understanding of the nature of 
the human psyche.  He saw three main types of “mental acts” or “attitudes” appearing 
in human consciousness: cognitive, affective, and volitional (Hodges, 1998, p. 37).  
These can also be labelled thinking, feeling, and willing – or reason, emotion, and will
– and were the three human faculties emphasized by eighteenth century psychology 
(Holmes, 1983).  According to Hodges (1998), Dilthey also saw a worldview as 
having three main components, corresponding to the three mental acts: “The first is a 
belief about the nature and contents of the world of facts; the second, built on this 
foundation, is a system of likes and dislikes, expressed in value-judgments; and the 
third, resulting from the two preceding it, is a system of desires and aversions, ends, 
duties, practical rules and principles” (p. 92).  In other words, according to Dilthey, a 
worldview includes an ontological component (based on reason), an axiological 
component (based on emotion), and a praxeological component (based on will).  
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Makkreel (1992) explains it this way: “a Weltanschauung (world-view), as Dilthey 
conceived it, is an overall perspective of life which encompasses the way a person 
perceives the world, evaluates and responds to it” (p. 346, emphasis added).
Not only did Dilthey use the idea of three primary mental acts to break down 
the definition of worldview into three main components, he also used them to develop
a theory of worldview types.  He felt that in each individual, one of the three attitudes 
(cognitive, affective, or volitional) tends to dominate and that this gives rise to one’s 
worldview “type.” Hodges (1998) writes, “The three basic attitudes can never reach a 
perfect balance in any mind... one must prevail and colour the Weltanschauung 
accordingly.  This gives rise to three main types of outlook, which Dilthey calls 
naturalism, objective idealism, and the idealism of freedom” (p. 99).  Thus, there are 
three main components of a worldview (ontological, axiological, and praxeological), 
as well as three main worldview types (naturalism, objective idealism, and the 
idealism of freedom).  The connections between the three mental acts, the three 
worldview components, and the three worldview types are summarized in Table 2 
below.
Table 2: Wilhelm Dilthey’s theory of worldview
Mental act or 
attitude:
Cognitive
(thinking/reason)
Affective
(feeling/emotion)
Volitional
(willing/will)
Worldview 
component:
Ontological - a belief about
the nature and contents of 
the world of facts (ie. how 
one perceives the world)
Axiological - likes and 
dislikes expressed in value-
judgements (ie. how one 
evaluates the world)
Praxeological - a system of 
desires and aversions, ends,
duties, practical rules and 
principles (ie. how one 
responds to the world)
Worldview 
type:
Naturalism Objective idealism Idealism of freedom
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The naturalist type of worldview corresponds to the cognitive mental act and 
focuses on how humans are similar to the rest of nature.  It rejects the other-
worldliness of religion and sees the physical, material world, as experienced through 
sense perception, as being the prime (or only) reality.  According to Hodges (1998), it 
is associated with Democritus, Protagoras, Epicurus, Hume, and Comte (p. 88).  On 
the other hand, objective idealism corresponds to the affective side of human 
experience and sees reality as a living, divine whole—much more organic than 
mechanical. It focuses more on one’s inner experience of the world and is associated 
with Hinduism, Spinoza and Hegel (Hodges, 1998, p. 89).  Finally, the idealism of 
freedom corresponds to volition and emphasizes humanity’s experience of free will 
and a morality which is not based on physical causation.  It is the worldview of 
theistic religions such as Christianity but can also be found in the philosophies of 
Plato and Aristotle (Hodges, 1998, p. 88).  
Over the years, other philosophers have come up with their own worldview 
definitions and typologies (e.g. - Pepper, 1970; Centore, 1979; Gellner, 1992).  
However, none have strayed far from Dilthey’s original theory. Thus, Dilthey’s 
definition based on three main components as well as his three main worldview types 
remain one of the simplest and most useful conceptualizations of worldview to this 
day.
2.1.2 A view from religion
In recent decades, several conservative Christian writers have utilized the 
worldview concept as a way to defend Christianity against other competing ideologies
(Brown & Phillips, 1996; Cosgrove, 2006; Geisler & Watkins, 1989; Nash, 1992; 
Noebel, 1994; Walsh & Middleton, 1984).  Most popular among these religious 
writers is James Sire, author of The Universe Next Door.  He defines a worldview as, 
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“a commitment, a fundamental orientation of the heart, that can be expressed as a 
story or in a set of presuppositions (assumptions which may be true, partially true or 
entirely false) which we hold (consciously or subconsciously, consistently or 
inconsistently) about the basic constitution of reality, and that provides the foundation
on which we live and move and have our being” (Sire, 2004, p. 17).  He goes on to 
frame the basic elements of a worldview in the form of seven questions (p. 20-21):
1. What is prime reality – the really real?
2. What is the nature of external reality, that is the world around us?
3. What is a human being?
4. What happens to a person at death?
5. Why is it possible to know anything at all?
6. How do we know what is right and wrong?
7. What is the meaning of human history?
Sire’s definition, as well as his questions, share much in common with 
Dilthey’s original conceptualization.  His “presuppositions about the basic 
constitution of reality” (upon which questions 1-4 are based) match Dilthey’s 
cognitive domain in that they are primarily concerned with ontological issues. The 
affective domain, with its concern for value-judgements, is covered by question six 
and the volitional domain, with its concern for practical ends, is covered by question 
seven.  The one question in Sire’s list that does not come up directly in Dilthey’s 
conceptualization is question five: Why is it possible to know anything at all?  This 
question deals with epistemology, a possible fourth component of a worldview.
In terms of a worldview typology, Sire offers a list that is much longer than 
Dilthey’s.   Sire (2004) discusses eight worldviews: Christian theism, deism, 
naturalism, nihilism, existentialism, eastern pantheism, new age, and postmodernism. 
Other Christian writers offer typologies ranging from two to seven worldviews.  
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Interestingly though, all of these various lists can be easily re-categorized according 
to Dilthey’s original three worldview types.  For example, Sire’s naturalism, deism, 
nihilism, and existentialism are all varieties of Dilthey’s naturalist type.  Sire’s eastern
pantheism and new age are both varieties of Dilthey’s objective idealism, and Sire’s 
Christian theism is a variety of Dilthey’s idealism of freedom.  The only one of Sire’s 
worldviews that doesn’t fit within Dilthey’s original framework is postmodernism.
Regardless of what one thinks of Sire’s claim that his particular worldview (ie.
Christian theism) is superior to all others, it is clear that his conceptualization and 
typology of worldview has strong philosophical roots and has not strayed far from 
Dilthey.  Most important however, is the fact that he includes epistemology as an 
additional component of a worldview, a component that is also included in the 
psychological and interdisciplinary perspectives considered below.
2.1.3 A view from psychology
The worldview concept has been discussed within the realm of psychology, 
going back at least as far as Sigmund Freud.  In his lecture “ The Question of a 
Weltanschauung”, Freud defines a worldview as, “an intellectual construction which 
gives a unified solution of all the problems of our existence in virtue of a 
comprehensive hypothesis, a construction, therefore, in which no question is left open
and in which everything in which we are interested finds a place” (Freud, 1933/1990).
He goes on to mention four worldviews — science, religion, art, and philosophy (and 
later, a fifth: Marxism) — but does not delineate the components of each.  Rather, 
most of the lecture is based on defending his view that the scientific worldview (upon 
which he claims psycho-analysis is based) is superior to both the religious and 
Marxist worldviews.
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A more comprehensive as well as more recent theory of worldview from a 
psychological perspective has been developed by Mark Koltko-Rivera.  In his far-
reaching summary of the worldview concept, Koltko-Rivera (2004) reviews eleven 
different worldview theories and then uses them to develop forty-two possible 
dimensions related to the concept.  Although his end result is likely too complex a 
conceptualization for the purposes of the present project, he also offers a very detailed
definition of the term “worldview” that, like Sire’s, does not stray far from Dilthey’s 
original: “A given worldview is a set of beliefs that includes limiting statements and 
assumptions regarding what exists and what does not (either in actuality, or in 
principle), what objects or experiences are good or bad, and what objectives, 
behaviors, and relationships are desirable or undesirable. A worldview defines what 
can be known or done in the world, and how it can be known or done” (p. 3).  Once 
again we have a cognitive component based on ontology (“what exists and what does 
not”), an affective component based on axiology (“what objects or experiences are 
good or bad”), and a volitional component based on praxeology (“what objectives, 
behaviors, and relationships are desirable or undesirable”).  However, like Sire, 
Koltko-Rivera adds a fourth component based on epistemology: “what can be known 
or done in the world, and how it can be known or done”.
Although Koltko-Rivera does not offer a typology of worldview like Dilthey 
and Sire do, the fact that he breaks down the concept of worldview into similar 
components is significant.  Taken together, the views discussed here from three 
separate fields — philosophy, religion, and psychology — offer a definition of 
worldview that can be broken down into four major components:  ontology, axiology, 
praxeology, and epistemology.  A final, interdisciplinary perspective builds on these 
four components even further and offers one of the most clear and concise 
conceptualizations of worldview to date.
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2.1.4 An interdisciplinary view
The Centre Leo Apostel for Interdisciplinary Studies (CLEA) is located at the 
Free University of Brussels and is named after the Belgian philosopher Leo Apostel.  
Unlike Dilthey, who highlighted the distinction between the natural sciences and the 
humanities, Apostel was known for his attempts to bring the two back together again. 
One of the primary objectives of CLEA is to build upon the work of Apostel by 
studying worldviews.  According to CLEA’s manifesto (Aerts, Apostel, De Moor, 
Hellemans, Maex, Van Belle & Van der Veken, 2007), a worldview seeks to answer 
the following seven questions:
1. What is the nature of our world? How is it structured and how does it 
function?
2. Why is our world the way it is, and not different? Why are we the way we are, 
and not different? What kind of global explanatory principles can we put 
forward?
3. What future is open to us and our species in this world? By what criteria are 
we to select these possible futures?
4. Why do we feel the way we feel in this world, and how do we assess global 
reality, and the role of our species in it?
5. How are we to act and to create in this world? How, in what different ways, 
can we influence the world and transform it? What are the general principles 
by which we should organise our actions?
6. How are we to construct our image of this world in such a way that we can 
come up with answers to (1), (2), and (3)?
7. What are some of the partial answers that we can propose to these questions? 
(p. 13)
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Another publication from CLEA (Videl, 2008) simplifies the above questions 
in the form of a table, reproduced below as Table 3.  (Note that in Videl’s table, the 
seventh question is left out, because it is considered to be a meta-question):
Table 3: Six components of a worldview
Question: Philosophical Discipline:
1. What is? Ontology (model of reality as a whole)
2. Where does it all come from? Explanation (model of the past)
3. Where are we going? Prediction (model of the future)
4. What is good and what is evil? Axiology (theory of values)
5. How should we act? Praxeology (theory of actions)
6. What is true and what is false? Epistemology (theory of knowledge)
Here again, we find Dilthey’s original three components in questions 1, 4, and 
5.  We also have Sire and Koltko-Rivera’s additional component, epistemology, in 
question 6.  But we also have two new components, covered by questions 2 and 3.  
These are based on one’s beliefs about the past as well as one’s beliefs about the 
future and are labelled by Videl as explanation and prediction.  Both explanation and 
prediction are dependent on one’s ontology but also serve important roles as 
additional components in their own right.  Explanation deals with the origin of the 
world and henceforth will be referred to as the “cosmological” component.  Prediction
deals with the direction and purpose of the world and henceforth will be referred to as 
the “teleological” component.   With the addition of these two new elements, CLEA’s 
definition of worldview has a total of six main components: ontology, cosmology, 
teleology axiology, praxeology, and epistemology.
As the most comprehensive yet also the most clear and concise 
conceptualization of worldwide, this final, interdisciplinary approach offered by 
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CLEA will be the one used in the next section to explore the worldview-level beliefs 
held by atheists.
2.2 Worldview-level beliefs held by atheists
It has been established in the previous section that a worldview is something 
that can be broken down into various components.  The model offered by The Centre 
Leo Apostel for Interdisciplinary Studies (CLEA), which is based on six main 
components, is the framework from which this section will explore the atheist 
worldview.  It is worth repeating that, based on the definition of an atheist in section 
1.1.1, atheism itself is not a worldview.  Rather, the atheist worldview is the 
worldview-level beliefs held by most atheists.  Although many have argued against 
trying to link atheism to a specific set of beliefs (e.g. - Smith, 1974), it will be 
demonstrated here that this warning applies more to political views or to specific 
schools of philosophy than it does to most of the basic components of a worldview as 
defined by CLEA.
This section will look at each of the six worldview components separately and 
attempt to determine what atheists are likely to believe about each.  It will be argued 
that atheists do in fact have much in common with each other in terms of worldview-
level beliefs and, for the most part, can be said to be in agreement with the secular 
humanist worldview (Note: in the following sections, the terms “humanist” and 
“secular humanist” will be used interchangeably; see section 1.2.3 for more 
information.)  Unlike atheism, secular humanism is considered to be a fully-fledged 
worldview and several humanist organizations have issued manifestos outlining what 
that worldview entails.  These include A Secular Humanist Declaration (1980) by the 
Council for Secular Humanism, The Amsterdam Declaration (2002) by the 
International Humanist and Ethical Union, and The Humanist Manifesto III (2003) by 
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the American Humanist Association.  Statements from these manifestos and other 
humanist writings will be compared to statements made by atheist writers to 
demonstrate the strong connection between secular humanism and atheism.
2.2.1 Ontological beliefs
The first component of a worldview is the ontological component. Koltko-
Rivera (2004) describes it as one’s beliefs about “what exists and what does not” (p. 
3) and Sire (2004) describes it as as “presuppositions which we hold about the basic 
constitution of reality” (p. 17).  In terms of ontology, virtually all atheists are 
naturalists.  In his book Atheism: A very short introduction, Baggini (2003), defines 
naturalism as, “a belief that there is only the natural world and not any supernatural 
one” (p. 4) and goes on to state that, “naturalism lies at the core of atheism” (p. 5) and
“atheism is essentially a form of naturalism” (p. 16).  Draper (2007) offers a slightly 
more detailed definition. He writes that naturalism is, “the hypothesis that the natural 
world is a closed system, which means that nothing that is not a part of the natural 
world affects it... naturalism implies that there are no supernatural entities, or at least 
none that actually exercises its power to affect the natural world” (para. 3).  American 
Atheists founder Madalyn Murray O’Hair also associates atheism with naturalism.  
She writes that atheism is based on a philosophy that, “holds that nothing exists but 
natural phenomena. There are no supernatural forces or entities, nor can there be any. 
Nature simply exists” (quoted in Harding, 2008).  
According to Martin (1990), naturalism and atheism are so closely aligned that
it is nearly impossible to be a naturalist without also being an atheist (p. 469). The 
only way one could be a naturalist but not an atheist would be to define God as a 
being that can be explained entirely by scientific methods.  According to Martin, this 
position is extremely rare today (p. 469).  He also discusses the possibility of being an
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atheist but not a naturalist but states that this anomaly would apply primarily to 
eastern religions such as Jainism (p. 470).  Since the current project focuses on non-
religious atheists, particularly those living in Western countries with Christian 
background, it is fair to conclude that when it comes to ontology, atheists 
overwhelmingly side with naturalism.
Secular humanists also associate themselves with naturalism.  In his book The 
philosophy of humanism, Lamont (1965) writes, “humanism believes in a naturalistic 
metaphysics or attitude toward the universe that considers all forms of 
supernaturalism as myth; and that regards Nature as the totality of being and as a 
constantly changing system of matter and energy which exists independently of any 
mind or consciousness” (pp. 12-13).  The Humanist Manifesto III (American 
Humanist Association, 2003) confirms this belief by stating that humanism is a 
philosophy of life “without supernaturalism” (p. 13).   A Secular Humanist 
Declaration (1980) takes a slightly more cautious approach, stating in Section 6 that, 
“As secular humanists, we are generally skeptical about supernatural claims. We 
recognize the importance of religious experience: that experience that redirects and 
gives meaning to the lives of human beings. We deny, however, that such experiences 
have anything to do with the supernatural” (www.secularhumanism.org).  In the same 
section, the declaration goes on to conclude that, “We consider the universe to be a 
dynamic scene of natural forces” (www.secularhumanism.org).
In contrast to secular humanism, the naturalist position is rarely found within 
religious or spiritual worldviews.  All three Western monotheistic faiths (Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam) traditionally hold that God is a being who exists outside of 
nature yet also acts within it.  Most Eastern religions are also opposed to naturalism.  
Both Hinduism and Buddhism traditionally portray the natural world as being an 
illusion, pointing to the unseen world of the soul or mind as being the true reality.  
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New Age spirituality, also referred to as the holistic milieu (Heelas & Woodhead, 
2005), has been heavily influenced by Eastern thought and thus also rejects 
naturalism.  According to Hammer (2004), followers of this alternative spirituality 
believe that “the basic ‘stuff’ of the cosmos is non-material, ‘energy’” (p. 76) – a view
that is incompatible with naturalism.
Religious worldviews also differ from secular humanism and the atheist 
worldview in their answer to Sire’s ontological question, “What happens to a person 
at death?” (2004, p. 20).  Traditionally, both Western and Eastern religions teach that 
humans possess some sort of non-material soul or mind that lives on after death, with 
Western religions teaching that the soul will face a one-time judgement after death 
and Eastern religions teaching that the soul will be repeatedly reincarnated until it is 
able to break free from the cycle.  On the other hand, naturalism leaves no room for a 
belief in an immaterial soul and thus most secular humanists and atheists believe that 
at death, life simply ends (Baggini, 2003, p. 17).
When it comes to their ontological beliefs, it is thus fair to say that most 
atheists, like secular humanists (but unlike most religious or spiritual individuals), 
hold to a naturalist worldview.  They believe that the natural world is all that really 
exists and that there is no such thing as supernatural beings or immaterial souls.  
Chapter nine of this paper will outline how the present project tested and found results
for the ontological views of atheists.
2.2.2 Cosmological beliefs
The second component of a worldview, according to the CLEA paradigm, is 
the cosmological component.  It is concerned with origins and seeks to explain how 
our world came to be (Videl, 2008).  Since atheism is strongly aligned with 
naturalism, it follows that there is no room for any sort of supernatural Creator in an 
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atheist worldview.  Atheists therefore do not appeal to any kind of force outside of 
nature, God or otherwise, as an explanation for how the universe came to exist.  
Instead, they believe that the universe is either uncaused (ie. that it has always existed 
in one form or another) or that it is self-caused (i.e. that its origins can be explained in
strictly naturalistic terms).   Smith (2008) reflects this belief in his summary of the 
atheistic cosmological argument, saying that, “the universe, be it infinitely old or 
finitely old, causes itself” (online).  It is also reflected in The Humanist Manifesto III, 
which states, “humanists recognize nature as self-existing” (American Humanist 
Association, 2003, online).
Since atheists tend to rely on science as their primary source of knowledge 
(see section 2.2.6 below) and since science currently does not have a firm 
understanding about how the universe could be self-existing, atheists are content to 
remain agnostic on this issue.  However, one theory that is popular among atheists is 
that of the multiverse (Carr, 2012, p. 168).  The multiverse theory holds that there 
exists a possibly infinite number of universes (Carr, 2009, p. 34) and that our 
universe, which is known to have had a beginning at the Big Bang approximately 13.7
billion years ago, might somehow have been born out of another universe (Bjorken, 
2009, p. 189). The  theory thus eliminates the need for a Creator by allowing for an 
eternal multiverse from which our non-eternal universe arose.
The multiverse theory is actually compatible with Western monotheism but the
idea of a self-existing multiverse is not.  Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all 
traditionally teach that the world was created by a supernatural Creator and hence in a
theistic worldview, the multiverse would have been created by God.  The theory is 
also compatible with Hinduism, in which there is an eternal cycle where the universe 
is born, dies, and then is born again.  However, in most forms of Hinduism, the 
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universe has its ground of being in some sort of divine reality and thus cannot be said 
to be wholly naturalistic or self-existing.
 When it comes to their cosmological beliefs, we can thus say that most 
atheists, like secular humanists (but unlike most religious individuals) hold to a 
worldview that does not involve a Creator or divine ground of being.  Instead, they 
believe that the universe (or multiverse) is self-existing and can be explained in 
strictly naturalistic terms.  Chapter nine of this paper will outline how the present 
project tested and found results for the cosmological views of atheists.
2.2.3 Teleological beliefs
The third component of a worldview, according to the CLEA paradigm, is the 
teleological component.  It is concerned with the future rather than the past and seeks 
to answer questions relating to the direction our world is heading and the purpose 
behind it (Videl, 2008).  Because atheism, by definition, requires a cosmology that 
does not involve a supernatural Creator, it also follows that atheism requires a 
teleology that does not include a divine purpose behind the universe.  The only grand 
purposes that atheists see in the universe as a whole are the simple workings of 
physical laws and, in the case of life, the additional workings of Darwinian forces.  
Rosenberg (2011) expresses this view in his book The atheist’s guide to reality: 
Enjoying life without illusions where he writes, “Newton expunged purpose from the 
physical world 350 years ago. Darwin did it for the biological realm 150 years ago. 
By now you’d think the message had gotten out. What is the purpose of the universe? 
There is none. What purposes are at work in the universe? Same answer: none” 
(ebook, chaper 3).  Therefore, for an atheist, the universe is not heading in any 
particular direction beyond that which is determined by simple physics and biology.
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However, the belief that the universe has no overall purpose does not 
necessarily lead to the belief that our individual lives are therefore purposeless and 
devoid of meaning.  According to Nielsen (1990), “if there is neither God nor Logos, 
there is no purpose to life, no plan for the universe or providential ordering of things 
in accordance with which we must live our lives. Yet from the fact, if it is a fact, that 
there is no purpose to life or no purposes for which we are made, it does not follow 
that there are no purposes in life that are worth achieving, doing, or having” (online).  
For an atheist, purpose is something that is created by the individual, not handed 
down from above or found externally.  In his book The good atheist: Living a 
purpose-filled life without God, Dan Barker (2011) explains: 
Although there is no purpose of life—and it is wonderful that there isn’t—you 
can still have a purpose-filled life.  To say there is no purpose of life does not 
mean there is no purpose in life... Purpose is not something you search for. It is
not something you find. It is not endowed by a creator or handed to you by 
your parents or government. It is something you choose to create (p. 32-33, 
emphasis in the original).
Secular humanists are in agreement with atheists on this point.  In Section 6, A
Secular Humanist Declaration (1980) states, “Secular humanists may be agnostics, 
atheists, rationalists, or skeptics, but they find insufficient evidence for the claim that 
some divine purpose exists for the universe.... They believe that men and women are 
free and are responsible for their own destinies” (online).  Lamont (1965) puts it this 
way: “Humanism, in opposition to all theories of universal determinism, fatalism, or 
predestination, believes that human beings, while conditioned by the past, possess 
genuine freedom of creative choice and action, and are, within certain objective 
limits, masters of their own destiny” (p. 13).
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In contrast, religious and spiritual worldviews hold that the universe does in 
fact have an overall purpose and that human beings ought to align themselves with 
that purpose.  For example, according to Christian theism, history is linear and is 
heading toward an end preordained by God (Sire, 2004, p. 42).  Christians are 
therefore encouraged to seek God’s will for their lives and to give up any practices 
that are incompatible with God’s purposes.  Those with a more New Age outlook also 
see history heading in a particular direction and tend to describe the future in 
optimistic and utopian terms (Heelas, 1996, p. 28).  Even Eastern religions, which 
view history in a more cyclical way, teach that the purpose of every life is the same —
to work towards freeing oneself from the cycle of reincarnation.
When it comes to their teleological beliefs, we can thus say that most atheists, 
like secular humanists (but unlike most religious and spiritual individuals), hold to a 
worldview that does not involve an overall purpose to the universe.  Instead, they 
believe that humans must create their own individual meaning and purpose.  Chapter 
nine of this paper will outline how the present project tested and found results for the 
teleological views of atheists.
2.2.4 Axiological beliefs
The fourth component of a worldview, according to the CLEA paradigm, is the
axiological component.  Dilthey defines it as, “a system of likes and dislikes, 
expressed in value-judgments” (Hodges, 1998, p. 92) and Koltko-Rivera (2004) 
defines it on as the basis on which we decide, “what objects or experiences are good 
or bad” (p. 3).  In other words, one’s axeology provides the foundation for one’s 
aesthetics and morality.
When it comes to this particular aspect of a worldview, atheists cannot be 
clearly distinguished from religious individuals in any discernible way.  With regards 
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to aesthetics, what one thinks of as beautiful will be a matter of individual taste and 
with regards to morality, current research indicates that there is no obvious correlation
between belief in God and one’s moral behaviour (see section 3.1.1).  In fact, atheists 
have gone to great lengths to communicate that their general morals and values are no
different than those of theists.  The two groups would probably disagree in terms of 
where human morality comes from (see Harris, 2006) but both groups would certainly
agree that murder and rape are bad and that helping the victims of a natural disaster is 
good.
When it comes to their axiological beliefs, and in particular their beliefs about 
morality, we can thus say that atheists do not differ as a group from religious 
individuals.  Chapter nine of this paper will outline how the present project present 
project tested and found results for the axiological views of atheists.
2.2.5 Praxeological beliefs
The fifth component of a worldview, according to the CLEA paradigm, is the 
praxeological component.  Dilthey defines it as, “a system of desires and aversions, 
ends, duties, practical rules and principles” (Hodges, 1998, p. 92) and Koltko-Rivera 
(2004) defines it as the basis on which we decide, “what objectives, behaviors, and 
relationships are desirable or undesirable” (p. 3).   Aerts et al. (2007) describes it as 
the answers to the  questions, “How are we to act and to create in this world? How, in 
what different ways, can we influence the world and transform it? What are the 
general principles by which we should organize our actions?” (p. 13).
Like axeology, when it comes to this particular aspect of a worldview, atheists 
cannot be clearly distinguished from religious individuals in any discernible way.  For
example, atheists may or may not agree with the following statement from The 
Humanist Manifesto III:
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Working to benefit society maximizes individual happiness. Progressive 
cultures have worked to free humanity from the brutalities of mere survival 
and to reduce suffering, improve society, and develop global community. We 
seek to minimize the inequities of circumstance and ability, and we support a 
just distribution of nature’s resources and the fruits of human effort so that as 
many as possible can enjoy a good life (American Humanist Association, 
2003).
Likewise, religious individuals may or may not agree.  Instead, one’s priorities on 
such  matters are probably based more on one’s political views than on whether or not
one believes in God.
When it comes to their praxeological beliefs, we can thus say that atheists do 
not differ as a group from religious individuals.  Chapter nine of this paper will 
outline how the present project tested and found results for the praxeological views of 
atheists.
2.2.6 Epistemological beliefs
The sixth and final component of a worldview is the epistemological 
component. Epistemology is concerned with knowledge and is is described by 
Koltko-Rivera (2004) as one’s beliefs about “what can be known or done in the world,
and how it can be known or done” (p. 3) and by Sire (2004) as the answer to the 
question, “Why is it possible to know anything at all?” (p. 20).  Here, atheists once 
again differ from religious individuals.  When it comes to epistemology, virtually all 
atheists are rationalists.  Martin (1990) states that the term rationalist, in the popular 
sense, refers to someone who relies on science and verifiable facts to arrive at 
conclusions as opposed to relying on revelation from God or appeals to church 
authority (p. 468).  According to Baggini (2003), “a rational account is broadly one 
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which confines itself to reasons, evidence and arguments that are open to scrutiny, 
assessment, acceptance or rejection, on the basis of principles and facts which are 
available to all” (p. 76).  Baggini traces the roots of rationalism and scientific thinking
to ancient Greece and then proceeds to argue for a direct link between rationalism, 
naturalism, and atheism:
The naturalism which lies at the heart and root of atheism is itself rooted in the
broader commitment to rationalism. (This kind of rationalism-with-a-small-r is
not to be confused with the 17th century Rationalism-with-a-capital-R, which 
is more specific and ambitious in the claims it makes for the power of 
rationality.) Naturalism follows from rationalism, and so it is rationalism, 
rather than naturalism, which is fundamental to the origins of atheism (p. 77).
Secular humanists also associate themselves with rationalism.  The Humanist 
Manifesto III (2003) states that, “knowledge of the world is derived by observation, 
experimentation, and rational analysis” (online) and A Secular Humanist Declaration 
(1980) states that, “we are committed to the use of the rational methods of inquiry, 
logic, and evidence in developing knowledge and testing claims to truth... we believe 
the scientific method, though imperfect, is still the most reliable way of understanding
the world” (online). 
 In contrast to atheism and secular humanism, religious individuals tend to rely 
heavily on divine revelation, in addition to science and reason, when it comes to 
epistemology.  In other words, although most theists are not opposed to science and 
reason, their worldview generally holds that there are certain truths that cannot be 
accessed by science and reason alone.  For example, according to Sire (2004), “human
beings can know both the world around them and God himself because God has built 
into them the capacity to do so and because he takes an active role in communicating 
with them... in theological terms, this initiative is called revelation” (pp. 34-35).  
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND ATHEISM 59
Christians traditionally look outward to the Bible for this revelation whereas Muslims 
turn to the Qur’an and Jews to the Torah.  Others, particular those associated with 
New Age beliefs or Eastern religions, look inward to “the experience of the Self” 
(Heelas, 1996, p29).  The only non-atheists who would adhere strictly to the 
principles of rationalism would be deists (those who believe in a non-interfering God)
– a relatively rare position in the twenty-first century.
When it comes to their epistemological beliefs, it is thus fair to say that most 
atheists, like secular humanists (but unlike most religious or spiritual individuals), 
hold to a rationalist worldview.  They believe that knowledge of the world is best 
derived from science and reason alone.  They do not believe in any sort of divine 
revelation.  Chapter nine of this paper will outline how the present project tested and 
found results for the epistemological views of atheists.
2.3 Conclusion
According to Baggini (2003), “atheists subscribe to a certain world view that 
includes numerous beliefs about the world and what is in it” (p. 8-9).  He also writes 
that, “atheism can be understood not simply as a denial of religion, but as a self-
contained belief system” (p. 74).  Chapter two aimed to defend these notions by first 
defining what a worldview is and then by carefully outlining the worldview-level 
beliefs held by most atheists.  It was determined that, out of six major worldview 
components, atheists differ significantly from religious and spiritual individuals on 
four: ontology, cosmology, teleology, and epistemology.  Most notably, it was 
determined that atheists are strongly aligned with naturalism (an ontological position) 
and rationalism (an epistemological position).  The only two worldview components 
on which atheists did not differ significantly from religious individuals were axiology 
and praxeology.
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It was also determined that atheists share much in common with secular 
humanists when it comes to worldview.  In the conclusion to his book Atheism: A very
short introduction, Baggini (2003) writes, “in the broad sense of the term, humanists 
are simply atheists who believe in living purposeful and moral lives... [thus] the terms
positive atheist and humanist (with a small h) are coterminous” (p. 109-110).  The 
worldview analysis done in this chapter confirms this view.
Having established that atheism has strong ties to several very specific 
worldview-level beliefs, the next chapter will go on to examine why certain 
individuals who were raised in religious environments end up abandoning their 
childhood worldviews and replacing it with an atheist “belief system.”
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3 WHY DO PEOPLE BECOME ATHEISTS?
In chapter one, the terminology and history of atheism as well as several other 
related constructs was discussed.  Chapter two introduced the concept of worldview 
and then proceeded to outline the worldview-level beliefs held by atheists, which 
were argued to be closely related to secular humanism. The current chapter will now 
turn its attention towards the various theories on why certain individuals who grow up
in religious environments end up becoming atheists and adopting an atheist 
worldview.  These theories have been divided into two categories based on their 
general point of view.  Four of the theories come from conservative Christian sources 
and three from academic sources.  The conservative Christian  theories are motivated 
by the desire to reclaim individuals who have become atheists and bring them back to 
the fold and/or to prevent people from becoming atheists in the first place. They have 
been included due to the frequency in which atheists end up dialoguing with them. 
They include theories based on selfishness, arrogance, anger, and poor father-child 
relationships.  On the other hand, the three academic theories simply seek to 
understand the phenomenon from a sociological and psychological viewpoint.  They 
include theories based on lower religious emphasis during childhood, deliberation in 
the pursuit of truth, and higher intelligence.
3.1 Conservative Christian theories
3.1.1 Atheism and selfishness
Probably the most extreme of the four Christian-based theories is the idea that 
atheists are simply selfish and have succumbed to their desire to live an immoral life.  
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For example, Lee Stroebel, author of the bestselling book The Case for Christ 
(Stroebel, 1998), claims that he was an atheist before becoming a Christian and that 
what held him back from becoming a Christian for many years was the, “self-serving 
and immoral lifestyle that I would be compelled to abandon if I were ever to change 
my views and become a follower of Jesus” (p. 13).  Another Christian author (Vitz, 
2008) writes, “through reflection on my own experience it is now clear to me that my 
reasons for becoming and for remaining an atheist-skeptic from about age 18 to 38 
were superficial, irrational, and largely without intellectual or moral integrity” (p. 35).
He goes on to say,
The fact is that it is quite inconvenient to be a serious believer in today’s 
powerful secular and neo-pagan world. I would have had to give up many 
pleasures and a good deal of time. Without going into details it is not hard to 
imagine the sexual pleasures that would have to be rejected if I became a 
serious believer. And then I also knew it would cost me time and some money. 
There would be church services, church groups, time for prayer and scripture 
reading, time spent helping others. I was already too busy. Obviously, 
becoming religious would be a real inconvenience (p. 36).
Comments like these have led many Christians to assume that most atheists become 
or remain so simply because they want the freedom to do whatever they want without 
having to answer to God.
Other conservative Christian authors use even stronger language.  Spiegel 
(2010) writes, “Atheism is not at all a consequence of intellectual doubts. Such doubts
are mere symptoms of the root cause—moral rebellion. For the atheist, the missing 
ingredient is not evidence but obedience” (p. 11).  He even goes as far as to say that 
atheism, “does not arise from the careful application of reason but from willful 
rebellion. Atheism is the suppression of truth by wickedness, the cognitive 
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consequence of immorality” (p. 18).  R. C. Sproul uses similar arguments in his 1974 
book The Psychology of Atheism.  He writes, “the problem is not that there is 
insufficient evidence to convince rational beings that there is a God, but that rational 
beings have a natural antipathy toward the being of God” (pp. 56-57).  He concludes 
that the “problem” with the atheist is, “not a lack of knowledge or a lack of cognitive 
equipment but is a moral deficiency” (p. 62).  Later in the book he goes on to describe
God as the “unviewed viewer” who sees our every thought and deed, thus making us 
feel rather uncomfortable and exposed—a feeling that some people just can’t handle 
and thus become atheists to avoid.
The association between atheism and selfish immorality has a long history, 
going back at least as far as the psalmist who writes, “Fools say in their hearts, ‘There
is no God.’ They are corrupt, they do abominable deeds; there is no one who does 
good” (Psalm 14:1, NRSV).  In fact, the American Heritage dictionary still includes 
immorality as part of its definition for atheism (American Heritage dictionary, 2009, 
online).  The connection is also often associated with Fyodor Dostoevsky and his 
novel The Brothers Karamazov (Dostoevsky, 1984).  Although the oft-quoted phrase, 
“Without God, all is permitted” does not actually appear in the English translation of 
the novel, the general idea certainly does come up in the book several times (Beit-
Hallahmi, 2010, pp. 114-115).  It echoes the idea from the early modern period that a 
belief in God is necessary in order to maintain social order. The philosopher John 
Locke writes that, “promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human 
society, can have no hold upon an atheist” (Locke, 1689/1983, p. 51) and Voltaire 
writes, “I want my attorney, my tailor, my servants, even my wife to believe in God; 
and I think I shall then be robbed and cuckholded less often” (quoted in Beit-
Hallahmi, 2010, p. 114).  According to Horwitz (1986), even George Washington 
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made it a point in his farewell address to remind citizens that morality cannot exist 
without religion.
These sentiments still linger among the general population today. According to
Edgell, Gerteis and Hartmann (2006), atheists are still one of the least trusted minority
groups in America. They found that atheists ranked even lower than Muslims and 
homosexuals when it came to groups Americans said share their vision of American 
society.  They also found that atheists ranked lowest in terms of presidential 
candidates people would vote for and individuals that they would approve of their 
children marrying.  The authors concluded that the main reason for this mistrust was 
the association in most people’s minds of religious belief with morality, and hence 
non-belief with immorality.
Atheists, of course, argue that the connection between atheism and immorality 
is unfounded.  They reply that morality can exist apart from God, and in fact, that 
morality does not come from religion at all.  In his article, “10 myths—and 10 truths
—about atheism,” Sam Harris writes, “We do not get our morality from religion. We 
decide what is good in our good books by recourse to moral intuitions that are (at 
some level) hard-wired in us and that have been refined by thousands of years of 
thinking about the causes and possibilities of human happiness” (2006, online).  
Michael Shermer (2004) expounds this idea in his book The Science of Good and 
Evil, where he writes:
Religion evolved as a social structure to enforce the rules of human 
interactions before there were such institutions as the state or such concepts as 
laws and rights... the religious foundation of human virtues and vices, saints 
and sinners, in fact, is a codification of an informal psychology of moral and 
immoral behaviour. Humans are a hierarchical social primate specific, and as 
such we need rules and morals and a social structure to enforce them (p. 7).
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The relationship between religious belief and morality, and thus atheism and 
immortality, is a particularly hard one for researchers to measure empirically since 
there are differing opinions about what is moral and what is not.  For example, The 
Barna Group (2008) found that young atheists and agnostics were more likely than 
young evangelical Christians to engage in behaviours such as the use of profanity, 
viewing pornography, or getting drunk.  However, this is not at all surprising 
considering that most evangelical Christians view these activities as immoral whereas 
many atheists and agnostics do not.  
Studies that have taken a fairer approach have been divided in their results, 
thus demonstrating that the relationship between religiosity and morality is complex.  
For example, on one hand, religious individuals have been found to cheat less on their
taxes and to give more to charity, but on the other hand, non-religious individuals 
have been found to be more tolerant and kind (Beit-Hallahmi, 2010).  However, 
according to Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle (1997), no connection was found between 
religiosity and the likelihood of an individual cheating on a test or helping a person in 
need.
One explanation for these varied results is that morality has less to do with 
religiosity and more to do with being a member of a group.  Bibby (2007) measured 
values that both atheists and theists agree on as being an important part of their 
morality, such as honesty, kindness, and patience.  He found that theists did tend to 
score higher on most values but reasoned that this had more to do with the fact that 
people tend to get their values from groups and that theists are much more likely than 
atheists to be part of a value-instilling group.  He concluded that, “people who don't 
believe in God can be good. But people who believe in God are more likely to value 
being good, enhancing the chances that they will be good” (p. 1).  Manning (2010) 
agrees that the correlation between religiosity and morality has more to do with being 
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a part of a group than with belief or non-belief in God. In reference to the moral 
benefits gained from religion, she writes, “a close look at all of these benefits, 
however, shows they are tied to the organizational aspects of religion, the fact that 
church or synagogue is a community of caring adults that guides children and 
provides support for a shared moral order. This suggests that those benefits could also 
be had from affiliation with a secular organization” (p. 25). 
Another way to approach the issue is to look at a national level, as opposed to 
an individual level. Paul (2005) did just that and found that a lack of belief in God 
might actually lead to a better society.  He compared the level of belief in God in 
developed countries with overall societal health. One of the things he concluded was 
that, “higher rates of belief in and worship of a creator correlate with higher rates of 
homicide, juvenile and early adult mortality, STD infection rates, teen pregnancy, and 
abortion in the prosperous democracies” (p. 7). The U.S. stood out as being highly 
exceptional in this study, both in terms of belief in God and lower societal health so it 
is hard to know whether the results were actually related to belief of God or some 
other aspect in U.S. society.
The above summary demonstrates that the connection between atheism and 
selfishness/immorality remains controversial and unclear.  Section 8.1.1 of this paper 
will outline how the present project further tested the possible connection and the 
results.
3.1.2 Atheism and arrogance
Another common notion among some conservative Christians is that atheists 
are arrogant and enjoy looking down on others.  They hold that atheists put too much 
“faith” in science and that it is presumptuous for anyone to claim to know that God 
does not exist.  For example, in his 2007 book What’s so great about Christianity, 
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Dinesh D’Souza writes that atheists, “presume that their rational, scientific approach 
gives them full access to external reality. It is this presumption that gives atheism its 
characteristic arrogance” (p. 168).  He goes on to claim that whereas atheists are, 
“dogmatic and arrogant,” religious believers are, “modest and reasonable” (p. 178).  
Other Christian writers have referred to atheists as being smug (Markham, 2011, p. 
33), smarter-than-thou (Stokes, 2012, p. x), and pompous (Hart, 2009, p. 220).
Catholic priest John Pasquini (2009) takes the idea of atheist arrogance to the 
extreme.  He claims that atheists suffer from “atheist personality disorder” and posits 
that atheists have an unhealthy desire for attention and recognition as a result of their 
low self-esteem.  He points to several famous atheists throughout history as examples,
with Nietzche being, for him, the perfect archetype. He writes, “Nietzche’s pride and 
his arrogance are widely acknowledged. Indeed, his philosophy is a celebration of 
pride and arrogance. His obsession with power, with being a superman, with killing 
God exemplifies this innate need for recognition” (p. 103).
Atheists, of course, disagree with this assessment and refer to the idea of 
atheists being arrogant as a myth (Harris, 2006; Blackford, 2013).  They often point 
out that they do not actually claim to know with absolute certainty that God does not 
exist (see section 1.1.1) and that it is the Christian who is arrogant in claiming that the
Christian religion is the correct one. To date, no empirical research has been done on 
the possible connection between atheism and arrogance or religiosity and arrogance.  
Section 8.1.2 of this paper will therefore outline how the present project tested the 
possible connection and the results.
3.1.3 Atheism and anger
Another common notion found in some Christian circles is the idea that many 
atheists  actually still believe in God, at least at a subconscious level, but have ended 
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up repressing their belief due to anger.  Novotni and Petersen (2001) coined the 
phrase “emotional atheism” and argue, based on their clinical experience, that some 
people become atheists because of a multi-step process related to anger over bad 
things that happened to them or others. They suggest that some people react to 
difficult situations by blaming God but then realize that it is “wrong” to do so. 
According to the authors, this leads them to repress their feelings and distance 
themselves emotionally from God, often resulting in the eventual denial of his 
existence.
There is some quantitative evidence that could be used to back up this claim.  
In a study of active versus inactive Mormons, Albrecht and Cornwall (1989) found 
that incidences of illness or injury, divorce, or the death of a loved one were more 
common among the inactive members than the active members.  They concluded that,
“the experience of positive events contributes to increased faith while the experience 
of negative events seems to be faith challenging” (p. 34).  In a study of 168 
undergraduates, Exline, Yali and Lobel (1999) compared measures of negative 
emotion with measures of religion and forgiveness. They concluded that people can 
become angry at God for events that seem cruel or unfair and that when people have 
difficulty letting go of this anger by “forgiving God”, this can lead to negative 
emotions such as increased anxiety or a depressed mood. They write that, “Our results
suggest that difficulty forgiving God is an important spiritual and psychological issue
—one that, for some individuals, may ultimately lead to a rejection of belief in the 
Divine” (p. 376).
In Exline (2004) and Exline and Martin (2005), a follow-up study is 
mentioned in which the unbelievers were divided into two groups: simple unbelievers 
(those who never believed in God) and conflicted unbelievers (those with a past 
history of belief). Compared to the current believers, conflicted unbelievers reported 
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having had greater anger towards God over negative life events in the past than 
believers, suggesting that negative feelings toward God might have played a role in 
why they lost faith (Exline, 2004, p. 5).  Exline and Martin (2005) list several 
predictors of anger toward God, including undeserved suffering, the severity and 
intentionality of the harm done, and an inflated sense of entitlement (p. 74-75). 
Although the above mentioned research seems to lend credence to the idea that
there is indeed a connection between anger at God and atheism, several qualitative 
studies suggest that this is not the case.  Based on 87 interviews with atheist apostates,
Zuckerman (2011) concluded that anger was not a general or overriding disposition 
among such individuals (p. 137).  He writes, “The notion that apostates are riddled 
with hostility, the claim that secular people are nothing buy angry curmudgeons... 
these widely touted assertions are simply untrue” (p. 137-138).  With regard to 
negative life events, he points out that:
Despite the fact that many individuals whom I interviewed cited instances of 
personal misfortune as a catalyst for their eventual rejection of religion, it is 
essential to recognize that widespread misfortune definitely does not cause 
secularization at the macro, societal level. In fact, it is exactly within those 
countries rife with misfortune, disease, poverty, and death that religion is the 
strongest” (p. 54).
In another study based on interviews with atheist apostates, Alidoosti (2009) 
found that anger was indeed a common emotion among atheists but that their anger 
was definitely not directed at God.  Instead, those he interviewed spoke of anger 
toward themselves (for not having “seen the light” earlier) or towards parents and 
church leaders for having misled them (p. 37).  Zuckerman (2011) uses the word 
“shock” rather than “anger” to describe the emotion that many apostates feel towards 
church leaders.  He writes, “one of the main reasons many apostates cite as to why 
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they eventually rejected their religion was that someone within their religious circle—
often a clergyman—was hypocritical, unkind, or immoral. And this behavior came as 
such a shock that it spawned their eventual apostasy” (p. 90).
The above summary demonstrates that the connection between atheism and 
anger is  still unclear.  Section 8.1.3 of this paper will outline how the present project 
further tested the possible connection and the results.
3.1.4 Atheism and the father-child relationship
The last of the four Christian-based theories is built on the notion that children 
develop their ideas about “God the Father” based on their relationship with their 
“worldly father”.  According to this theory, individuals who have loving fathers 
develop positive ideas about God whereas individuals with cold, distant, or absent 
fathers develop negative ideas, which might then lead them to reject the God-concept 
altogether and become atheists.  One of the main contemporary proponents of this 
view is Paul Vitz.  In his 1999 book Faith of the Fatherless: The Psychology of 
Atheism, Vitz suggests that a weak or absent father was the primary reason why the 
majority of the most influential nonbelievers throughout history were unable to 
believe in God.  He lists Nietzche, Hume, Russell and Sartre among those with dead 
fathers and Hobbes, Voltaire, Feuerbach and Freud among those with weak or abusive
fathers.  By way of contrast, he describes the positive relationship that many key 
theist thinkers from the same time periods had with their fathers such as Pascal, 
Kierkegaard, Chesterton and Barth.
Vitz’s theory is a play on the well-known projection theory suggested by 
Feuerbach and popularized by Freud.  In the original theory, designed to show why 
people believe in God, it is said that God is simply a projection of our human desires
—a wish fulfillment coming from our childhood need for protection and security 
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(Vitz, 1999, p. 6).  Vitz writes, “Freud is quite right to consider that a belief might be 
an illusion because it derives from powerful wishes or unconscious, childish needs.  
The irony is that he inadvertently provides a powerful new way to understand an 
illusion as the psychological basis for rejecting God—that is, a projection theory of 
atheism” (p. 9).  In other words, some individuals might wish to get rid of their fathers
and therefore get rid of God instead. Vitz also relates his theory to Freud’s famous 
Oedipus complex. He writes, “in the Freudian framework, atheism is an illusion 
caused by the Oedipal desire to kill the father (God) and replace him with oneself” (p.
13).
Tucker (2002) mentions Vitz’s theory and offers the stories of Charles 
Templeton and Billy Graham as further evidence in support of the defective father 
hypothesis.  Templeton and Graham were life-long friends and, at one time, were both
well-known evangelists. Graham, of course, is still a well-known evangelist.  
Templeton, on the other hand, lost faith and became an agnostic (the story of which he
published in his 1996 book Farewell to God: My reasons for rejecting the Christian 
faith).  Tucker points out that Graham had a very positive relationship with his father, 
whereas Templeton’s father abandoned his family when Charles was very young.
There doesn’t seem to be any recent empirical data that could be used to either 
validate or invalidate Vitz’s theory. However, in one older study of atheists (Vetter & 
Green, 1932), it was found that half of those who had become nonbelievers before the
age of twenty had lost one or both of their parents. The authors claim that this at least 
twice the expected mortality rate and state that this was one of the most interesting 
findings to come out of their study (p. 187).
Although there is a lack of empirical evidence for the weak or absent father 
theory, there is some evidence in the research literature of a correlation between the 
abandonment of one’s religious beliefs and poor parental relationships in general 
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(Caplovitz & Sherrow, 1977; Hunsberger, 1983; Hunsberger & Brown, 1984).  One 
might therefore assume that poor parental relationships could indeed be a factor in 
why some people become atheists.  However, as Hunsberger (1983) points out, it’s 
hard to know whether or not the poor relationships led to the apostasy, or the apostasy
led to the poor relationships (p. 32). Hunsberger and Brown (1984) lean toward the 
latter explanation and state that, “there is no reason to conclude that poor parental 
relations themselves caused apostasy” (p. 250).
Other research indicates that a major disruption in the family, such as a 
divorce, might play a role in why some people give up religion.  Lawton and Bures 
(2001) found that children whose parents had divorced were more likely than others 
to abandon their religious beliefs.  Hadaway and Roof (1988) state that “high levels of
apostasy among the children of divorced parents indicate that family disruption is 
closely related to apostasy” (p. 38).
The above summary demonstrates that the connection between atheism and 
parental relationship is still unclear.  Section 8.1.4 of this paper will outline how the 
present project further tested the possible connection, particularly with regard to the 
father-child relationship, and the results.
3.2 Academic Theories
3.2.1 Atheism and religious emphasis during childhood
Probably the simplest and most common sense explanation for why some 
people continue to be religious as adults whereas others do not is that it depends 
primarily on the degree to which religion was emphasized in the home during 
childhood.  One would assume that those who grew up in homes where church 
attendance and religious beliefs were emphasized strongly would be more likely to be 
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religious later in life than those who grew up in homes where religion was 
emphasized less or where at least one parent did not attend church.  Generally 
speaking, this is exactly what researchers have found (Hunsberger, 1980; Hunsberger, 
1983; Hunsberger & Brown, 1984; Hadaway & Roof, 1988).  However, the situation 
appears to be more complicated.  Hadaway and Roof (1988) write, “Clearly, religious 
background is important, but we might have expected a stronger association” (p. 41).
The first step to understanding the relationship between religious emphasis 
during childhood and religiosity later in life is to recognize that not all church leavers 
are the same.  Brinkerhoff and Burke (1980) provide a useful model in this regard.  
They break down religiosity into two main parts: believing and belonging.  There are 
thus four groups of people to consider:
1. Those who both believe and belong (fervent followers)
2. Those who believe but do not belong (outsiders)
3. Those who belong but do not believe (ritualists)
4. Those who neither believe nor belong (apostates)
It is important to consider the possibility that the correlation between religious 
emphasis during childhood and religiosity later in life might apply more to outsiders 
than it does to  apostates.  In other words, a low religious emphasis during childhood 
might lead to a lack of church attendance as an adult but have no bearing on whether 
or not someone still believes in God.  
A unique study by Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1997) provides some evidence 
for this hypothesis.  Puzzled by why some people did not follow the basic rule of  
“religious people come from religious homes and nonreligious people come from 
nonreligious homes”, they decided to study the anomalous cases in depth.  Their study
focused on “amazing apostates” (those who grew up in highly religious environments 
yet became nonbelievers) and “amazing believers” (those who grew up in mostly 
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nonreligious environments yet became believers).  What they found was that all of the
amazing apostates abandoned their former religious beliefs for the exact same reason
—they simply found it impossible to believe in them anymore (p. 118).  The ironic 
thing is that it is very likely that their strong religious upbringing was the very thing 
that caused them to be unable to believe.  The authors explain:
For all their lives the [amazing apostates] were told their religion was the true 
religion, and they had to live according to its teachings. Were they not then 
being implicitly told that truth was a more basic good than even their religious 
beliefs, that the beliefs were to be celebrated because they were the truth? 
Furthermore, all the training in avoiding sin and being a good person “on the 
outside” would have promoted integrity... if this teaching succeeded, it would 
produce someone who deeply valued truth and had deep-down integrity. The 
religion would therefore create the basis for its own downfall, if it came up 
short in these departments. It may further have added to its vulnerability by 
insisting that all of its teachings were the absolute truth. When the first 
teaching failed, in the mind of the devout believer, that put the whole system 
of beliefs at risk (p. 120).
As for the amazing believers, Altemeyer and Hunsberger found that the majority were
dealing with serious personal problems at the time of their conversions and therefore 
perhaps used religion as a way to stablize their lives (p. 194).
Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s study demonstrates that, although there is a 
general correlation between low religious emphasis during childhood and low 
religiosity during adulthood, there are a significant number of individuals for which 
the opposite is true.  The exact connection between atheism and religious emphasis 
during childhood is therefore still unclear.  Section 8.1.5 of this paper will outline how
the present project further tested this connection, and the results.
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3.2.2 Atheism and deliberation in the pursuit of truth
The well-known Christian apologist C. S. Lewis once wrote, “if you examined
a hundred people who had lost their faith in Christianity, I wonder how many of them 
would turn out to have been reasoned out of it by honest argument? Do not most 
people simply drift away?” (Lewis, 1952, p. 124).  Based on current research, it 
appears that this assumption is incorrect.  It turns out that, for many people, honest 
argument (or at least what they sincerely believe is honest argument) is exactly what 
leads them to lose their faith.
As mentioned in the previous section, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1997) 
concluded that the primary reason why certain people who grow up in very religious 
environments still end up abandoning their faith is that such people have a strong 
commitment to pursuing the truth—ironically, a trait which was probably 
strengthened by their religious upbringing.  Several other writers agree that it is 
indeed possible to swing from being very religious to being very nonreligious due to a
passion for the truth and a keen interest in examining the arguments.
In Bell (2002), the author coins the term “pendular atheist.”  He uses it 
primarily to describe the main character in Goethe’s famous play Faust but also calls 
it a “common Enlightenment type” (p. 74).  He traces the idea’s origin to Robert 
Burton’s 1621 work The Anatomy of Melancholy in which Burton speaks of the two 
extremes of religious melancholy: overzealousness toward God and the outright 
rejection of God  (p. 76). Bell writes that, “enthusiasm breeds atheism, because it 
encourages wildly optimistic expectations about the providential ordering of the 
universe and our own moral perfectibility, which, once disappointed as they inevitably
must be, send us swinging to the opposite pole, absolute pessimism and/or atheism” 
(p. 74).
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Tucker (2002) mentions a similar dynamic. She talks about those who are so 
devoted to the search for God that they, “dig so deep or reach so high only to come to 
a place where they find emptiness and darkness” (p. 67).  She concludes that, “there is
often a very close relationship between seeking God and losing faith—though not 
necessarily losing faith altogether” (p. 68).
McKnight and Ondrey (2008) agree that intense deliberation in the pursuit of 
truth is what actually leads many people to lose their faith.  Such people want a belief 
system that makes sense to them and when it no longer does so, they replace it with 
one that does.  They write, “in essence, those who leave the faith discover a profound,
deep-seated and existentially unnerving intellectual incoherence to the Christian faith. 
The faith that once held their lives together, gave it meaning, and provided direction 
simply no longer makes sense. For such persons, the whole of life has to be 
constructed from the bottom up” (p. 15).
In his 1992 book Losing faith in faith: From preacher to atheist, former 
Christian evangelist Dan Barker describes his journey to atheism. He writes, “the 
motivation that drove me into ministry is the same that drove me out. I have always 
wanted to know.  Even as a child I fervently pursued the truth. I was rarely content to 
accept things without examination, and my examinations were intense” (p. 53). 
“Testimonies” from other atheists tend to be similar (see Babinski, 1995). They all 
contain a common thread related to a very deliberate pursuit of truth and the 
abandonment of former beliefs when they fail to hold up under intellectual scrutiny.
It is important to note that the sources quoted in this section should not lead 
one to conclude that everyone who passionately pursues the truth will end up ceasing 
to believe in God.  They merely serve to show that atheists are often just as serious 
about the truth as theists are—they just differ in their conclusions.  It is therefore 
hasty to assume that atheists simply do not care or haven’t bothered to think through 
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religious arguments carefully enough.  Aldridge (2000) makes a similar comment 
about those who switch their religious affiliation or give it up altogether.  He writes, 
“moving from one religious affiliation to another is not necessarily to be interpreted 
as a sign of the shallow nature of religious commitment. We need to view such 
movements case by case and in their societal context. People who are hammering out 
a genuine commitment may well shift their affiliation. Instead of betraying 
superficiality it may show exactly the opposite” (pp. 13-14).
McKnight and Ondrey (2008) stress the fact that when someone loses his or 
her faith, they are actually also gaining something in return.  They write, “it has 
become popular today to call this process of leaving the Christian faith 
‘deconversion’. Others can use terms they prefer, but calling such a process 
‘deconversion’ captures only part of what happens even if it clearly shows that the 
focus is often on what one is leaving. Deconversion tells the story of ‘from’ instead of
the story of ‘to’” (p. 47).  In other words, it is important to remember that every 
apostasy is also a conversion (p. 7).  Therefore, it might be useful to see atheism, not 
simply as giving up God, but also as embracing a new worldview (as discussed in 
chapter two)—a worldview that is chosen based on serious deliberation.
The above summary demonstrates that the connection between atheism and 
deliberation in the pursuit of truth is one that merits further research.  Section 8.1.6 of 
this paper will outline how the present project further tested the possible connection, 
and the results.
3.2.3 Atheism and intelligence
The last of the three academic theories is the idea that atheists have a higher 
than average intelligence (perhaps due to a better education) and that this leads them 
to give up their belief in the supernatural.  This explanation is, for obvious reasons, 
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one that is more likely to be given by atheists themselves than by theists.  In recent 
years, several empirical studies have focused on this issue and have produced some 
seemingly clear, yet also controversial, results.
For example, a recent study of white adolescents in America (Nyborg, 2009) 
found that atheists in this group had an average general IQ of 111, agnostics 109, 
members of liberal denominations 107, and members of conservative (or “dogmatic”) 
denominations 105. This study used representative data from the National 
Longitudinal Study of Youth and was therefore based on a large sample size (n = 
3,742).  Another recent study (Lynn, Harvey & Nyborg, 2009) compared the data on 
national IQ from Lynn and Vanhanen (2006) with the levels of atheism in 137 
countries from Zuckerman (2007) and found a .60 correlation between national IQ 
and disbelief in God.  The authors suggested that as civilizations develop, they are 
more likely to rely on science as a means to explain and control nature, than 
“unprovable religious dogmas” (p. 14).
In discussions of atheism and intelligence, a meta study by Paul Bell of Mensa
is often cited. In this article, Bell (2002, quoted in Dawkins, 2006, p. 103) is said to 
have concluded, “Of 43 studies carried out since 1927 on the relationship between 
religious belief and one’s intelligence and/or educational level, all but four found an 
inverse connection. That is, the higher one’s intelligence or education level, the less 
one is likely to be religious or hold ‘beliefs’ of any kind.”
Another line of reasoning used to build the case for the relationship between 
atheism and intelligence is the prevalence of non-belief among scientists, who are 
generally accepted to be among the most intelligent and educated members of society.
In a study modelled on a survey done by James Leuba in 1914, Larson and Witham 
(1997) found that only 39.3% of American scientists believe in God, compared to 
over 90% of the general population (a percentage that had changed very little from the
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41.8% reported back in 1914).  In a follow-up study (Larson & Witham, 1998), the 
authors focused only on “greater” scientists—those who were members of the 
prestigious National Academy of Sciences.  In the second study, they found that only 
7.0% believed in God, with 72.2% describing themselves as atheists and 20.8% 
describing themselves as agnostic.  Similar studies have found that belief in God is 
also relatively rare among Nobel laureates (Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997, p. 180).
Two other recent studies (Kanazawa, 2010) suggest that atheism, along with 
liberalism and male sexual exclusivity, are evolutionarily novel preferences and that 
this is why they are more likely to be found among those with higher intelligence. The
first study, based on the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, found that
young adults who identified as “not at all religious” had an average IQ of 103, 
whereas those who identified as “very religious” had an average IQ of 97. The second
study, based on the General Social Surveys, found a significant correlation between 
IQ and atheism in adults as well. 
Although not all apostates are atheists, studies on apostasy are nevertheless 
also important to consider with regard to the issue of atheism and intelligence.  
Several apostasy-related studies have shown a connection between the rejection of 
one’s childhood religion and an intellectual orientation (Caplovitz & Sherrow, 1977; 
Hunsberger & Brown, 1984). Hadaway and Roof (1988) also report a positive 
correlation between apostasy and higher education.
Although the connection between atheism and intelligence appears to be quite 
clear, there are some who think the issue is more complex. For instance, Beit-
Hallahmi and Argyle (1997) point out that the correlation might have more to do with 
class differences and access to education than with religious belief (p. 183). It is 
already known that wealthier people are less likely to hold strong religious views than
poorer poorer people (Zuckerman, 2011, p. 105) This hypothesis seems to be backed 
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up by a recent study done by Theos, a public theology think-tank in the U.K. 
(Spencer, 2009). The study found that although life-long atheists do tend to be better 
educated and come from higher classes, converts to atheism (those who believed in 
God at some point but abandoned that belief at some point), when compared to 
converts to theism, tended to have less education and come from lower social grades.  
Spencer believes that this is the result of atheism shifting from being a minority 
movement among the higher social classes to being a more mass phenomenon.  He 
writes, “The data suggests that the effect of vocal atheism over the last decade has 
been to reach successfully into previously uncharted demographic territory... if this 
happening, we might expect to atheism to become increasingly ‘religious’ in its 
composition, if not its size” (para. 12-13).
Others have noted the shift as well.  Lee and Bullivant (2010) cite that an 
analysis of the 2008 British Social Attitudes Survey found that among white British 
males aged 25-34, religious people were more likely to have a degree (40%) than non-
religious people (25%).  They also reported results from the World Values Survey 
which found that there are slightly less non-believers among those with university 
degrees (14.8%) than among those whose highest attainment was secondary level 
(17.2%).  In the U.S., at least one study (Lee, 2002) also found that higher education 
strengthens faith more often than it weakens it.  The study, based on 5,426 college 
students surveyed during their freshman year and then again four years later, found 
that 37.9% reported that their faith had increased during their college years whereas 
only 13.7% reported that it had decreased.
It has long been noted that women tend to be more religious than men and that 
men are more likely to become apostates (Hadaway & Roof, 1988). But this is 
changing as well, almost certainly due to greater gender equality in education and 
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women’s increasing role in the workforce. In describing the faith journeys of two 
women (Zuckerman, 2011) writes:
both of these women lost their faith when they were feeling—perhaps for the 
first time—in control of their own destinies. The fact that Rita and Nancy both
rejected religion at a period in their lives when they were working for the first 
time—making money and supporting themselves—suggests the possibility 
that there may be a connection at the broader, societal level to women’s 
participation in the workforce and secularization (p. 114).
Finally, there is some evidence that being exposed to a variety of different 
cultures and ideas, which can be seen as a type of informal education, plays an 
important role in why many people end up abandoning their religious beliefs.  
Zuckerman (2011) explains that for many non-believers it is:
moving to a new country and being exposed to new ways of life that makes 
them question their beliefs. For others, it is experiencing or becoming 
acquainted with other religions. For still others, it is simply taking a class in 
which they learn about other religions, other cultures. But the underlying 
dynamic is always the same: experiencing, witnessing, or learning about other 
people who do things differently, believe different things, and/or hold different
outlooks on life can stir up a process of critical self-reflection that can be 
potentially corrosive to one’s long-held religious convictions (p. 156).
The above summary demonstrates that the connection between atheism and 
intelligence is still somewhat unclear.  Section 8.1.7 of this paper will outline how the 
present project further tested the possible connection and the results.
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3.3 Conclusion
Chapter three reviewed seven existing theories on why certain individuals who
grow up in religious environments end up becoming atheists: immorality, arrogance, 
anger, poor father-child relationships, lower religious emphasis during childhood, 
deliberation in the pursuit of truth, and higher intelligence. It was demonstrated that 
the research literature related to each theory is inconclusive and that further 
investigation into each area is merited.  The present project will thus incorporate 
measures related to each of these seven existing theories alongside measures related to
the central thesis of the project.
Aside from the theory of higher intelligence, the existing theories all have one 
thing in common: they are all based on subjective, emotional, or social reasons rather 
than some sort of objective or innate quality in the person.  However, there is reason 
to believe that innate qualities may play a role as well.  After discussing many of the 
theories covered in this chapter,  Zuckerman (2011) concluded, based on his 
numerous interviews with atheist apostates:
One of the most common metaphors people employed in describing their 
apostasy was that it was akin to “coming out” as a homosexual. Such people 
said that they had tried their hardest to be religious—and they had even 
convinced themselves for a spell that they did have faith—but in the end, they 
just couldn’t deny their internal irreligiosity any longer, and they had to simply
admit and embrace the atheism or agnosticism that seemed to be at the core of 
their being. 
The next chapter will introduce one model of individual differences that may prove 
useful in determining which innate qualities may play a role in why some people 
become atheists and others do not.
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4 WHAT IS PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE?
The previous chapter examined seven existing theories on why some 
individuals who grow up in religious environments become atheists as adults.  Most 
of these theories are based on people’s experiences and/or people’s reactions to those 
experiences and are thus explanations based on “nurture.”  This chapter will turn its 
attention to the “nature” side of the debate by looking at the possible role of innate 
qualities instead.  The model of individual differences that will be used to examine the
possible role of innate qualities is that of psychological type.  This chapter will 
examine the development of psychological type theory and outline how it has been 
theorized to relate to the realm of religion and spirituality.  This will lay the necessary 
foundation for assessing its potential for the current project and other future projects 
relating to atheism and nonbelief.
4.1 Basics of psychological type
4.1.1 History of psychological type theory
Psychological type theory has its origins in the work of Swiss psychologist 
Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961).  Originally a close colleague of Sigmund Freud, Jung 
eventually parted company with the father of psychoanalysis and developed his own 
school of psychology, known as “analytical psychology.”  One of Jung’s greatest 
contributions to the field of psychology was his concept of extraversion versus 
introversion.  For Jung, whether a person was an extravert or an introvert represented 
the most basic difference between human personalities and was a division based on 
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biology rather than on deliberate choice or upbringing.  Referring to extraverts and 
introverts as two distinct “attitude-types,” he explains:
It is a fundamental contrast, sometimes quite clear, sometimes obscured, but 
always apparent when one is dealing with individuals whose personality is in 
any way pronounced. Such people are found not merely among the educated, 
but in all ranks of society... sex makes no difference either... such a widespread
distribution could hardly have come about if it were merely a question of a 
conscious and deliberate choice or attitude... [Therefore, it] must be due to 
some unconscious, instinctive cause. As a general psychological phenomenon, 
therefore, the type-antithesis must have some kind of biological foundation 
(Jung, 1971a, pp. 179-180).
For Jung, the primary difference between an extravert and an introvert is his or
her attitude towards the outside world of people and things (which he refers to as “the 
object”) and how this effects their psychological energy (which he refers to as 
“libido”). As he explains,
The introvert’s attitude is an abstracting one; at bottom, he is always intent on 
withdrawing libido from the object, as though he had to prevent the object 
from gaining power over him. The extravert, on the contrary, has a positive 
relation to the object. He affirms its importance to such an extent that his 
subjective attitude is constantly related to and oriented by the object (Jung, 
1971a, p. 179).
He goes on to describe introverts as “reserved, inscrutable, rather shy people” and 
extroverts as “the open, sociable, jovial, or at least friendly and approachable 
characters who are on good terms with everybody, or quarrel with everybody, but 
always relate to them in some way and in turn are affected by them” (p. 179).  Jung 
makes it clear that neither type is better than the other and that the two attitudes 
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simply evolved as equally successful ways of adapting to one’s environment.  He 
writes, “the one [attitude] consists of a high rate of fertility, with low powers of 
defence and short duration of life for the individual; the other consists in equipping 
the individual with numerous means of self preservation plus a low fertility rate” 
(Jung, 1971a, p. 180).  Recent studies have confirmed Jung’s view by demonstrating 
that the extraversion-introversion distinction can be found throughout the animal 
kingdom.  It has been found in mammals such as chimpanzees, cats, dogs, and pigs, 
and even in guppies and octopi (Gosling & John, 1999).
Jung broke down the psychological typing of humans further by combining his
view of extraversion and introversion with his view of how the psyche is structured.  
According to Jung (1971b), human consciousness has four main functions: sensing 
(the perception of physical reality), intuition (the perception of possibilities), thinking 
(the recognition of our perceptions), and feeling (the evaluation of our perceptions).  
The first two, he labelled “perceiving functions” and the last two, he labelled “judging
functions”.
Although every person uses all four functions, Jung felt that each person 
naturally prefers to use one of the four the most and thus becomes more adept at using
that particular function than the other three.  Thus, an individual’s preference of 
dominant function, combined with their general attitude of extraversion or 
introversion, results in eight possible psychological types: Extraverted Sensing, 
Extraverted Intution, Extraverted Thinking, Extraverted Feeling, Introverted Sensing, 
Introverted Intuition, Introverted Thinking, and Introverted Feeling.  Jung offered 
general descriptions of each type in his writings (see Jung, 1971a, pp. 182-266) but 
did not develop the theory any further than that.  For instance, he never moved from 
the theoretical to practical applications, nor did he ever attempt to develop a method 
for determining an individual’s psychological type.
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The task of developing Jung’s theory further was taken up by the mother-
daughter team of Katharine Briggs (1875-1968) and Isabel Myers (1897-1980).  
Katharine Briggs was the wife of Lyman Briggs, director of the National Bureau of 
Standards and a key person in the early stages of the Manhattan Project (the research 
group that produced the first atomic bombs).  While Lyman Briggs was engaged in 
the war effort at the national level, Katharine Briggs and her daughter were engaged 
on a more grassroots level.  As Isabel Myers’ son Peter Myers explains,
[The two women] had been interested in Jung’s theory for about 16 years 
when the Second World War took many men from the industrial workforce 
into the services and brought many women out of their normal activities to 
replace them.  Since, for the majority of these women, the heavy industrial 
workplace was strange new territory, my mother and grandmother thought that
a knowledge of one’s personality preferences in terms of Jungian type theory 
might be a valuable aid to identifying the kind of job for the war effort in 
which someone without previous relevant experience could be most 
comfortable and effective. They searched in vain for a test or some indicator 
of a person’s Jungian preference and finally decided to create one of their own 
(Myers, 1980, p. xiii).
The result was the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator® or MBTI® – a psychometric 
instrument that is now taken by millions of individuals each year, in postsecondary 
institutions, workplaces, the military, and even churches.
Psychological type theory as developed by Briggs and Myers differs somewhat
from Jung’s original theory.  The most noteable difference is that the Briggs/Myers 
theory includes sixteen distinct psychological types, whereas Jung’s theory included 
only eight.  As discussed earlier, Jung based his types on what he called the dominant 
function – the one function out of four that an individual preferred the most  However,
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he also mentioned the possibility of an auxiliary, or secondary function.  After 
describing the eight main psychological types, he writes that, “closer investigation 
shows with great regularity that, besides the most differentiated function, another, less
differentiated function of secondary importance is invariably present in consciousness
and exerts a co-determining influence” (Jung, 1971a, p. 266).  He theorized that this 
secondary function would never be of the same category as the first.  For example, if 
the dominant function was sensing (a perceiving function), then the secondary 
function would be one of the two judging functions (thinking or feeling).  This means 
that each of the eight main psychological types would have two subtypes.  Although 
Jung never listed them or described them, Briggs and Myers picked up on the fact that
Jung’s theory allowed for the following sixteen combinations (Table 4):
Table 4: The original sixteen psychological types, based on Jung
1a Extravert with Sensing (dominant) + Thinking (secondary)
1b Extravert with Sensing (dominant) + Feeling (secondary)
2a Extravert with Intuition (dominant) + Thinking (secondary)
2b Extravert with Intuition (dominant) + Feeling (secondary)
3a Extravert with Thinking (dominant) + Sensing (secondary)
3b Extravert with Thinking (dominant) + Intuition (secondary)
4a Extravert with Feeling (dominant) + Sensing (secondary)
4b Extravert with Feeling (dominant) + Intuition (secondary)
5a Introvert with Sensing (dominant) + Thinking (secondary)
5b Introvert with Sensing (dominant) + Feeling (secondary)
6a Introvert with Intuition (dominant) + Thinking (secondary)
6b Introvert with Intuition (dominant) + Feeling (secondary)
7a Introvert with Thinking (dominant) + Sensing (secondary)
7b Introvert with Thinking (dominant) + Intuition (secondary)
8a Introvert with Feeling (dominant) + Sensing (secondary)
8b Introvert with Feeling (dominant) + Intuition (secondary)
In addition to focusing on the sixteen types instead of the core eight, Briggs 
and Myers introduced new ideas about the dominant and secondary functions.  They 
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theorized that if a person were an extravert, he or she would use the dominant 
function primarily to interact with the outside world and the secondary function 
primarily to interact with their inner world.  For an introvert, the opposite would be 
true.  The dominant function would be used primarily to interact with the inner world 
and the secondary function would be used primarily to interact with the outer world. 
Myers (1980) explains it this way:
A good way to visualize the difference is to think of the dominant process as 
the General and the auxiliary process as his Aide. In the case of the extravert, 
the General is always out in the open. Other people meet him immediately and
do their business directly with him.  They can get the official viewpoint on 
anything at any time.  The Aide stands respectively in the background or 
disappears inside the tent.  The introvert’s General is inside the tent, working 
on matters of top priority. The Aide is outside fending off interuptions, or, if he
is inside helping the General, he comes out to see what is wanted.  It is the 
Aide whom others meet and with whom they do their business.  Only when 
the business is very important (or the friendship is very close) do others get in 
to see the General himself (p. 13).
However, in order to help individuals understand psychological type theory in a more 
simple way, Briggs and Myers opted not to explain the theory in terms of dominant 
and secondary functions.  Instead, they chose to explain it in terms of four 
dichotomous preferences, each represented by a choice between two letters:
1. Is the person an extravert (E) or and introvert (I)?
2. Which perceiving function does the person use most: sensing (S) or intuition 
(N)?  Note: the letter “N” was chosen to represent intuition because “I” was 
already being used to represent introversion. 
3. Which judging function does the person use most: thinking (T) or feeling (F)?
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4. Which function does the person present to the outside world, your judging 
function (J) or your perceiving function (P)?
Thus, in order to determine psychological type, one must determine one’s 
preference in each of these four areas.  The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator® is designed
to do this and does so by asking sets of forced-choice questions related to the four 
areas.  The result is a four-letter code that represents one of the sixteen psychological 
types (see Figure 3 below).  These map perfectly onto the sixteen types from Jung’s 
theory even though the method used to arrive at them, as well as the notation, is 
different.
Although one’s dominant function is not immediately apparent in the notation 
used by Briggs and Myers, it can still be determined by using the four letters.  For 
extraverts, the process is straight-forward.  If an extravert is a J, his or her judging 
function (T or F) will be the dominant one, whereas if an extravert is a P, his or her 
perceiving function (S or N) will be the dominant one.  Because introverts present 
their secondary function to the outside world, the opposite will be true.   If an 
introvert is a J, his or her perceiving function (S or N) will be the dominant one.  If an 
introvert is a P, his or her judging function (T or F) will be the dominant one.
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ISTJ
5a
ISFJ
5b
INFJ
6b
INTJ
6a
ISTP
7a
ISFP
8a
INFP
8b
INTP
7b
ESTP
1a
ESFP
1b
ENFP
2b
ENTP
2a
ESTJ
3a
ESFJ
4a
ENFJ
4b
ENTJ
3b
Figure 3: The sixteen psychological types according to Briggs and Myers.  Note: the 
numbers below each type indicate the corresponding Jungian type as listed in Table 
4.
Although the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator® is a proprietary product, currently
owned by CPP, Inc. of Mountainview, California, the actual theory of psychological 
type as developed by Briggs and Myers, including their notation system, is within the 
public domain.  It it thus important to note that, whereas the term “Myers-Briggs 
type” refers exclusively to one’s psychological type as determined by the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator®, the terms “psychological type” or “Jungian type” are more 
generic and refer to one’s type as determined by the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator®, 
or by some other means, of which there are now many.  For example, the current 
project will use the Francis Psychological Type Scales (FPTS) to determine 
psychological type.  This instrument will be described in more detail in Part II.
4.1.2 The four dichotomies of psychological type
The previous section outlined how Briggs and Myers took Jung’s original 
theory of psychological type and developed it further.  This section will look at the 
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current theory of psychological type in more detail by focusing on the four 
dichotomies that Briggs and Myers introduced in order to make the theory more 
accessible to the general public.
It is important to note at the outset that psychological type theory, which is 
based on the concept of types, is very different from other theories of personality, 
most of which are based on the concept of traits.  Trait theories seek to place 
individuals on continuums with regard to the different aspects of their personality.  On
the other hand, type theories seek to place individuals in mutually exclusive 
categories.  For example, in a trait theory, extraversion is presented on a scale with 
positions ranging from 1 to 100.  Individuals scoring 17 and 32 on such a scale would 
both be considered to display “low extraversion” (and hence introversion) but the 
individual scoring 17 would be considered to be “more introverted” than the 
individual who scored 32.  On the other hand, in a type theory, an individual is either 
an extravert or introvert and nothing more can be said beyond that.  In other words, in 
a type theory, no introvert is ever considered to be “more introverted” than any other 
introvert.  
It is also important to note that psychological type theory is based on the idea 
of preference.  For example, just because an individual prefers to use his or her 
thinking function more often than his or her feeling function (and could thus be 
labelled a “thinker”), it does not mean that that person is incapable of using his or 
feeling function or that that person never does so.  As Goldsmith (1997) explains:
[Psychological type theory suggests] that our behaviour (the combination of 
ways of taking in information, processing it, and developing responses and 
actions in the world) is not random but follows certain patterns. These patterns
are not determined so that they take away our personal responsibility. Instead, 
we remain free to choose how we behave, but we are more likely to act in 
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certain ways because of the preferences which we have developed. I am more 
likely to choose a tape or CD of Bach than of the Beatles. That is not to say 
that I won’t ever choose one, but it is far more likely that I will opt for Bach 
because that is my preference (p. 24).
One of the benefits of psychological type theory’s focus on preference is that 
the two sides of each dichotomy are seen as being neutral in terms of “emotional 
health, intellectual functioning, and psychological adaptation” (Myers, McCaulley, 
Quenk & Hammer, 2003, p. 5).  Thus, psychological type theory is less value-laden 
than most trait-based theories.  With this in mind, the four dichotomies will now be 
examined in detail.
 The first dichotomy in psychological type theory is that of extraversion versus 
introversion.  Following Jung’s original definitions, this dichotomy is primarily 
concerned with where an individual focuses his or her psychological energy.  
According to the current MBTI® manual, “Extraverts are oriented primarily toward 
the outer world; thus they tend to focus their energy on people and objects.  Introverts 
are orientated toward the inner world; thus they tend to focus their energy on 
concepts, ideas, and internal experience” (Myers, McCaulley, Quenk & Hammer, 
2003, p. 6).  The result of this difference is that extraverts tend to be more sociable, 
energetic, and bold whereas introverts tend to be more quiet, subdued and likely to let 
others take the lead.  Also, extraverts tend to have many friendships and many 
interests, whereas introverts tend to have fewer, but deeper, friendships and fewer, but
more refined, interests.  However, regardless of behaviour, the key point about 
extraversion and introversion in psychological type theory is that the difference is 
based on where a person focuses their psychological energy.  An introvert might be 
very talkative and sociable on occasion, having learned to do so out of necessity, but 
acting in such a manner is likely to drain their psychological energy more than it 
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would for an extrovert.  For example, after attending a party and meeting a lot of new 
people, an introvert is likely to desire some quiet time alone to reflect and “refuel”, 
whereas an extrovert will likely leave such a gathering feeling more energized, not 
less.  This focus on the deeper issue of energy orientation sets  psychological type 
theory apart from other personality measures that focus more on outward behaviour 
only.
The second dichotomy in psychological type theory is that of sensing versus 
intuition.  According to Jung, sensing and intuition are the two perceiving functions 
existing within the human psyche.  They represent two different ways of seeing the 
world and gathering information about it.  Those individuals who prefer to use their 
sensing function tend to focus on the present and on what is real, concrete, and 
practical, whereas those who prefer to use their intuition function tend to focus on the 
future and on what is possible, abstract and theoretical.  Myers, McCaulley, Quenk 
and Hammer (2003) explain it this way: “a person may rely primarily upon the 
process of Sensing (S), which attends to observable facts or happenings through one 
or more of the fives senses, or a person may rely more upon the less obvious process 
of Intuition (N), which attends to meanings, relationships, and/or possibilities that 
have been worked out beyond the reach of the conscious mind” (p. 6).  Another key 
difference relating to this dichotomy is that individuals who prefer sensing tend to 
focus on the details of a situation whereas individuals who prefer intuition tend to 
focus on the “big picture” (i.e. the broader context and resulting implications).   
The third dichotomy in psychological type theory is that of thinking versus 
feeling.  According to Jung, thinking and feeling are the two judging functions 
existing within the human psyche.  They represent two different ways of processing 
and responding to the information given by the perceiving function.  From the outset, 
Myers, McCaulley, Quenk and Hammer (2003) make it clear that, “in Jung’s and 
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Myers’ approaches, the term Thinking does not imply intelligence or competence, and
the term Feeling is not to be confused with emotional.  Intelligence and emotional 
expression are independent of psychological type” (p. 6).  Instead, they explain that a 
person who prefers thinking simply prefers to make decisions based on “logic and 
consequences” whereas a person who prefers feeling prefers to make decisions based 
on “personal or social values” (p. 6).  The result is that thinkers tend to be impersonal,
impartial, and willing to offer criticism when necessary, whereas feelers tend to be 
more sympathetic, diplomatic, and focused on maintaining harmony within groups.  
The third dichotomy is the only one of the four known to be influenced by gender 
with males, on average, tending more towards Thinking and females, on average, 
tending more towards Feeling.
The fourth and final dichotomy in psychological type theory is that of judging 
versus perceiving.  It is important to note that the term judging is in no way related to 
being judgemental, and perceiving is in no way related to being perceptive.  Instead, 
the two terms refer to the two categories of mental functions in Jung’s original theory. 
According to Briggs and Myers, individuals on the judging side prefer to use their 
judging function (thinking or feeling) when dealing with the outside world whereas 
individuals on the perceiving side prefer to use their perceiving function (sensing or 
intuition).  The result is that judgers tend to like firm decisions and detailed plans (so 
that they can feel that a thing is “settled”), whereas perceivers tend to like flexibility 
and tentative plans (so that they can feel open to integrate new information along the 
way).  Because of this, judgers usually appear more organized and structured whereas 
perceivers appear more casual and relaxed.  A judger’s greatest strength is his or her 
ability to keep to schedules and stay on task whereas a perceiver’s greatest strength is 
his or her ability to adapt well when situations suddenly change. 
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Two final pieces of information should be noted about the four dimensions of 
psychological type.  The first is that, for most of the dichotomies, the general 
population is split approximately 50-50 when it comes to the two possible 
preferences.  For example, there are approximately the same number of introverts in 
the general population as there are extroverts.  The one exception to this rule is the 
S/N dichotomy.  According to a representative sample reported in Myers, McCaulley, 
Quenk and Hammer (2003), a preference for sensing (S) occurs in about 75% of the 
general population, whereas a preference for intuition (N) occurs only in about 25% 
(p. 298).  Second, for most of the dichotomies, gender does not play a role.  For 
example, the percentage of introverts among females in the general population is 
about the same as the percentage of introverts among males.  The one exception to 
this rule is the T/F dichotomy.  Surveys usually find females tend towards feeling at 
higher percentages than thinking, whereas males tend towards thinking at higher 
percentages than feeling.  According to Myers, McCaulley, Quenk and Hammer 
(2003), this difference is most likely due to socially-influenced ideas about gender 
rather than by innate differences between females and males (p. 122).
4.1.3 How psychological type theory is used today
One of the greatest benefits of psychological type theory as it exists today is 
that it allows for more than one way to explore personality differences.  First, one can 
simply look at the four dichotomies separately, as discussed above.  This allows for 
direct comparisons to be made with many trait-based theories.  For example, Costa 
and McCrae (1989) found that individuals who prefer Feeling in the Myers-Briggs 
model tend to score higher, on average, than those who prefer Thinking on the trait 
known as Agreeableness in the Big 5 model (see Section 5.2.3).  Second, one can 
explore “whole type” by looking at each of the sixteen psychological types separately 
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and delving into the detailed descriptions of each type given by Briggs and Myers as 
well as numerous other researchers.  Third, one can explore “type dynamics” by 
focusing primarily on the Jungian notions of dominant and secondary functions.  
Fourth, one can look at the different ways in which the various parts of a person’s 
personality combine and work together.  For example, by focusing on the first and 
fourth dimensions of psychological type, one comes up with four possible 
combinations: IJ, IP, EJ, and EP.  The types ISTJ, ISFJ, INFJ, and INTJ would all fall 
into the larger category of “IJ” and would share certain things in common in contrast 
to those in the IP, EJ, or EP categories.  Figure 4 outlines the six ways in which the 
psychological type table (shown in Figure 4) can be divided for further analysis.
ST SF NF NT
IJ
IP
EP
EJ
IS IN
ES EN
IT IF IT
ET EF ET
SJ NJ
SP NP
SJ NJ
TJ FJ TJ
TP FP TP
TJ FJ TJ
Figure 4: Possible psychological type groupings
A fifth and final way to explore psychological type is to focus on 
temperament.  This particular method was made popular by American psychologist 
David Keirsey (1921-2013) in his 1984 book Please Understand Me.  According to 
Keirsey, one can divide the psychological table in such a way that the resulting four 
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groups correspond roughly to the four ancient temperaments, or humours, spoken of 
by the second century Greek physician Galen.  Keirsey did this by first dividing the 
table into S versus N and then dividing the S side into SJ versus SP and dividing the N
side into NF versus NT.  However, instead of using Galen’s labels for the four 
temperaments (Melancholic, Sanguine, Choleric, and Phlegmatic), he renamed the 
four groups Guardians, Artisans, Idealists, and Rationalists.
According to Keirsey, Guardians (SJs) are practical and well-organized 
individuals who value security and stability.  They like to belong to some sort of 
institution and are usually responsible, loyal and hard-working, being careful to 
uphold and live by the established rules, structures and traditions of those institutions. 
On the other hand, Artisans (SPs) are more adventurous and adaptable.  Although they
like to be busy with practical, hands-on jobs, they need more freedom and flexibility 
than their SJ counterparts.  They are often good at sports, artistic expression or 
activities which require special skills.  They can be excellent problem solvers in times 
of crisis but are also known for sometimes breaking the rules.  On the intuitive side, 
Idealists (NFs) are mostly concerned with developing human potential, both in 
themselves and others.  They want their lives to be meaningful and like to feel needed 
by others.  They have strong values and good communication skills and are therefore 
usually the ones who maintain harmony in groups.  In contrast, Rationalists (NTs) 
value knowledge and competence above all else.  They want to make sense of the 
world so that they can help improve it but are generally not interested in taking care of
the details.  Although they are good at connecting ideas and recognizing patterns, they
often do things their own way and can be somewhat serious or absent-minded.
As mentioned earlier, psychological type theory is widely used in educational, 
business, government, and religious settings.  This is true not only of the proprietary 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator® but of psychological type theory in general, including 
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the four Keirsey types and the other applications mentioned above.  The fact that it is 
so widely used and widely known, combined with the fact that it uses value neutral 
terminology, makes it an ideal model for the current project.  However, before looking
at how psychological type has been used within the field of the Psychology of 
Religion, the various criticisms levelled at the theory must first be addressed.
4.2 Assessing psychological type theory
4.2.1 Criticism of psychological type theory
Bayne (1995) outlines ten criticisms of psychological type theory (p. 77-93).  
The first and most common criticism is that the theory is an insult to individuality and
that it “puts people in boxes.”  This criticism is one that is likely to be levelled at any 
model of individual differences.  However, as Kluckhohn and Murray (1953) put it:  
“Every man [sic] is, in certain respects: [1] like all other men, [2] like some other 
men, and [3] like no other man.”  Psychological type theory, like all personality 
theories, simply focuses on the second truth and in no way denies the first and third.  
As Francis (2005) writes, “type theory does not try to capture individuality, but rather 
provides a broad framework which helps move toward appreciating individuality” (p. 
88).  Although type theory does carry the risk of stereotyping individuals, this risk can
be minimized by being aware of this danger and by understanding that the theory does
not claim to be an exact science. As Baynes writes, “the preferences and types are 
reference points, not pigeon-holes” (p. 77).
The second criticism is that people behave differently in different situations 
and thus innate personality preferences do not exist.  While it is true that human 
behaviour does vary and that it is impossible to predict how a person will act in any 
given situation, decades of social psychology research have demonstrated that over 
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time, human behaviours do show a high level of consistency.  For example, an 
introvert might, from time-to-time, behave in a very extroverted way.  But on average,
he or she is likely to tend towards more introverted behaviours.  Thus, even though 
knowledge of personality preferences cannot predict what will happen in every 
situation, it can still be used to make broader, larger-scale predictions.
The third and fourth criticisms are that the results are skewed by the Forer 
effect (also known as the Barnum effect) because the type descriptions are too vague 
and too positive.  The Forer effect is the tendency for people to think that certain 
descriptions of their  personality and/or life are very specific and accurate when really
they are vague and general enough to apply to most people.  The best example of the 
Forer effect is the way in which some people take newspaper horoscopes seriously 
and believe that they accurately describe their lives.  If psychological type theory 
were subject to the Forer effect, the instruments used to measure type would 
demonstrate very low reliability.  However, this is not the case when it comes to the 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator® and the Francis Psychological Type Scales (see 
Section 4.1.5 below).  In one particular study of the MBTI®’s reliability, Carskadon 
(1982) administered the questionnaire and then one week later gave each participant 
five different results in a random order, including their actual result and the opposite 
of their result, and then instructed them to choose the one that described them most 
accurately.  He found that 66% chose either their actual result or a type very close to 
their actual result (one in which their lowest scoring preference was reversed), 
whereas only 4% chose the exact opposite of their result.
The fifth and sixth criticisms are that psychological type theory as it exists 
today has departed from various aspects of Jung’s original theory.  This observation is,
in fact, true but is actually a point in the current theory’s favour. As Francis (2005) 
writes, “it has also to be recognized that some aspects of Jung’s theory are themselves 
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highly contentious and that it may be a serious error to take a fundamentalist attitude 
toward Jung’s own writings.  Currently, there is much better empirical support for the 
model of personality assessment promoted by some of the type indicators than from 
basic Jungian views” (p. 89).
The seventh criticism is that self-report questionnaires cannot be trusted 
because they are too easy to fake.  According to Costa and McCrae (1992b), there 
actually exists substantial evidence to the contrary; i.e. self-report questionnaires are 
in fact trustworthy, both in terms of indicating what a person is really like, as well as 
his or her self-concept.  In fact, according to Bayne (1995), “even in situations where 
faking would be rewarded, people tend not to fake” (p. 90).  The validity of 
psychological type instruments has been found to be strong and this will be discussed 
further in Section 4.1.5.
The eighth criticism is that the numerical results given by the MBTI® are 
confusing.  As mentioned earlier, type theories differ significantly from trait theories.  
In psychological type theory, the numerical results represent clarity of preference, not 
the degree to which an individual possesses a trait.  A high score simply indicates that 
the result is likely to be correct, whereas a low score indicates that the result may 
change in a future assessment.  If this distinction is adequately explained by those 
administrating the assessment, confusion can be reduced.
The ninth criticism is that psychological type theory is “just a racket for 
making money” (Bayne, 1995, p. 92).  Although it is true that the MBTI® is a 
proprietary instrument and that taking the official inventory can be expensive, it can 
be argued that designing and maintaining a quality psychometric instrument requires 
adequate funds and that properly controlling and licensing its use greatly improves its 
reliability and validity.  On the other hand, there are many other public domain 
measures of psychological type that have been shown to be reliable and valid as well. 
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Many of these, such as the Francis Psychological Type Scales, have been used 
exclusively for research purposes and not for making money.
The tenth and final criticism is that psychological type theory is just like 
astrology.  However, as mentioned above, the Forer effect plays a major role in 
astrology, whereas it plays a much smaller role in type theory.  In addition to this, 
astrology tends to be prescriptive in nature, whereas type theory is descriptive and 
based on an individual’s self-report.  
4.2.2 The reliability and validity of psychological type theory
Two important concepts when it comes to assessing the value of a 
psychometric instrument are reliability and validity.  Reliability refers to how 
consistent the instrument is, whereas validity refers to how accurate it is.  Although 
the two concepts are related, they are not identical.  For example, an archer could be 
consistent but not accurate by missing the target ten times in a row but hitting the 
same spot every time.  On the other hand, the archer could be accurate but not 
consistent by hitting spots close to the target but hitting a different spot each time.
The two main types of reliability are internal consistency reliability and test-
retest reliability.  Internal consistency is determined by dividing the item pool in half 
and testing to see if each half produces a similar result.  A statistical analysis of all 
possible item correlations results in a number between zero and one, known as the 
alpha coefficient.  This number should be at least .7 if the instrument is to be 
considered very reliable, although alphas above .6 are also considered acceptable 
(DeVellis, 2003).  According to the current MBTI® manual (Myers, McCaulley, 
Quenk & Hammer, 2003), the MBTI® achieved the following alpha coefficients on 
each of its four scales: .91 for the E-I scale, .92 for the S-N scale, .91 for the T-F 
scale, and .92 for the J-P scale..  According to Francis, Craig, and Hall (2008), the 
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Francis Psychological Types Scales achieved the following alpha coefficients:  .83 for
the E-I scale, .76 for the S-N scale, .73 for the T-F scale, and .79 for the J-P scale.  
Thus, the two instruments can be considered to be internally consistent.  The other 
type of reliability, test-retest reliability, is determined by giving the same participant 
the same instrument at a point in the future and testing to see if a similar result is 
produced.  According to the current MBTI® manual (Myers, McCaulley, Quenk & 
Hammer, 2003), a combined analysis of several studies measuring the test-retest 
reliability of the MBTI® found that 65% of participants (n = 424) got the exact same 
result one month later and 93% got either the same result or just one letter different 
(p. 163).  It also found that higher clarity scores resulted in fewer changes in the 
retests.  In other words, when a letter was changed, this was most often due to the fact
that the participant achieved a low clarity score for that particular scale.  These 
findings point to good test-retest reliability.
Tests of validity focus on whether or not an instrument is in fact measuring 
what it is supposed to be measuring.  Two methods used to test validity are factor 
analysis and comparison to similar scales.  Factor analysis is a statistical test in which 
correlations between items are measured to determine how many independent factors 
or scales the instrument is measuring.  In the case of the MBTI®, there should be four 
independent scales.  According to the current MBTI® manual (Myers, McCaulley, 
Quenk & Hammer, 2003), several factor analysis studies of the MBTI® have 
confirmed that the instrument is indeed measuring the four scales it purports to be 
measuring (p. 172).  In studies in which the MBTI® was taken alongside other 
personality instruments, each of the four MBTI® scales were found to be strongly 
correlated with other similar scales.  For example, the E-I scale correlated with  
liveliness and social boldness on the 16PF and with sociability and social presence on 
the California Psychological Inventory (Myers, McCaulley, Quenk & Hammer, 2003, 
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pp. 173-184).  Most noteably, Costa and McCrae (1989) found that the MBTI® 
correlates strongly with the Big Five personality traits, with the E-I scale correlating 
with Extraversion, the S-N scale correlating with Openness, the T-F scale correlating 
with Agreeableness, and the J-P scale correlating with Conscientiousness.  The 
connection between psychological type theory and the Big Five model of personality 
will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Five (Section 5.2.3).
This section demonstrated that psychological type theory stands up well to 
criticism and is both reliable and valid.  The next section will focus on how the theory
has been used within the realm of the Psychology of Religion.
4.3 Theoretical applications of psychological type to religion
Psychological type theory has been applied to the realm of religion and 
spirituality both theoretically and empirically.  This section will look at the numerous 
books that have been written on the subject from a theoretical perspective.  This will 
set the stage for chapter five, which will turn its attention to the many empirical 
studies that have used the theory.
Although the MBTI® was first developed in the 1940s, it was not until the 
1980s that  psychological type theory started to be applied within the realm of religion
and spirituality.  During that decade, several books were published on the subject, the 
first of which was From image to likeness: A Jungian path in the gospel journey by 
Grant, Thompson, and Clarke (1983).  This book looks at the four Jungian functions –
Sensing, Intuition, Thinking and Feeling – and seeks to view the Christian gospel 
from each.  According to the authors, the Sensing function reminds Christians of 
God’s simplicity and presence in their lives.  They encourage readers to use the 
Sensing function to focus on the physical aspects of gathering together as a 
community to worship God.  On the other hand, the authors see the Intuitive function 
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as important when it comes to wrestling with the more abstract, future implications of 
the Christian gospel.  They point to how symbols have been used extensively within 
the Christian church to express the unknown and to how these are the product of the 
intuitive function.  As for the two judging functions, the authors see Thinking as 
useful for understanding theological issues related to God’s justice and for organizing 
the church into an institution with a structured liturgy, whereas they see Feeling as 
useful for acting out the compassion and healing aspects of the gospel.
In their book, Personality and spiritual freedom (subtitled Growing in the 
Christian life through understanding personality type and the Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicator), Robert and Carol Faucett (1987) took a slightly different approach, 
focusing instead on how individuals with different psychological type preferences will
express their spirituality in different ways.  For example, they write, “the introvert 
will naturally be drawn to more reflective forms of prayer and the inner journey, that 
is prayer forms that are more inward and quiet... the extrovert, on the other hand... 
may want to be more involved and act out their relationship with God as leaders, in 
service, and will tend to be more social- and action-oriented” (p. 110-111).  Likewise, 
they write that the sensor will be more apt to enjoy the presence of God in the here 
and now, whereas intuitives will be more apt to enjoy using symbolism and their 
imagination to understand and experience the divine.  Finally, they point out that 
thinkers will be more drawn to bible study and to structured church services whereas 
feelers will be more interested in the relational aspects of congregational life.
Charles Keating’s book Who we are is how we pray: Matching personality and
spirituality (1987) goes one step further by looking at how each of the sixteen 
psychological types experience spirituality differently.  For example, he writes that an 
ISTJ will enjoy a private spirituality with scheduled prayer, whereas an ENFP (the 
opposite type) will enjoy a people-orientated spirituality but need time for deep 
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reflection (pp. 50-51).  He also discusses how introverts will differ from extroverts, 
how sensors will differ from intuitives, how thinkers will differ from feelers, and how 
judgers will differ from perceivers.
Personality type and religious leadership, by Roy Oswald and Otto Kroeger 
(1988) was the first book to focus primarily on those in religious leadership – 
clergymen, clergywomen, pastors, and ministers – and on how psychological type 
impacts the ways in which they do their jobs, from preaching to parish administration.
The authors make use of the four Keirsey temperaments and present four major 
pastoral types: the serving SJ pastor who excels at administrative duties and at 
maintaining traditions; the action-oriented SP pastor who excels at youth work and in 
mission-based congregations; the relationship-oriented NF pastor who excels at 
inspiring others to reach their full potential; and the intellectual NT pastor who excels 
at executive leadership and academics.  They also draw parallels between the four 
pastoral types and the four gospels: SJ with Matthew, SP with Mark, NF with Luke, 
and NT with John.
Since the 1980s, many more books have been written on the subject of 
psychological type and spirituality.  In Prayer and Temperament: Different prayer 
forms for different personality, Michael and Norrisey (1991) use the four Keirsey 
temperaments and connect them to four different types of spirituality named after four
famous Catholic saints.  According to the authors, the SJ temperament is connected 
with Ignatian spirituality, named after Jesuit founder St Ignatius of Loyola (1491-
1556), and focused on worship that is structured, orderly and well-planned.  The SP 
temperament is connected with Franciscan spirituality, named after the nature-loving 
St Francis of Assisi (1181-1226), and focused on worship that is spontaneous and 
open to the Spirit.  The NF temperament is connected with Augustinian spirituality, 
named after the early Christian philosopher St Augustine of Hippo (354-430), and 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND ATHEISM 106
focused on worship that is rich in symbolism and hidden meanings.  The NT 
temperament is connected with Thomistic spirituality, named after medieval 
philosopher St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), and focused on worship that stems from
theological insight.
In a like manner, Four Spiritualities: Expressions of self, expressions of spirit 
by Peter Richardson (1996) connects the four psychological type function pairs (ST, 
SF, NF, NT) with the four yoga practices of Hinduism.  He connects the ST types to 
karma yoga, which is the path of good works.  He connects the SF types to bhakti 
yoga, which is the path of devotion to a particular God.  He connects the NF types to 
raja yoga, which is the path of meditation.  Finally, he connects the NT types to jnana 
yoga, which is the path of knowledge.  He also lists two spiritual mentors for each 
group: Moses and Confucius for the ST types, Mohammed and St Francis of Assisi 
for the SF types, Jesus and Rabindranath Tagore for the NF types, and Socrates and 
the Buddha for the NT types.
In his book, Your personality and the spiritual life, Reginald Johnson (1999) 
connects each of the eight original Jungian types to characters from the Bible.  First, 
he labels Jung’s extroverted sensing type (ESTP and ESFP) “the energizers” and uses 
David as a case study.  Second, he labels Jung’s introverted sensing type (ISTJ and 
ISFJ) “the stabilizers” and uses Mark as a case study.  Third, he labels Jung’s 
extroverted intuitive type (ENFP and ENTP) “the crusaders” and uses Joshua as a 
case study.  Fourth, he labels Jung’s introverted intuitive type (INFJ and INTJ) “the 
renewers” and uses John a case study.  Fifth, he labels Jung’s extroverted thinking 
type (ESTJ and ENTJ) “the organizers” and uses Solomon as a case study.  Sixth, he 
labels Jung’s introverted thinking type (ISTP and INTP) “the analyzers” and uses 
Matthew as a case study.  Seventh, he labels Jung’s extroverted feeling type (ESFJ 
and ENFJ) “the encouragers” and uses Ruth as a case study.  Finally, he labels Jung’s 
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introverted feeling type (ISFP and INFP) “the enhancers” and uses Luke as a case 
study.  
Lynne Baab takes a more practical approach in her book Personality type in 
congregations: how to work with others more effectively (1998).  She explores how 
Christians can use psychological type theory for various applications: finding out 
where best to serve within a congregation; discovering one’s spiritual gifts; improving
one’s prayer and bible study; growing spiritually; engaging in congregational 
activities; becoming a leader; and, serving in a pastoral role.
The most comprehensive book about psychological type and spirituality to 
date is most likely SoulTypes: Matching your personality and spiritual path by Hirsh 
and Kise (2006).  In this book, the authors take each of the sixteen types in turn and 
offer suggestions about prayer, worship, service, and spiritual growth.  They also list 
each type’s greatest gifts and best roles in community and give advice on what might 
push each type away from their spiritual path.  This last aspect is particularly 
important to the present project.  For example, the authors note that ISTJs have a 
tendency to notice hypocrisy, that ENTJs have a tendency to make spiritual growth a 
low priority, and that INTJs have a tendency to be at odds with the idea of a higher 
power.
Although the above mentioned books are of interest when it comes to 
exploring the connection between psychological type theory and religious belief, they 
all rely on theory alone and thus cannot be used to make any scientific claims about 
the matter.  However, over the last decade or so, numerous empirical studies have 
been performed using psychological type theory within the realm of religion and 
spirituality.  Chapter five will look at these studies in detail and the results that they 
produced.
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter examined the development of psychological type theory and 
assessed its strength as a measure of personality.  It also outlined how the model has 
been theorized to relate to the realm of religion and spirituality.  Psychological type 
theory was found to be a model of personality that holds up well to criticism, and has 
been demonstrated to be strong  in terms of both reliability and validity.  It also has 
the added advantages of being widely known and of using terms that are neutral as 
opposed to value-laden.  The next chapter will turn its attention toward the numerous 
empirical studies that have used psychological type theory within the realm of religion
and spirituality in order to further assess its usefulness for the current project and to 
build a framework for predictions.
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5 HOW DOES PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AFFECT RELIGIOUS BELIEF?
The previous chapter introduced psychological type theory and began to look 
at how it has been applied within the realm of religion and spirituality.  This chapter 
will move from the theoretical to the empirical by reviewing the many quantitative 
studies that have used  psychological type theory to explore questions related to 
religion and spirituality.  These studies have been divided into four major strands: 
those that have profiled members of the clergy, those that have profiled religious 
groups, those that have explored different ways of being religious, and those that have
explored dissatisfaction with religion.  A final section in this chapter will introduce 
three other models of personality – Hans Eysenck’s PEN model, Raymond Cattell’s 
sixteen personality factors model, and Lewis Golderg’s Big Five model. – and outline 
how studies using these models relate to the studies that use the psychological type 
model.
5.1 Empirical studies using psychological type theory
5.1.1 Psychological type profiles of clergy members
One area that has been explored in great detail when it comes to psychological 
type theory and religion is the profiling of Christian clergy members.  Researchers 
have profiled Bible College students (Francis, Penson & Jones, 2001), 
interdenominational church leaders (Craig, Francis & Robbins, 2004), missionary 
personnel (Craig, Hotsfall & Francis, 2005), Roman Catholic priests (Craig, Duncan 
& Francis, 2006), Anglican clergy (Francis, Craig, Whinney, Tilley & Slater, 2007), 
youth ministers (Francis, Nash, Nash & Craig, 2007), and seminarians (Francis, Craig
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& Butler, 2007).  Taken together, this body of research, all of which was done in the 
United Kingdom, indicates that Christian clergy tend towards introversion over 
extraversion, sensing over intuition, feeling over thinking, and judging over 
perceiving (i.e., ISFJ).  Francis, Robbins, Kaldor and Castle (2009) confirmed this 
tendency in their study of 3,715 clergymen and clergywomen from a variety of 
denominations in Australia, England, and New Zealand.  They also noted that clergy 
members with a preference for introversion and thinking report lower work-related 
psychological health than other types.  This finding may relate to the types most likely
to be dissatisfied with religion in general; this topic is discussed below in Section 
5.1.4.
5.1.2 Psychological type profiles of religious groups
Another area that has been explored in great detail is the profiling of religious 
groups in general.  This area is of greater interest to the current project since it focuses
on the overall membership of religious groups, and not just the leadership of those 
groups.  The knowledge of which psychological types are most likely to be found in 
religious groups is useful because it can be used to predict which psychological types 
might be the most common among non-religious individuals.
The earliest study to provide a psychological type profile of a religious group 
is Gerhart (1983).  This study focused on members of a Unitarian Universalist 
congregation in the U.S. and found that most of the members preferred introversion 
over extraversion, intuition over sensing, and judging over perceiving.  The number of
thinking versus feeling individuals was close to equal.  In the 1990’s, three Canadian-
based studies provided profiles of other groups.  First, Delis-Bulhoes (1990) surveyed 
48 Roman Catholics as well as 154 Evangelical Protestants and found an overall 
preference for introversion, sensing, and judging in both groups.  The main difference 
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between the two groups was that the Catholics, on average, preferred feeling, whereas
the Protestants, on average, preferred thinking.  Second, Ross (1993) surveyed 116 
Anglicans and found an overall preference for introversion, intuition, feeling, and 
judging.  Third, Ross (1995) surveyed 175 Roman Catholics and found an overall 
preference for  introversion, intuition, feeling, and judging among women and 
introversion, thinking, and judging among men (the number of sensing versus 
intuition individuals was close to equal among men).
In the 2000’s, data from the United Kingdom started to be collected as well, all
based on members of Anglican congregations.  In three initial studies, an overall 
preference for introversion, sensing, and judging was found among 101 members of 
Welsh congregations (Craig, Francis, Bailey & Robbins, 2003), among 327 members 
of English congregations (Francis, Duncan, Craig & Luffman, 2004), and among 158 
members of English congregations (Francis, Butler, Jones & Craig, 2007).  In the 
Welsh study, an overall preference for feeling was also found and in the two English 
studies, an overall preference for feeling was found among females with the thinking 
versus feeling dimension being close to equal among men.
Although the above mentioned studies are useful in comparing type 
differences between various religious groups, the results are unable to address the 
larger question of how religious individuals as a whole compare to the general 
population.  This is because the sixteen psychological types do not occur equally in 
the general population (Myers, McCaulley, Quenk & Hammer, 2003).  So, for 
example, if a study finds that a certain religious group has more ISFJs than ENFPs, 
this might not actually be significant because it could be that there are simply more 
ISFJs than ENFPs in the general population.  In order to address this weakness in the 
data, a series of recent studies have begun to compare the percentages of the sixteen 
psychological types in religious groups with the percentages found in the general 
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population.  The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator: Step 1 manual supplement (Kendall, 
1998) gives percentages for the general U.K. population and these figures have been 
used in four new studies of churchgoers in Wales and England.  
In the first study, Francis, Robbins, Williams and Williams (2007) compared 
185 Anglican churchgoers with the U.K. population norms from Kendall (1998) and 
found an over-representation of ISFJ and ESFJ in both male and female churchgoers.  
Among females, these two types accounted for 64% of the churchgoers, whereas the 
expected figure based on populations norms is only 36%.  Among males, the two 
types accounted for 46% of the churchgoers, whereas the expected figure based on 
populations norms is only 13%.  In the second study, Craig, Francis and Barwick 
(2010) compared 626 Anglican churchgoers to the population norms and found an 
over-representation of introversion, intuition, and judging among the churchgoing 
women and an over-representation of intuition and judging among the churchgoing 
men.  The feeling versus thinking percentages were close to the norm for the women 
and the extraversion versus introversion percentages as well as the feeling versus 
thinking percentages were close to the norm for the men.  The most under-represented
types among the female churchgoers were ESTJ, ESFP and ISTP and the most under-
represented types among the male churchgoers were ISTP, ESFP and ISFP.  In the 
third study, Francis, Robbins and Craig (2011) compared 3,304 Anglican churchgoers 
to the population norms and found an over-representation of introversion and judging 
among the churchgoing women and an over-representation of introversion, sensing, 
feeling and judging among the churchgoing men.  The sensing versus intuition 
percentages as well as the feeling versus thinking percentages were close to the norm 
among the women.  The most under-represented types among the female churchgoers 
were ENTP, ISTP and ESTP and the most under-represented types among the male 
churchgoers were INTP, ESTP and ISTP.  In the fourth study, Village, Baker and 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND ATHEISM 113
Howat (2012) compared 1,156 churchgoers from a variety of Christian denominations
in the U.K. to the population norms and found an over-representation of introversion, 
intuition, and judging among the churchgoing women and an over-representation of 
introversion, intuition, feeling and judging among the churchgoing men.  The feeling 
versus thinking percentages were close to the norm among the women.  The most 
under-represented types among the female churchgoers were ESFP, ENTP and ESTP 
and the most under-represented types among the male churchgoers were ISTP, ENTP 
and ESTP.
In addition to the four U.K. studies mentioned above, Robbins and Francis 
(2011) did a study in Australia based on 1,527 churchgoers from 18 different 
denominations.  In this case, the population norms for Australia were those given in 
Ball (2008) from the archive of the Psychological Type Research Unit at Deakin 
University.  This study found an over-representation of sensing, feeling, and judging 
among the churchgoing women and an over-representation of introversion, sensing, 
feeling, and judging among the churchgoing men.  The extraversion versus 
introversion percentages were close to the norm among the women.  The most under-
represented types among the female churchgoers were INTP, INFP and ENTP and the 
most under-represented types among the male churchgoers were ISTP, INTP and 
ENTP.
Although the various studies cited in this section took place in different 
settings and produced different results each time, when taken together, they do reveal 
a somewhat uniform pattern.  The most consistent result pertains to the judging versus
perceiving dimension of psychological type theory.  In every study, both male and 
female churchgoers had an overall preference for judging over perceiving and, in the 
cases where the results were compared to population norms, this overall preference 
for judging was always greater than what would be expected to occur in the general 
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population.  The next most consistent result pertains to the extraversion versus 
introversion, and the thinking versus feeling dimensions.  Although over-
representations were not always found on these dimensions, when they did occur, they
were always in the directions of introversion and feeling.  This is particularly true of 
male churchgoers.  The one dimension they did not produce a consistent result was 
the sensing versus intuition dimension.   Francis, Robbins, Williams and Williams 
(2007), Francis, Robbins and Craig (2011) and Robbins and Francis (2011) 
demonstrated an over-representation of sensing types among churchgoers whereas 
Craig, Francis and Barwick (2010) and Village, Baker and Howat (2012) found an 
over-representation of intuitive types.  The conclusion based on this review is that 
religious groups tend towards I_FJ.  This matches closely to what we know of clergy 
as well (as discussed in the previous section).  If ones assumes that non-religious 
individuals are the opposite of religious individuals in terms of psychological type, 
one could then hypothesize that non-religious individuals would tend towards E_TP.  
When looking at which types are the most under-represented in religious groups, it is 
interesting that the four TP types (ISTP, ESTP, INTP and ENTP) appear most often. 
It should be noted that all of the religious groups discussed thus far in this 
section have been Christian groups.  This is due to the fact that there is very little data 
available for other religious groups.  Researchers have only recently begun to collect 
data on the psychological type profiles of non-Christian groups.  For example, Francis
and Datoo (2012) profiled 48 Muslims, Silver, Ross and Francis (2012) profiled 31 
Buddhists, and Williams, Francis, Billington and Robbins (2012) profiled 75 Druids.  
The sample sizes from these studies are all too small to draw any real conclusions.  
However, considering the fact that the current project is focused on individuals who 
grew up attending Christian churches, this lack of data from non-Christian groups is 
not a concern.
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5.1.3 Psychological type and different ways of being religious
Another way in which psychological type theory has been used to explore 
issues related to religion and spirituality is comparing different ways of being 
religious.  Within this category, there have been four major streams of research.  The 
first has looked at psychological type and mysticism; the second has looked at 
psychological type and intrinsic versus extrinsic versus quest orientations; the third 
has looked at psychological type and conservative forms of religion; and the fourth 
has looked at psychological type and doubt.
Five studies have explored the possible connection between psychological 
type theory and a mystical orientation.  All base their definition of mysticism on the 
work of Frederick Crossfield Happold, who, in Happold (1963), lists seven defining 
characteristics of mysticism: ineffability, noesis, transience, passivity, consciousness 
of the oneness of everything, a sense of tirelessness, and true ego.  One of the studies 
(Francis, 2002) found no connection between psychological type theory and a 
mystical orientation.  However, the other four (Francis & Louden, 2000; Francis, 
Village, Robbins & Ineson, 2007; Francis, Robbins & Cargas, 2012; and Francis, 
Littler & Robbins, 2012) all found a strong correlation between a preference for 
intuition and higher scores on mysticism.
Two studies have explored the possible connection between psychological 
type theory and the three major religious orientations: intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest.  
The idea of intrinsic versus extrinsic orientations originated in the work of pioneering 
personality psychologist Gordon Allport in his 1966 article “Religious context of 
prejudice.” According to Allport, those with an intrinsic religious orientation sincerely
believe what their religion teaches and seek to live their lives accordingly, whereas 
those with an extrinsic religious orientation attend a place of worship primarily for the
social benefits gained from doing so.  Daniel Batson later added a third possible 
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orientation to the theory, which he labelled the quest orientation and described in 
Batson (1976) as including those who see religion as a search for truth that will never 
be fully completed.  In the first study to explore the connection between psychological
type theory and the three orientations, Francis, Robbins and Murray (2010) found a 
correlation between extroversion and the extrinsic orientation and introversion and the
intrinsic orientation among 65 churchgoers.  However, in a larger sample (n = 481), 
Ross and Francis (2010) did not find this correlation.  Instead, they found a 
correlation between a preference for intuition and the quest orientation.
Eight studies have explored the possible connection between psychological 
type theory and more conservative, traditional expressions of religion.  In the first 
study, Francis and Ross (1997) concluded that, “sensers give higher value than 
intuitives to the traditional aspects of Christian spirituality, like church attendance and
personal prayer, while intuitives give higher value than sensers to the experiential 
aspects of spirituality, like a fine sunset and a star filled sky” (p. 99).  In the second 
study, Francis and Jones (1997) found that churchgoers who preferred thinking over 
feeling scored higher on measures of charismatic experience such as being born-again
and speaking in tongues (both of which are associated with conservative forms of 
religion).  In the third study, Francis and Jones (1998) found that churchgoers who 
preferred sensing and thinking were more likely to hold traditional beliefs than 
churchgoers who preferred intuition and feeling.  In the fourth study, Jones, Francis 
and Craig (2005) found a higher percentage of extroverts, thinkers, and perceivers 
among charismatic Christians.  In the fifth study, Ross, Francis and Craig (2005) 
found a strong correlation between young people that preferred sensing and dogmatic 
religious beliefs.  In the sixth study, Francis, Craig and Hall (2008) found that 
churchgoers who preferred sensing, thinking, and judging were least likely to be 
interested in non-traditional, Celtic expressions of Christianity.  In the seventh study, 
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Village, Francis and Craig (2009) found that conservative, evangelical Christians tend
more towards sensing, whereas Anglo-Catholics tend more towards intuition.  Finally,
in the eighth study, Village (2012) found a correlation between a preference for 
sensing and a belief in biblical literalism among recently ordained clergy.  Taken 
together, this body of research demonstrates that there is a strong connection between 
a preference for sensing and more conservative expressions of religion.  To a lesser 
extent, there also appears to be a connection between a preference for thinking and  
conservative expressions.
Two studies have explored the possible connection between psychological 
type theory and comfort with religious doubt and uncertainty.  In the first study, Ross, 
Weiss and Jackson (1996) found that religious individuals who preferred intuition 
were more open to doubt and change than their sensing counterparts.  This was 
confirmed in a second study, in which Francis, Jones and Craig (2004) reached the 
same conclusion.
Section 5.2 established that religious individuals tend towards I_FJ preferences
with no clear preference between sensing and intuition.  This indicates that there are at
least two different ways of being religious that parallel psychological type theory – 
one based on sensing and one based on intuition.  The studies surveyed in this section 
provide evidence for this difference.  Taken together, they demonstrate quite 
consistently that religious individuals who prefer sensing tend more towards 
conservative, traditional, evangelical/charismatic, and literal expressions of religion, 
whereas religious individuals who prefer intuition tend more towards liberal, non-
traditional, mystical, and quest-orientated expressions of religion.  Those who prefer 
intuition are also more open to doubt, uncertainty and change.
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5.1.4 Psychological type and dissatisfaction with religion
A final way in which psychological type theory has been applied to issues 
related to religion and spirituality is measuring levels of satisfaction with religion.  
This area is of most interest to the present project since one can assume that those 
with lower levels of satisfaction are the most likely to stop attending church and to 
stop believing in God.  A series of four studies looked at psychological type and 
attitude towards Christianity and a fifth looked at psychological type and 
congregational satisfaction.
All four of the studies that looked at psychological type and attitude towards 
Christianity were based on post-secondary students and used the Francis Scale of 
Attitude toward Christianity.  Two of the studies (Jones & Francis, 1999 and Francis, 
Robbins, Boxer, Lewis, McGuckin & McDaid, 2003), with sample sizes of 82 and 
149 respectively, found a correlation between a preference for feeling and a more 
positive attitude towards Christianity.  The other two (Fearn, Francis & Wilcox, 2001 
and Francis, Jones and Craig, 2004), with samples size of 367 and 552 respectively, 
found a correlation between a preference for judging and a more positive attitude 
towards Christianity.  Fearn, Francis and Wilcox (2001) also found a correlation 
between sensing and a more positive attitude towards Christianity.  That both feeling 
and judging stood out as being related to a more positive attitude towards Christianity 
fits with the findings from Section 5.3 that religious individuals as a whole tend more 
towards these preferences as well.  The largest of the four studies, Francis, Jones and 
Craig (2004) also ranked all sixteen types by their average score on the Francis Scale 
of Attitude toward Christianity.  The types with the least positive attitude towards 
Christianity were INTP, ENTP and ISTP – all of which share in common a preference 
for thinking and perceiving (the opposite of feeling and judging).
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In a large (n = 1,867) study of Anglican churchgoers in England, Francis and 
Robbins (2012) measured both psychological type and congregational satisfaction.  
Those with lower satisfaction tended towards introversion, intuition, thinking, and 
perceiving.  The three types that scored scored lowest on congregational satisfaction 
were INTJ, INTP and ENTP.  Again, thinking and perceiving stand out as being the 
most common preferences related to a more negative attitude towards Christianity.  
5.1.5 Summary
As outlined in the first part of this chapter, psychological type theory has been 
used extensively within the realm of religion and spirituality and researchers have 
been able to produce a large body of empirical data on what psychological types are 
the most common among religious individuals.  The two preferences that appear the 
most often among religious individuals and among those who are the most satisfied 
with religion are feeling and judging.  Likewise, the two preferences that appear the 
least are the corresponding preferences of thinking and perceiving.  Thus, it is not 
hard to imagine that individuals with preferences for thinking and perceiving might 
feel more uncomfortable in religious settings than individuals with preferences for 
feeling and judging and therefore might also be more likely to look seriously at other 
worldviews, such as atheistic worldviews.  By providing new data on the 
psychological type preferences of atheist church-leavers, the current project will 
address this hypothesis directly.
5.2 Empirical studies using other models of personality
5.2.1 Hans and Sybil Eysenck’s P-E-N model
Hans Eysenck (1916-1997) was born in Germany but spent the entirety of his 
professional career in the United Kingdom (having left Germany during World War II 
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due to his opposition to Hitler).  According to Haggbloom et al. (2002), he ranks 
number 13 on the list of the 100 most eminent psychologists of the twentieth century 
and is the third most frequently cited author in professional journals of psychology.  
One of his primary contributions to the field of psychology was his and his wife’s P-
E-N (or “Big Three”) model of personality, which was a forerunner of the current Big 
Five model (discussed in the next section).  Initially, Eysenck focused on only two 
main personality traits: extraversion and neuroticism (Eysenck, 1947) but later, in 
collaboration with his wife Sybil, he added a third: psychoticism (Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1976).  The result was a three-trait model of personality, sometimes referred 
to as the P-E-N model (a mnemonic for psychoticism, extraversion and neuroticism). 
In the 1970s, the Eysencks also developed the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire 
(EPQ) to measure the three traits.  Francis, Jones and Craig (2004) summarize the 
Eysenck model as follows:
The high scorer on the extraversion scale is characterised... as a sociable 
individual, who likes parties, has many friends, needs to have people to talk to,
and prefers meeting people to reading or studying alone. The high scorer on 
the neuroticism scale is characterised as an anxious, worrying individual who 
is moody and frequently depressed, likely to sleep badly and to suffer from 
various psychosomatic disorders. The high scorer on the psychoticism scale is 
characterised as being cold, impersonal, hostile, lacking in sympathy, 
unfriendly, untrustful, odd, unemotional, unhelpful, lacking in insight, strange,
with paranoid ideas that people were against him or her. (p. 18)
There are four important things to note about the Eysenck model.  First, the 
Eysencks believed that each of the three traits operate orthogonally, i.e. that each 
exists independently without interfering or overlapping with the other two.  This is 
important because older models of personality saw neuroticism and psychoticism as 
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being the opposite poles of a single trait.  Second, he believed that there is a biological
basis to each of the three traits.  He felt that extraversion is related to differences in 
the brain’s cortical arousal, neuroticism is related to differences in the brain’s limbic 
system, and psychoticism is related to differences in testosterone levels.  Third, he 
believed that there is a direct connection between two of the personality traits, 
neuroticism and psychoticism, and pathology.  He felt that every individual fits 
somewhere along a continuum for each of the traits and that these continuums 
stretched from an average, healthy range to an abnormal, unhealthy range.  In other 
words, neurotics and psychotics are simply individuals who obtain extremely highly 
scores on measures of neuroticism and psychoticism.  Fourth, there may exist some 
correlation between the Eysenck model and psychological type theory.  For example, 
Furnham, Jackson, Forde and Cotter (2001) found that the Eysencks’ extraversion and
neuroticism correlate strongly with the E-I dimension of  psychological type theory 
(high extraversion matching a preference for extraversion, as expected, and high 
neuroticism matching a preference for introversion) and that the Eysencks’ 
psychoticism correlates strongly with the J-P dimension (high psychoticism matching 
a preference for perceiving).  Correlations with the S-N and T-F dimensions were 
much weaker.
Several studies have used the Francis Scale of Attitude toward Christianity 
alongside a revised, abbreviated version of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire  
among adults and university students in the United Kingdom (Francis, 1991; Francis, 
1993, Francis, Lewis, Brown, Philipchalk and Lester, 1995; Francis, 1999).  The 
results of these studies have been very consistent.  Each study found a correlation 
between low psychoticism and a more positive attitude towards Christianity (and 
hence, between high psychoticism and a more negative attitude towards Christianity). 
No correlation was found between neuroticism or extraversion and attitude towards 
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Christianity.  This is significant because, if high psychoticism parallels a preference 
for perceiving, as suggested by Furnham, Jackson, Forde and Cotter (2001), this is 
further evidence that a preference for perceiving might be more common among those
who are dissatisfied with religion.
The explanation given for the connection between high psychoticism and low 
religiosity has to social conformity and conditioning.  According to Francis and Jones 
(2004), a major component of Eysenck’s psychoticism trait is impulsivity, and 
individuals who score high on impulsivity are less likely to conform to social norms 
and are less likely to be easily conditioned.  On the other hand, those who score low 
on psychoticism (and thus low on impulsivity) conform and condition more readily.
The major weakness in applying Eysenck’s model to the issue of 
churchleaving is that the language it employs is extremely value-laden.  As mentioned
above, high psychoticism is associated with words such as “cold”, “unfriendly” and 
“odd” and low psychoticism is associated with being easily conditioned.  It is no great
leap to imagine people taking issue with being placed on either side of such a 
continuum.  On the other hand, the language used to describe judging versus 
perceiving in the psychological type model are much more neutral.
5.2.2 Raymond Cattell’s sixteen personality factors
The Eysencks’ main rival when it came to competing personality theories was 
his contemporary Raymond Cattell (1905-1998).  According to Haggbloom et al. 
(2002), he ranks number 16 on the list of the 100 most eminent psychologists of the 
twentieth century and is the seventh most frequently cited author in professional 
journals of psychology.  Born in the United Kingdom but spending most of his 
professional career in the United States, Cattell took a very different approach from 
the Eysencks’ to understanding personality.  Whereas Eysenck focused on broad, 
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independent traits (and thus ended up with only three), Cattell focused on more 
narrow, interrelated traits (and thus ended up with sixteen).  Also, whereas Eysenck 
built his model on his belief that each trait had a biological basis, Cattell based his 
model on lexical studies.  Cattell started with a large database of English words used 
to describe personality and behaviour and then used a statistical tool called factor 
analysis to find out which groups of words tended to occur together most often based 
on self-report questionnaires.  Using this method, Cattell (1973) narrowed things 
down to sixteen personality factors, as outlined in Table 5 below.  He also developed a
psychometric instrument to measure the sixteen personality factors, called the 16PF, 
and an adolescent version of the instrument to measure fourteen of the factors, called 
the HSPQ (high school personality questionnaire).
Table 5: Raymond Cattell's 16 personality factors
Factor Label High Score Description Low Score Description
A Outgoing Reserved
B More intelligent Less intelligent
C Calm Easily upset
E Assertive Submissive
F Spontaneous Restrained
G Rule-conscious Non-conforming
H Socially bold Shy
I Sensitive Tough
L Skeptical Trusting
M Imaginative Conventional
N Private Forthright
O Insecure Confident
Q1 Open to change Traditional
Q2 Self-reliant Group-oriented
Q3 Perfectionist Flexible
Q4 Tense Relaxed
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Two studies have looked at religious attitudes within the context of Cattell’s 
model.  Francis and Bourke (2003) and Bourke, Francis and Robbins (2007) used the 
Francis Scale of Attitude toward Christianity alongside the HSPQ and found the same 
result both times:  Those with a more positive attitude toward Christianity scored 
higher on Factors G, I and Q3 and lower on Factors E and F.  This indicates that 
religious adolescents are more rule-conscious, sensitive, perfectionist, submissive and 
restrained, while non-religious adolescents are more non-conforming, tough, flexible, 
assertive, and spontaneous.  According to Myers, McCaulley, Quenk and Hammer 
(2003), high scores on Factors G and Q3 correlate strongly with a preference for 
judging; a low score on Factor E and a high score on Factor I correlates strongly with 
a preference for feeling; and a low score on Factor F correlates strongly with a 
preference for introversion.  This provides further evidence for an overall preference 
towards I_FJ among religious individuals and therefore for E_TP among non-
religious individuals.
5.2.3 The Big Five personality traits
Over the last few decades, a new model of personality, known as “the Big 
Five” or the “Five-Factor Model” (FFM), has emerged as the dominant model used by
personality psychologists.  In many ways, it is a compromise between the Eysencks’ 
model, which is seen by many researchers to be comprised of too few traits, and 
Cattell’s model, which is seen by many researchers to be comprised of too many traits.
Although the Big Five traits were not  widely known or widely used until the 1990’s, 
they were actually first “discovered” in the 1950’s by U.S. Air Force researchers 
Ernest Tupes and Raymond Christal.  Through a group of studies that looked for 
correlations between Cattell’s personality traits, Tupes and Christal concluded that the
traits could actually be reduced to just five, which they labelled surgency, 
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agreeableness, dependability, emotional stability, and culture.  They reported their 
findings in a 1961 government report, which remained largely unknown to other 
personality researchers until it was re-published much later in the Journal of 
Personality (Tupes & Christal, 1992), after the Big Five had been discovered 
independently.
The “re-discovery” of the Big Five traits is generally credited to Lewis 
Goldberg of the University of Oregon and the recent popularization of the model is 
generally credited to Paul Costa and Robert McCrae of the U.S. National Institutes of 
Health.  Like Cattell, Goldberg searched for personality traits using lexical studies but
unlike previous researchers, he started from scratch with new sets of descriptive 
words.  The result was a five-factor solution very similar to the one found by Tupes 
and Christal (Goldberg, 1990).  He coined the term “the Big Five” and used the same 
labels as Tupes and Christal with the exception of the label dependability, which he 
renamed conscientiousness.  He then shared his work with the team of Costa and 
McCrae, developers of the NEO personality inventory.  Costa and McCrae’s model of 
personality was originally based on only three traits (neuroticism, extraversion and 
openness – hence the acronym “NEO”) but was later expanded to include 
agreeableness and conscientiousness, thus matching the Big Five (neuroticism being 
the reverse of emotional stability and openness being similar to culture).  The Revised
NEO Personality Inventory, or NEO PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992a), was developed 
to include the additional two traits and to this day remains the primary psychometric 
instrument for measuring the Big Five personality traits.
In the current Big Five model, extraversion (originally called surgency) is 
characterized by a tendency to be energetic, assertive, and sociable; neuroticism is 
characterized by a tendency to be anxious, irritable, and depressed; openness 
(originally called culture) is characterized by a tendency to be intellectual curious, 
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appreciative of art, and interested in novelty; agreeableness is characterized by a 
tendency to be trusting, cooperative, and compassionate; and conscientiousness is 
characterized by a tendency to be organized, dependable, and self-disciplined.
There are six major benefits of the Big Five model.  The first is that it 
corresponds well to both the Eysencks’ model and Cattell’s model and in a sense, 
combines them (see Table 6 below).  It carries forward the traits of extraversion and 
neuroticism from Eysenck and splits psychoticism into agreeableness and 
conscientiousness.  The only real addition is openness (which Hans Eysenck argued is
simply a rough measure of intelligence).  On the other hand, the model is based on 
lexical studies, like Cattell’s model.  Further research into Cattell’s sixteen personality
factors has demonstrated, as Tupes and Christal suggested, that there do indeed exist 
five “higher order” traits alongside the primary sixteen.  Cattell and his wife Heather 
(who carried on his work after his death) ended up referring to these as the “five 
global factors” or “supertraits”.  Roughly speaking, factors A, F, H, N and Q2 
correspond to extraversion; factors C, O and Q4 correspond to neuroticism (labelled 
“anxiety” by the Cattells); factors E and L correspond to agreeableness (the reverse of
which was labelled “independence” by the Cattells); factors I, M and Q1 correspond 
to openness (labelled “receptivity” by the Cattells); and factors G and Q3 correspond 
to conscientiousness (labelled “self control” by the Cattells).  The only factor that 
does not correspond to any of the Big Five is factor B.
The second benefit of the Big Five model is that it is demonstrably very 
robust.  It has been applied in other languages and cultures and has been found to 
exist in every part of the world.  According to Gosling and John (1999), differences in
the Big Five traits have even been found to exist in several non-human animals, 
including chimpanzees (all five traits), dogs (all except openness), and octopi 
(extraversion and neuroticism only). 
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The third benefit of the Big Five model is that it has been expanded by Costa 
and McCrae to include subordinate dimensions, called “facets”.  Each of the Big Five 
traits is associated with six facets, resulting in a total of 30 facets (see Table 6).  This 
allows the theory to be applied to more specific behaviours.  Several of these facets 
will be used in the current project to operationalize concepts addressed in chapter 
three, namely immorality, arrogance, anger, deliberation and intelligence.
The fourth benefit of the Big Five model is that a public domain version of the 
NEO PI-R has been developed by Lewis Goldberg and his colleagues.  Known as the 
IPIP-NEO, the instrument measures both the Big Five traits and Costa and McCrae’s 
30 facets.  As explained in chapter eight, the current project will make use of this 
instrument to measure several of the facets thought to relate to atheism.
 The fifth benefit of the Big Five model is that four of the Big Five personality 
traits have been demonstrated to correlate strongly with the four dimensions of 
psychological type theory (Costa & McCrae, 1989).  As summarized in Table 6 below,
a preference for extraversion (E) correlates with high scores on Big Five extraversion,
and a preference for introversion (I) correlates with low scores on Big Five 
extraversion.   A preference for sensing (S) correlates with low scores on openness, 
and a preference for intuition (N) correlates with high scores on openness.   A 
preference for thinking (T) correlates with low scores on agreeableness, and a 
preference for feeling (F) correlates with high scores on agreeableness.   A preference 
for judging (J) correlates with high scores on conscientiousness, and a preference for 
perceiving (P) correlates with low scores on conscientiousness.   These correlations 
allow researchers to make direct comparisons between studies that have used 
psychological type theory and studies that have used the Big Five model.
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Table 6: The Big Five Personality Traits
E N O A C
Tupes & 
Christal (1961)
Surgency Emotional 
Stability*
Culture Agreeableness Dependability
Eysenck (1976) Extraversion Neuroticism Psychoticism
Cattell 
(Supertraits 
shown in 
paranthesis
A, F, H,
N*, Q2*
(Extraversion)
C*, O, Q4 
(Anxiety)
I, M, Q1
(Receptivity)
E, L
(Independ-
ence*)
G, Q3
Self Control
Goldberg 
(1990)
Surgency Emotional 
Stability*
Culture Agreeableness Conscientious-
ness
Costa & 
McCrae (1992)
Extraversion Neuroticism Openness Agreeableness Conscientious-
ness
Costa & 
McCrae’s 
facets
Warmth
Gregariousness
Assertiveness
Activity
Excitement-
seeking
Cheerfulness
Anxiety
Anger
Depression
Self-
consciousness 
Impulsivness 
Vulnerability
Imagination
Aesthetics
Emotionality
Adventurous-
ness
Intellect
Liberalism
Trust
Morality
Altruism
Cooperation
Modesty
Sympathy
Competence
Orderliness
Dutifulness
Achievement-
striving
Self-discipline
Deliberation
Psychological 
Type Theory
E versus I* S* versus N T* versus F J versus P*
* Reverse trait label
 The sixth benefit of the Big Five model is that it has been used in many 
studies related to personality and religion.  Saroglou (2010) did a meta-analysis of 
these studies comprised of 71 different samples from 19 countries (n = 21,715), and 
found that two of the Big Five traits – agreeableness and conscientiousness – correlate
consistently with measures of religiousness.  This finding was consistent across age, 
gender, nationality, religious measure used, and Big Five instrument used.  This 
finding confirms both the connection between the Eysencks’ psychoticism and 
religiosity (psychoticism being a possible combination of agreeableness and 
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conscientiousness) and the connection between a preference for FJ (feeling and 
judging) and religiosity (feeling being correlated with agreeableness and judging with 
conscientiousness).
Although the Big Five model has many benefits, there is one major weakness 
that makes it unsuitable to serve as the main model of personality used for the current 
project:  Like the Eysencks’ model, it uses labels that are extremely value-laden and 
easily perceived as perjorative.  Since the words “openness”, “agreeableness”, and 
“conscientiousness” all carry very positive connotations, scoring low on these traits 
can be seen as negative.  Likewise, since “neuroticism” carries a very negative 
connotation, scoring high on this trait can also be seen as negative.  The only trait 
label in the Big Five model that is value-free is extraversion.  On the other hand, 
psychological type theory uses dichotomous terms that are all value-free.  For 
example, by using the terms “thinking” and “feeling” instead of high agreeableness 
and low agreeableness, it is easier to point out the fact that both sides have strengths 
and that both sides have weaknesses.  This is particularly important when dealing with
a sensitive topic like religion.  It is for this reason that the current project has chosen 
to use psychological type theory as its main model for exploring the role that 
personality might play in why certain people give up belief in God and become 
atheists.
5.2.4 Other relevant variables
One more recently published study is worth noting.  In her meta-review of 
empirical research focusing on atheists and independent personality variables, 
Caldwell-Harris (2012) noted that atheists tend to score higher on measures of logical 
reasoning as well as measures of noncomformity.  This fits well with the expectation 
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that atheists would tend towards a preference for thinking and for perceiving in the 
psychological type model.
5.3 Conclusion
Chapter four and five of this paper have examined psychological type theory 
in depth, from its development to how it has been used in empirical studies focused on
personality and religion.  Based on this analysis, it is concluded that psychological 
type is a robust model and the best model to use for the current project due to its use 
of neutral terminology.  Based on the studies surveyed in this chapter, it is 
hypothesized that the current project will find a connection between atheism and 
psychological type preferences for thinking (T) and perceiving (P).  Should such a 
connection be found, it would provide confirmation of what is already known about 
the link between personality and religiosity from two other models.  Due to the known
correlations between the various personality models, it would support the finding that 
low religiosity is associated with psychoticism in the Eysenck model and the finding 
that low religiosity is associated with low agreeableness and low conscientiousness in 
the Big Five model. 
A connection between preferences for TP and atheism would also provide a 
new explanation for why some individuals are more likely than others to stop 
attending church and to become atheists.  Individuals who prefer TP are minorities in 
church environments and are therefore more likely than other types to feel out of 
place.  On top of this, individuals who prefer TP are non-conformists who prefer to 
make decisions based on logical reasoning as opposed to shared social values.  They 
would thus have the boldness necessary to leave their childhood religious beliefs 
behind and to embrace a new worldview without God.
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This concludes the literature review portion of this thesis (Part I).  The second 
half of the thesis (Part II) will turn its attention towards the current research project.  
Chapter six will cover the research assumptions, research questions, and methodology
used.  Chapters seven through nine will outline the predictions and results.  Please 
note that, unlike the first half of this thesis, which referred to the current project using 
the future tense, the second half of this thesis will refer to the current project using the
past tense.
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6 GENERAL METHODOLOGY
The main goal of this research project was to explore the reasons why certain 
individuals who were raised in Christian environments as children become atheists as 
adults, while other individuals remain Christian.  In particular, the goal was to explore
the role of innate personality using psychological type theory as the primary model.  
With this goal in mind, the first half of this paper reviewed the research literature 
relevant to the topic, including: atheist terminology and history (Chapter One); the 
concept of worldview and how it applies to atheist beliefs (Chapter Two); existing 
theories of why certain individuals become atheists after having been raised in 
Christian environments (Chapter Three); the development and application of 
psychological type theory (Chapter Four); and finally, empirical studies that have used
psychological type theory and other models of personality within the realm of religion
and spirituality (Chapter Five).  The following chapter will summarize the 
assumptions that were made in the current project based on the literature review, list 
the research questions, and outline the general methodology that was used.
6.1 Assumptions based on the literature review
Based on the literature reviewed in Chapter One, for the purposes of this 
research project ,the term “atheist” was defined as: “an individual who lacks a belief 
in God due to a conscious rejection of that belief.”  However, it was understood that 
such a person may or may not actually use the label “atheist” to describe him or her 
self and may instead, or in addition, choose to use a label such as agnostic, 
freethinker, humanist, or skeptic.  Hence, the question of whether or not an individual 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND ATHEISM 133
meets the definition of an atheist was assumed to be of greater importance than the 
question of which label they prefer to use for self-description.
Based on the literature reviewed in Chapter Two, it was further assumed that 
atheists share much in common with each other with regard to worldview-level 
beliefs, in addition to sharing a lack of belief in God.  Most importantly, it was 
assumed that atheists share an ontology based on naturalism (the belief that the 
natural world is all that exists and that there is no such thing as the supernatural), and 
an epistemology based on rationalism (the belief that knowledge should be based on 
science and reason alone and never on divine revelation or tradition).
Based on the literature reviewed in Chapter Three, it was assumed that the 
following seven factors may play a role in why certain individuals become atheists 
and therefore should be tested alongside psychological type: selfishness, arrogance, 
anger, relationship with parents during childhood, religious emphasis in the home 
during childhood, deliberation in the pursuit of truth, and intelligence.  
Based on the literature reviewed in chapters four and five, it was assumed that 
innate differences in personality exist between individuals and that these differences 
can be best determined using psychological type theory.  These primary differences 
include two ways of maintaining psychological energy (extraversion versus 
introversion), two ways of gathering information (sensing versus intuition), two ways 
of making decisions (thinking versus feeling), and two ways of operating in the 
outside world (judging versus perceiving).
6.2 Research questions
The current project examined three major research questions.  The first and 
most important research question was: Which psychological types are over-
represented among atheist church-leavers, as compared to those who continue to 
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attend church, and what might this reveal about why certain individuals are more 
likely than others to give up their childhood religious beliefs and become atheists?  
The hypothesized answer to this question as well as the results will be covered in 
Chapter Seven.  Chapter Seven will also discuss the psychological type profiles of 
theist church-leavers as well as those who did not grow up attending church.
The second research question was: Is there evidence to support any of the 
other theories about why certain individuals are more likely than others to give up 
their childhood religious beliefs and to become atheists?  This question was broken 
down into seven parts based on the seven theories outlined in Chapter Three:
1. Are atheist church-leavers more selfish than those who remain in church?
2. Are atheist church-leavers more arrogant than those who remain in church?
3. Are atheist church-leavers more prone to anger than those who remain in 
church?
4. Did atheist church-leavers have a more negative relationship with one or both 
of their parents during childhood, as compared to those who remain in church?
5. Did atheist church-leavers grow up in homes where religion was emphasized 
less than in the homes of those who remain in church?
6. Are atheist church-leavers more deliberate in their decision-making processes 
than those who remain in church?
7. Are atheist church-leavers more intelligent than those who remain in church?
The hypothesized answer to these questions as well as the results will be covered in 
Section 8.1.  Section 8.2 will use binomial logistic regression to explore the relative 
importance of each factor as well as of psychological type.
The third research question had two parts.  The first part was: Do atheists share
a common worldview, as suggested in Chapter Two of this paper?  This part of the 
question was explored by comparing the way in which atheists answered various 
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worldview questions with the way in which churchgoers and other theists answered 
the same questions.  The second part was:  Do the different terms used by atheists for 
self-description (atheist, agnostic, freethinker, humanist, or skeptic) reflect major 
differences in worldview-level beliefs? This part of the question was explored by 
comparing the way in which self-described atheists answered various worldview 
questions with the way in which self-described agnostics, freethinkers, humanists, and
skeptics answered the same questions.  The hypothesized answer to both parts of the 
third research question, as well as the results, will be covered in Chapter Nine. 
6.3 Procedure
The method used for the current project was quantitative and survey-based.  
According to Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000), the survey model is the best 
approach for research that aims to make large scale generalizations (p. 78).  They also 
write that, “where measurement is sought then a quantitative approach is required” (p.
248).  The primary purpose of the present study was to make generalizations about the
differences between atheist church-leavers and continuing churchgoers based on 
measuring variables thought to be relevant, and therefore the quantitative survey 
model was ideal.  More specifically, the study aimed to test for possible correlations 
between the variables and therefore required data that could be stored numerically and
analyzed statistically.  In such cases, a large sample with easily coded data is more 
important than more rich, contextualized data (Robson, 1993, pp. 49 & 243) and 
therefore a questionnaire made up entirely of close-ended items was chosen over case 
studies or a series of interviews.  Further details on the specific items used will be 
described in section 6.5 below.
The survey was constructed using software from the website 
surveymonkey.com and was made available online at the domain godsurvey.org for a 
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total of seven months, from September 1, 2011 to March 31, 2012.  Potential 
participants were invited to take the survey using the snowball sampling method.  In 
snowball sampling, the researcher finds individuals who fit the criteria for 
participation and then asks those individuals to pass the survey on to others in their 
social network who also fit the criteria.  According to Palys (2003), the snowball 
technique is particularly appropriate, “if your target population is a deviant or ‘closet’ 
population, or isn’t well-defined or accessible” (p. 145).  This applied to the case at 
hand because individuals from one of the groups being studied, the atheist church-
leavers, are often stigmatized and therefore do not always openly identify themselves 
as atheists. Also, most atheists do not belong to organizations from which they could 
be easily recruited.  Because of these reasons, the snowball sampling method was the 
easiest way to find atheist participants.  In order to ensure that the two samples were 
comparable, the same method was used for recruiting churchgoing participants.
In order to obtain a wide range of participants, “snowballs” were started using 
a variety of different approaches: directly emailing leaders from both the atheist and 
Christian communities; approaching well-known atheist and Christian bloggers and 
asking them to provide a link to the survey on their blogs; posting messages on 
forums and Facebook groups frequented by either atheists or Christians, or both; and 
placing advertisements on Facebook, Google, and other websites targeting atheists 
and Christians.
This procedure proved to be very successful and, due to the viral nature of 
internet sharing, the total number of completed questionnaires was 23,697 (far 
exceeding expectations).  An analysis of the visitor statistics for the domain 
godsurvey.org revealed that 78% of the visitors to the site came from one of the 
following three sources: by clicking on a Facebook post shared by one of their friends
(40%); by clicking on a link posted in the atheist category of the bookmark sharing 
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website Reddit (24%); or, by clicking on a link posted by the popular atheist blogger 
P. Z. Myers on his blog Pharyngula (14%).  The remainder of the visitors came from a
variety of other blogs, forums, and social media websites.  Although these statistics 
are for the website visitors as opposed to the actual survey participants (the two 
numbers being different because some visitors opted not to complete the survey), they
do provide a general idea of how survey participants learned about the survey.
6.4 Ethical considerations
The primary ethical considerations were confidentiality and informed consent. 
Confidentiality was ensured by making the questionnaire anonymous.  No names, 
addresses or other identifying information were collected.  According to Cohen, 
Manion and Morrison (2000), informed consent requires four main elements: 
competence, voluntarism, full information and comprehension (p. 51).  These 
conditions were met by limiting participation to adults aged 19 or older and by 
posting this message on the first screen of the questionnaire: “The following survey 
consists of questions about your personality, life experiences and religious beliefs. 
Participation is voluntary and you may choose to exit at any time. Upon completion of
the survey, your responses will be submitted anonymously and there is no way that 
they can be linked back to you.”  The survey was submitted to the ethics committee at
the University of Warwick and approved in 2012.
6.5 Measures
The survey consisted of seven sections.  The first section contained a single 
question, which was used to determine whether the participant was an atheist (option 
1), a traditional theist (option 2), a non-traditional theist (option 3) or unsure of his or 
her position (option 4).  The question read: “To begin, please select the phrase that 
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best describes your current view” and the four options were: (1) I do not believe in 
any sort of God, gods, or Higher Power; (2) I believe in a personal, creator God; (3) I 
believe in some other kind of God, gods, or Higher Power; or (4) I’m really not sure.
The second section differed according to how the participant answered the 
initial question in Section One.  Those who selected option 1 (the atheists) were asked
five questions.  First, they were asked which terms they felt comfortable using to 
describe themselves. Options included: atheist, agnostic, bright, freethinker, humanist,
and skeptic.  Second, they were instructed to choose the one term that they use the 
most often to describe themselves.  The same six options were given as well as a box 
for “other” in which the participants could choose their own word.  Third, they were 
asked if they are a member of an atheist, humanist, or other similar organization.  
Fourth, they were asked information about how often they engage in atheist-related 
activities.  Fifth, they were asked whether or not they attended a church or other place 
of worship as children or teenagers.  
Those who selected option 2 (I believe in a personal, creator God), option 3 (I 
believe in some other kind of God, gods, or Higher Power), or option 4 (I’m really not
sure) for the initial question in Section One were given four questions in Section Two.
First, they were asked which term they felt best described themselves. Options 
included: Christian, Muslim, Jew, Hindu, Buddhist, spiritual but not religious, 
agnostic, don’t know, and don’t care.  Second, they were asked how often they 
currently attend a church or other formal place of worship (mosque, temple, etc.).   
Options included: usually every week, at least six times a year, once a year, and rarely
or never.  Those who selected rarely or never were instructed to skip ahead to Section 
Three.  Third, they were asked which denomination or faith community they currently
attend.  Twenty-one options were given as well as other Christian, and other non-
Christian.  Fourth, they were asked to describe their church or faith community using 
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one of the following terms: very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very
liberal.
The rest of the survey was identical for both the atheists and the other 
participants.  Section Three consisted of six questions.  First, participants were asked 
how many years, from birth to age 18, they regularly attended a church or other place 
of worship (“regularly” being defined as at least six times per year).  Those who 
selected zero were instructed to skip ahead to Section Four.  Second, they were asked 
which denomination or faith community they attended as a child.  Twenty-one options
were given as well as “Other Christian”, and “Other non-Christian”.  Third, they were 
asked to describe the church or faith community of their childhood using one of the 
following terms: very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal.  
Fourth, they were asked which of the following individuals attended with them: 
father, mother, sibling(s), grandparent(s), and other extended family.  Fifth, they were 
asked to what degree the teachings and practices of the group were emphasized in 
their childhood home: very high, high, moderate, low, or very low.  Sixth, they were 
asked to rate their feelings about their childhood religious experiences using a five-
point Likert scale (very positive, positive, neutral, negative, and very negative).  This 
sixth question was broken down into ten items.  Participants were asked to rate their 
feelings about: the other children their age, the adult members, the leadership, the 
teachings and practices, the activities they participated in, the opportunities they were 
given, the way they were treated, the sincerity of the members, the integrity of the 
members, and the overall experience that they had.  These ten items were used to 
calculate an overall childhood religious experience score.  
Section Four included 18 items designed to measure worldview-level beliefs.  
These were given in the form of statements followed by a five-point Likert scale: 
strongly agree, agree, not sure, disagree, and strongly disagree.  There were three 
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items for each of the six worldview components discussed in Chapter Two: ontology, 
cosmology, teleology, axiology, praxeology, and epistemology.  For each component, 
two items were stated in the positive and one item in the negative.  
Section Five collected basic demographic information, including sex, age, 
race/ethnicity, nationality, birth order, education, income level, marital status, and 
sexual orientation.
Section Six consisted of the 50 items from the Francis Psychological Type 
Scales (Francis, 2005).  These were all forced-choice items with two options each.  
Forty of the items were used to determine psychological type.  The remaining ten 
were used to determine a score for emotional stability.  However, this final scale was 
not used in the analysis as it does not impact psychological type.
Section Seven consisted of 50 items from the open-source international 
personality item pool (Goldberg, 1999) designed to measure the following five facets 
(ten items per facet) from the Big Five model of personality: selfishness (altruism), 
arrogance (modesty), anger, deliberation, and intellect.  These five facets were 
selected from the total of thirty facets because they were, according the literature 
reviewed in chaper three, the most relevant to the second research question.  The 
items that measure the facets are part of a subset of the international personality item 
pool known as the IPIP-NEO and consist of a brief statement following by a five-
point Likert scale: strongly agree, agree, not sure, disagree, and strongly disagree.  
The final section, Section Eight,  consisted of seven questions related to 
parental relationships.  The first question asked how many years, from birth to age 18,
the participant shared a home with his or her father.  The second question asked how 
many years, from birth to age 18, the participant shared a home with his or her 
mother.  The third question asked if the participant’s parents had divorced or separated
and, if so, how old the participant was at the time.  The fourth question asked if the 
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participant’s father had died and, if so, how old the participant was at the time.  The 
fifth question asked if the participant’s mother had died and, if so, how old the 
participant was at the time.  The sixth and seventh questions consisted of a list of 
words or phrases that could be used to describe his or her father (Question 6) and 
mother (Question 7).  For each item, the participants were asked to rank how well a 
word or phrase described their parents while growing up using five-point Likert scale:
strongly agree, agree, not sure, disagree, and strongly disagree.  The words/phrases 
were: caring, supportive, involved in my life, loving, close to me, sensitive, accepting,
always there for me, someone I respected, and someone others respected.  The ten 
items from these questions were used to calculate overall scores for “childhood 
relationship with father” and “childhood relationship with mother”.
6.6 Participants
6.6.1 Sample groups
The 23,697 participants were divided into six samples, three of which  
comprised individuals who attended church regularly as children and three of which  
comprised individuals who did not attend church regularly as children.  Regular 
attendance was defined as attending at least six times per year, for at least one full 
year.  The three samples who grew up attending church were further subdivided into 
those who continue to attend church as adults (Group One), those who no longer 
attend church as adults and are atheists (Group Two) and those who no longer attend 
church as adults but still retain some sort of belief in God (Group Three).  The three 
samples who did not grow up attending church were further subdivided into those 
who converted to Christianity and currently attend church as adults (Group Four), 
those who still do not attend church as adults and are atheists (Group Five), and those 
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who still do not attend church as adults but have some sort of belief in God (Group 
Six).  Due to low numbers, members of non-Christian religions (such as Jews, 
Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and Sikhs) as well as genderqueer individuals 
(participants who indicated that they were neither male nor female) were not placed 
into a sample.
As mentioned above, the individuals in Group One included those who 
attended church as children, still attend church as adults, and still believe in some sort 
of God as adults.  This group consisted of 2,326 individuals (1,137 females and 1,189 
males) and will henceforth be referred to as the “continuing churchgoers”.  This group
included current churchgoers who selected “I believe in a personal, creator God” in 
response to the initial survey question, as well as current churchgoers who selected “I 
believe in some other kind of God, gods, or Higher Power” and current churchgoers 
who selected “I’m not sure” but then self-identified as being either Christian or 
spiritual.
The individuals in Group Two included those who attended church as children,
do not attend church as adults, and do not believe in God.  This group consisted of 
10,515 individuals (2,677 females and 7,838 males) and will henceforth be referred to
as the “atheist church-leavers”.  This group included church-leavers who selected “I 
do not believe in any sort of God, gods, or Higher Power” in response to the initial 
survey question as well as church-leavers who chose “I’m really not sure” but then 
self-identified as being either atheist or agnostic.  Many of the individuals in this 
group could be considered what Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1997) called “amazing 
apostates” (see Section 3.2.1).
The individuals in Group Three included those who attended church as 
children, do not attend church as adults, but still believe in some sort of God as adults.
This group consisted of 2,326 individuals (1,137 females and 1,189 males) and will 
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henceforth be referred to as the “theist church-leavers”.  Some of these individuals 
stated that they believe in a personal, creator God while others stated that they believe
in some other kind of God, gods, or Higher Power.  Likewise, some still identified as 
Christian while others identified as deist, neopagan, or “spiritual but not religious”.
The individuals in Group Four included those who did not attend church as 
children but who attend church as adults due to a conversion to Christianity.  This 
group consisted of 179 individuals (78 females and 101 males) and will henceforth be 
referred to as the “Christian converts”.  Many of the individuals in this group could be
considered what Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1997) called “amazing believers” (see 
Section 3.2.1).
The individuals in Group Five included those who did not attend church as 
children, do not attend church as adults, and do not believe in God.  This group 
consisted of 7,123 individuals (1,776 females and 5,341 males)  and will henceforth 
be referred to as the “unchurched atheists”.
The individuals in Group Six included those who did not attend church as 
children, do not attend church as adults, but do believe in some sort of God. This 
group consisted of 510 individuals (270 females and 240 males) and will henceforth 
be referred to as the “unchurched theists”.  
The first two groups, the continuing churchgoers and the atheist church-
leavers, were the most important to the project as their responses were used to answer 
the first two research questions.  The two groups were compared in terms of 
psychological type (see Chapter Seven) as well as in terms of the seven theories 
thought to be relevant to atheist church-leavers (see Chapter Eight).  The other groups 
were used to further explore differences in psychological type (see Chapter Seven) as 
well as differences in worldview (see Chapter Nine).  When it came to worldview, 
Groups One and Four were combined as “Churchgoing Christians”, Groups Two and 
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Five were combined as “Atheists and Agnostics”, and Groups Three and Six were 
combined as “Spiritual but not Religious”.  A summary of the six samples is provided 
in Table 7 below.
Table 7: Summary of the six samples
Sample/Group Description Female Male Gender-
queer
Totals 
1. Continuing 
churchgoers
Attended church as children 
Attend church now
Believe in God
1,137 1,189 - 2,326
2. Atheist church-
leavers
Attended church as children
Do not attend church now
Do not believe in God
2,677 7,838 - 10,515
3. Theist church-
leavers
Attended church as children
Do not attend church now
Believe in God
1,134 843 - 1,977
4. Christian 
converts
Did not attend church as children
Attend church now
Believe in God
78 101 - 179
5. Unchurched 
atheists 
Did not attend church as children
Do not attend church now
Do not believe in God
1,776 5,341 - 7,117
6. Unchurched 
theists
Did not attend church as children
Do not attend church now
Believe in God
270 240 - 510
Unused data Members of other religions
Gender-queer individuals
346 620 107 1,073
Totals 7,418 16,172 107 23,697
6.6.2 Demographics
The demographics of the two main samples (the continuing churchgoers and 
the atheist churchleavers) differed in several ways.  In terms of age, the average age 
for the atheists was 34, whereas the average age for the churchgoers was slightly 
higher, at 35.  In terms of race and ethnicity, the atheist group was less diverse with 
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90.2% of the atheists self-identifying as white, compared to 86.5% of the churchgoers.
This matches the observation made by Hutchinson (2014) that minorities are under-
represented in atheist communities.  In terms of nationality, both groups were 
primarily comprised of Americans (71.9% for the atheists and 76.8% for the 
churchgoers) but the atheist group had a noticeably larger percentage of Europeans 
(13.5% for the atheists and 6.8% for the churchgoers).  This was likely due to the fact 
that rates of atheism are much higher in Europe (see Table 1 in section 1.3.4).  In 
terms of income level, the atheists reported higher levels of income overall, with 
38.4% stating that their income was either higher or much higher than average, 
compared to 31.6% for churchgoers.  In terms of marital status, the atheist group had 
a lower percentage of married individuals (45.9%, compared to 54.9% for the 
churchgoers).  Finally, in terms of sexual orientation, 13.2% of the atheists self-
identified as either lesbian, gay, or bisexual, whereas the figure was only 5.3% for the 
churchgoers.  This difference can be explained by the fact that a stigma against  
lesbians, gays, and bisexuals still exists in many churches, particularly those 
associated with conservative denominations.
By far the most significant way in which the two main samples differed from 
each other was with regard to sex.  The atheist sample had about three times as many 
males as females (7,838 males and 2,677 females), whereas the churchgoing sample 
was fairly evenly divided between males and females (1,189 males and 1,137 
females).  It is unknown whether the disproportionate number of males in the atheist 
samples was due to the sampling method used or whether it indicates that atheists are 
more likely to male.  However, the belief that males far outnumber females among 
atheists is not new.  For example, Bekiempis (2011) and Engelhart (2013) mention it 
as a major problem for the the new atheist movement, with Engelhart stating that 
atheism is a “clique of white men” (Engelhart, 2013, online).  Because of the 
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disproportionate number males in the atheist sample and because sex is known to be a
factor on the T/F dimension of psychological type, each samples was divided into 
female and male subgroups for statistical analysis.
6.6.3 Additional information on the atheist participants
According to the data collected, only 20.3% of the atheist participants 
indicated that they were a member of an atheist-related organization, and only 9.5% 
indicated that they often attend atheist-related meetings and events.  However, 63% 
indicated that they spend a lot of time on atheist-related websites; 50.7% indicated 
that they had a lot of atheist friends; 52.5% indicated that they read a lot of books 
about atheism; and 26.1%  indicated that they listen to a lot of atheist-related 
podcasts.  In addition to these figures, 75.7% of the atheist participants indicated that 
their families were aware that they were atheists and 64.3% indicated that they openly
discussed their atheist views with non-atheist friends.
As mentioned in section 6.5 above, the survey included two questions for the 
atheist participants about preferred terminology.  First, it provided the participants 
with a list of six terms and asked them to choose as many terms as they liked based on
which terms they felt comfortable using to describe themselves.  Second, it provided 
the participants with the same list of six terms and asked them to choose only one 
based on which term they use the most to describe themselves.  Table 10.1 below 
presents the results for these two questions.  The majority of the atheist participants 
were comfortable using the terms “atheist” (89.5%), “skeptic” (68.8%), “humanist” 
(61.3%) and “freethinker” (60.9%).  However, only 33.4% were comfortable with the 
term “bright” and only 28.7% were comfortable with the term “agnostic”.  The most 
popular term used as a primary descriptor was “atheist” (58.2%), followed by 
“skeptic” (11.4%), “humanist” (8.6%), “freethinker” (7.5%) and “agnostic” (7.2%).  
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Only 2.0% preferred the term “bright”.  5.1% opted to list their own term, including 
0.7% who listed the terms “non-religious”, “non-theist”, or “non-believer” and 0.6% 
listed the term “anti-theist”.
6.6.4 Additional information on the churchgoing participants
 As mentioned in section 6.5 above, the survey included several questions for 
the churchgoing participants about their denomination and church attendance.  
According to the data, the most represented denominations were: non-denominational 
(19.6%), Catholic (14.3%), Baptist (14.3%), Methodist (8.2%), Pentecostal (6.3%), 
Presbyterian (5.8%), Anglican (5.4%), Lutheran (4.3%), and Mormon (2.6%).  In 
terms of the conservative-liberal spectrum, 62.0% of the churchgoers described their 
church as conservative, 28.8% as moderate, and 8.7% as liberal.  When it came to 
church attendance, 80% said that they attend church every week and 20% said that 
they attend at least six times per year.
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7 ANALYSIS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE
This chapter will address the first research question:  Which psychological 
types are over-represented among atheist church-leavers, as compared to those who 
continue to attend church, and what might this reveal about why certain individuals 
are more likely than others to give up their childhood religious beliefs and become 
atheists?  It will use the study data to report on the psychological type profile of the 
continuing churchgoers and then use this data to make a comparison between the 
continuing churchgoers and the atheist church-leavers.  Of note will be which 
psychological types were over-represented and under-represented among the atheist 
church-leavers, as compared to the continuing churchgoers.  This chapter will also 
report on the psychological type profiles of the theist church-leavers, the Christian 
converts, the unchurched atheists, and the unchurched theists.
7.1 Predictions
It was predicted that the continuing churchgoers in the current study would 
have a greater tendency towards feeling (F) and judging (J), and that the atheist 
church-leavers would have a greater tendency towards thinking (T) and perceiving 
(P).  There were four reasons for this prediction.  First, as outlined in Section 5.1.2, a 
well-established body of research has demonstrated that Christian groups tend to have
a higher percentage of individuals who prefer feeling (F) and judging (J) than in the 
general public.  In such settings, individuals who prefer the opposite preferences, i.e. 
thinking (T) and perceiving (P) would likely feel more uncomfortable and isolated.  
Second, as outlined in Section 5.1.4, several studies have demonstrated that 
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individuals with more positive attitudes towards Christianity are more likely to prefer 
feeling (F) and judging (J), whereas individuals with less positive attitudes towards 
Christianity are more likely to prefer thinking (T) and perceiving (P).  In addition to 
this, Francis and Robbins (2012) reported that individuals who are less satisfied with 
their church congregations also tend towards thinking (T) and perceiving (P).  Third, 
as outlined in Section 5.2.1, a well-established body of research has demonstrated a 
link between low religiosity and Hans and Sybil Eysenck’s trait of psychoticism.  
Because psychoticism is known to correlate with a preference perceiving in the 
psychological type model (Furnham, Jackson, Forde and Cotter, 2001), it follows that 
there should also exist a link between low religiosity and a preference for perceiving 
(P).  Fourth, as outlined in Section 5.2.3, a well-established body of research has 
demonstrated a link between low religiosity and both low agreeableness and low 
conscientiousness in the Big Five model.  Because low agreeableness is known to 
correlate with a preference for thinking and low conscientiousness is known to 
correlate with a preference for perceiving (Costa & McCrae, 1989), it follows that 
there should also exist a link between low religiosity and preferences for thinking (T) 
and perceiving (P).  
No prediction was made regarding the psychological type profile of theist 
church-leavers.  This was due to the fact that this group represents a middle ground 
between the continuing churchgoers and the two atheists groups.  On the one hand, 
they retain some sort of belief in God, and in this manner, are similar to the 
continuing churchgoers.  On the other hand, they do not belong to a religious 
community and in this manner, are similar to the atheists.  Thus, it was unclear as to 
whether they would have similar preferences to the churchgoers or to the atheists.
As for the unchurched groups, it was predicted that each group would be 
similar to their corresponding churched group in terms of psychological type.  In other
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words, the Christian converts would be similar to the continuing churchgoers, the 
unchurched atheists would be similar to the atheist church-leavers, and the 
unchurched theists would be similar to the theist church-leavers.
7.2 Psychological type analysis of the continuing churchgoers
As stated in Chapter Six, the instrument used to measure psychological type 
was the Francis Psychological Type Scales (Francis, 2005).  The four scales that 
measured the four dimensions of psychological type all achieved satisfactory alpha 
coefficients according to DeVellis (2003): extraversion versus introversion 0.80; 
sensing versus intuition 0.65; thinking versus feeling 0.70; judging versus perceiving 
0.74.
Psychological type data was collected from a total of 2,326 continuing 
churchgoers (1,137 females and 1,189 males).   Table 8 presents the type distribution 
of the 1,137 female continuing churchgoers.  These data demonstrated that the female 
continuing churchgoers displayed overall preferences for introversion (63.2%) over 
extraversion (36.8%), sensing (60.4%) over intuition (39.6%), feeling (54.1%) over 
thinking (45.9%), and judging (81.6%) over perceiving (18.4%).  The percentage of 
female continuing churchgoers with the FJ combination was 42.0%, whereas the 
percentage with the TP combination was 6.3%.  In terms of the 16 discreet types, the 
four most common types among the female continuing churchgoers were ISTJ 
(19.7%), ISFJ (16.0%), ESFJ (10.6%), and INFJ (8.9%), and the four least common 
types were ISTP (1.1%), ESTP (1.4%), ISFP (1.5%) and ENTP (1.5%).
Table 9 presents the type distribution of the 1,189 male continuing 
churchgoers.   These data demonstrated that the male churchgoers displayed overall 
preferences for introversion (69.9%) over extraversion (30.1%), sensing (51.4%) over 
intuition (48.6%), thinking (68.3%) over feeling (31.7%), and judging (76.2%) over 
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perceiving (23.8%).  The percentage of male continuing churchgoers with the FJ 
combination was 19.4%, whereas the percentage with the TP combination was 11.5%.
In terms of the 16 discreet types, the four most common types among the male 
continuing churchgoers were ISTJ (25.9%), INTJ (16.3%), ESTJ (8.2%), and ISFJ 
(7.0%), and the four least common types were ESTP (1.1%), ESFP (1.4%), ISTP 
(1.6%), and ISFP (2.5%).
These results matched the prediction but only in part.  On the one hand, the 
female continuing churchgoers showed overall preferences for both feeling (F) and 
judging (J), as expected.  Also, the FJ combination occurred at a high percentage 
among the female churchgoers (42.0%), while the TP combination occurred at a low 
percentage (6.3%).  On the other hand, the male continuing churchgoers showed an 
overall preference for judging, as expected, but showed an overall preference for 
thinking instead of feeling, which was not expected.  However, this still fits the 
prediction in part because it was the TJ combination that occurred at a high 
percentage among the male churchgoers (56.8%), not the TP combination (11.5%).
However, it is important to note that solid conclusions cannot be made from 
type percentages alone.  Researchers know that the sixteen psychological types are 
not distributed equally within the general population (Myers, McCaulley, Quenk & 
Hammer, 2003, p. 122) and therefore a comparison must be made between at least 
two groups before any meaningful discussion can be had.  When comparing groups, 
attention must be paid to which types are the most over-represented and which types 
are the most under-represented.  In the next Section, the psychological type profile of 
the continuing churchgoers will be compared directly to the psychological type profile
of the atheist church-leavers in order to test for over-representions and under-
representations.
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Table 8: Type distribution of continuing churchgoers (females)
The 16 complete types Dichotomous preferences
ISTJ
n = 224
(19.7%)
++++++++++
++++++++++
ISFJ
n = 182
(16.0%)
++++++++++
++++++
INFJ
n = 101
(8.9%)
+++++++++
INTJ
n = 95
(8.4%)
++++++++
E  n= 418 (36.8%) 
I  n= 719 (63.2%) 
S  n= 687 (60.4%) 
N  n= 450 (39.6%) 
T  n= 522 (45.9%) 
F  n= 615 (54.1%) 
J  n= 928 (81.6%) 
P  n= 209 (18.4%) 
ISTP
n = 13
(1.1%)
+
ISFP
n = 17
(1.5%)
++
INFP
n = 61
(5.4%)
+++++
INTP
n = 26
(2.3%)
++
Pairs and temperaments
IJ n= 602 (52.9%) 
IP n= 117 (10.3%) 
EP n=  92 ( 8.1%) 
EJ n= 326 (28.7%) 
ST n= 349 (54.7%) 
SF n= 338 (29.7%) 
NF n= 277 (24.4%) 
NT n= 173 (15.2%) 
SJ n= 622 (54.7%) 
SP n=  65 ( 5.7%) 
NP n= 144 (12.7%) 
NJ n= 306 (26.9%) 
TJ n= 450 (39.6%) 
TP n=  72 ( 6.3%) 
FP n= 137 (12.0%) 
FJ n= 478 (42.0%) 
IN n= 283 (24.9%) 
EN n= 167 (14.7%) 
IS n= 436 (38.3%) 
ES n= 251 (22.1%) 
ET n= 164 (14.4%) 
EF n= 254 (22.3%) 
IF n= 361 (31.8%) 
IT n= 358 (31.5%) 
ESTP
n = 16
(1.4%)
++
ESFP
n = 19
(1.7%)
++
ENFP
n = 40
(3.5%)
++++
ENTP
n = 17
(1.5%)
++
ESTJ
n = 96
(8.4%)
++++++++
ESFJ
n = 120
(10.6%)
++++++++++
+
ENFJ
n = 75
(6.6%)
+++++++
ENTJ
n = 35
(3.1%)
+++
Jungian types (E)
       n    %
E-TJ  131 (11.5%) 
E-FJ  195 (17.2%) 
ES-P  35  ( 3.1%)  
EN-P  57  ( 5.0%)  
Jungian types (I)
       n    %
I-TP  39  ( 3.4%) 
I-FP  78  ( 6.9%) 
IS-J  406 (35.7%) 
IN-J  196 (17.2%)   
Dominant types
        n    %
Dt. T  170 (15.0%) 
Dt. F  273 (24.0%) 
Dt. S  441 (38.8%) 
Dt. F  253 (22.3%) 
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Table 9: Type distribution of continuing churchgoers (males)
The 16 complete types Dichotomous preferences
ISTJ
n = 308
(25.9%)
++++++++++
++++++++++
++++++
ISFJ
n = 83
(7.0%)
+++++++
INFJ
n = 72
(6.1%)
++++++
INTJ
n = 194
(16.3%)
++++++++++
++++++
E  n= 358 (30.1%) 
I  n= 831 (69.9%) 
S  n= 611 (51.4%) 
N  n= 578 (48.6%) 
T  n= 812 (68.3%) 
F  n= 377 (31.7%) 
J  n= 906 (76.2%) 
P  n= 283 (23.8%)
ISTP
n = 30
(2.5%)
+++
ISFP
n = 19
(1.6%)
++
INFP
n = 70
(5.9%)
++++++
INTP
n = 55
(4.6%)
+++++
Pairs and temperaments
IJ n= 657 (55.3%) 
IP n= 174 (14.6%) 
EP n= 109 ( 9.2%) 
EJ n= 249 (20.9%) 
ST n= 448 (37.7%) 
SF n= 163 (13.7%) 
NF n= 214 (18.0%) 
NT n= 364 (30.6%) 
SJ n= 532 (44.7%) 
SP n=  79 ( 6.6%) 
NP n= 204 (17.2%) 
NJ n= 374 (31.5%) 
TJ n= 675 (56.8%) 
TP n= 137 (11.5%) 
FP n= 146 (12.3%) 
FJ n= 231 (19.4%) 
IN n= 391 (32.9%) 
EN n= 187 (15.7%) 
IS n= 440 (37.0%) 
ES n= 171 (14.4%) 
ET n= 225 (18.9%) 
EF n= 133 (11.2%) 
IF n= 244 (20.5%) 
IT n= 587 (49.4%) 
ESTP
n = 13
(1.1%)
+
ESFP
n = 17
(1.4%)
+
ENFP
n = 40
(3.4%)
+++
ENTP
n = 39
(3.3%)
+++
ESTJ
n = 97
(8.2%)
++++++++
ESFJ
n = 44
(3.7%)
++++
ENFJ
n = 32
(2.7%)
+++
ENTJ
n = 76
(6.4%)
++++++
Jungian types (E)
       n    %    
E-TJ  173 (14.6) 
E-FJ   76 ( 6.4) 
ES-P   30 ( 2.5)  
EN-P   79 ( 6.6)  
Jungian types (I)
       n    %    
I-TP   85 ( 7.1) 
I-FP   89 ( 7.5) 
IS-J  391 (32.9) 
IN-J  266 (22.4)   
Dominant types
        n    %    
Dt. T  258 (21.7) 
Dt. F  165 (13.9) 
Dt. S  421 (35.4) 
Dt. F  345 (29.0) 
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7.3 Psychological type analysis of the atheist church-leavers
The research literature on psychological type uses the selection ratio (indicated
by I) to state the differences in type percentages between two groups.  If I is greater 
than 1, this indicates an over-representation.  For example, if I = 2.0, this means that 
there are twice as many individuals in the one group as compared to the other group.  
If I is less than 1, this indicates an under-representation.  For example, if I = 0.5, this 
means that there is half as many individuals in the one group as compared to the other
group.  A statistical test based on chi-square is then used to measure the statistical 
relevance of the differences (indicated by p).  When it comes to social science 
research, a p value of less than 0.05 is generally seen as being significant, a p value of
less than 0.01 as highly significant, and a p value of less than 0.001 as very highly 
significant.  These conventions will be used in the comparison between the continuing
churchgoers and the atheist church-leavers below.  However, it is important to note 
that large sample sizes, like the ones used in this study, can often lead to very small 
differences acheiving significant p values.  For this reason, attention will primarily be 
paid to results acheiving a p value of less than 0.001.
Table 10 compares the type distribution of the 2,677 female atheist church-
leavers with the type distribution of the 1,137 female continuing churchgoers. These 
data demonstrated that the female atheist church-leavers displayed very highly 
significant over-representations of introversion over extraversion (I = 1.22), sensing 
over intuition (I = 1.10), and thinking over feeling (I = 1.65).  There was no 
significant difference between judging and perceiving.  Also of note was the very 
highly significant over-representation of the TP combination (I = 2.14) and the very 
highly significant under-representation of the FJ combination (I = 0.41).  In terms of 
the 16 discrete types, the female atheist church-leavers had significant over-
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representations of ISTP (I = 3.79), INTP (I = 2.29), ISTJ (I = 1.91), and INTJ (I = 
1.47), and significant under-representations of ENFJ (I = 0.23), ESFJ (I = 0.29), 
ENFP (I = 0.40), ISFJ (I = 0.47), ESFP (I = 0.49), INFJ (I = 0.57), and INFP (I = 
0.58).  There were no significant differences in the percentages of ISFP, ESTP, ENTP, 
ESTJ, or ENTJ.
Table 11 compares the type distribution of the 7,838 male atheist church-
leavers with the type distribution of the 1,189 male continuing churchgoers. These 
data demonstrated that the male atheist church-leavers displayed very highly 
significant over-representations of introversion over extraversion (I = 1.13), sensing 
over intuition (I = 1.26), and thinking over feeling (I = 1.31).  There was no 
significant difference between judging and perceiving.  Also of note was the very 
highly significant over-representation of the TP combination (I = 1.89) and the very 
highly significant under-representation of the FJ combination (I = 0.31).  In terms of 
the 16 discrete types, the male atheist church-leavers had significant over-
representations of ISTP (I = 3.20), ESTP (I = 2.19), INTP (I = 1.81), and ISTJ (I = 
1.56), and significant under-representations of ENFJ (I = 0.22), ESFJ (I = 0.22), INFJ 
(I = 0.29), INFP (I = 0.31), ENFP (I = 0.32), ISFJ (I = 0.42), ESFP (I = 0.42), ENTJ (I
= 0.56), and ISFP (I = 0.58).  There were no significant differences in the percentages 
of INTJ, ENTP, or ESTJ.
The results from these two tables indicate that the prediction regarding the 
atheist church-leavers was mostly correct.  As expected, both the female and the male 
atheist church-leavers had a very highly significant over-representation of thinking 
(T) and a very highly significant under-representation of feeling (F).  But contrary to 
the expectation, there was no over-representation of perceiving (P) and no under-
representation judging (J). However, it should be noted that, when the T/F and J/P 
dimensions were considered together, the over-representation of the TP combination 
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was very highly significant for both sexes and the under-representation of the FJ 
combination was very highly significant for both sexes.  It should also be noted that 
two TP types in particular, ISTP and INTP, were over-represented at very highly 
significant levels for both sexes, whereas the two opposite types (ENFJ and ESFJ) 
were under-represented at very highly significant levels for both sexes.  
Four conclusions can be reached from these results.  First, atheist church-
leavers do in fact differ significantly from continuing churchgoers in terms of 
psychological type.  Whereas churchgoers, on average, tend towards FJ, atheist 
church-leavers have a much greater tendency towards TP.   Second, the way in which 
atheist church-leavers differ from continuing churchgoers is similar to the way in 
which those with low congregational satisfaction differ from those with high 
congregational satisfaction, as reported by Francis and Robbins (2012).  This supports
the hypothesis that psychological type plays a role in why some individuals are more 
likely than others to become atheist church-leavers.  If churches have a tendency 
towards FJ preferences, it is easy to imagine that those with the opposite preferences 
(TP) would feel out of place and would therefore be more likely to leave.  Third, the 
greater tendency among atheist church-leavers towards TP supports the findings from 
Caldwell-Harris (2012) that indicate that atheists score higher on measures of logical 
reasoning as well as measures of noncomformity.  This also supports the hypothesis 
that psychological type plays a role in why some individuals are more likely than 
others to become atheist church-leavers.  Churches are complex social settings made 
up of individuals bound together by shared values.  Those with preferences towards 
FJ will thrive more readily in such environments due to their increased focus on 
maintaining group harmony and their greater tendency towards social conformity.  In 
contrast, those with preferences towards TP will be more concerned with using logic 
to analyze beliefs and with doing what seems best for themselves.  Fourth, the greater 
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tendency among atheist church-leavers towards TP supports the research tradition that
connects low religiosity with  psychoticism in the Eysenck model (Francis, 1991; 
Francis, 1993, Francis, Lewis, Brown, Philipchalk and Lester, 1995; Francis, 1999) 
and with low agreeableness and low conscientiousness in the Big Five model 
(Saroglou, 2010).
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Table 10: Type distribution of atheist church-leavers compared to continuing 
churchgoers (females)
The 16 complete types Dichotomous preferences
ISTJ
n = 1,009
(37.7%)
I = 1.91***
++++++++++
++++++++++
++++++++++
++++++++
ISFJ
n = 203
(7.6%)
I = 0.47***
++++++++
INFJ
n = 135
(5.0%)
I = 0.57***
+++++
INTJ
n = 328
(12.3%)
I = 1.47***
++++++++++
++
E  n= 620 (23.2%) I=0.63***
I  n=2057 (76.8%) I=1.22***
S  n=1773 (66.2%) I=1.10***
N  n= 904 (33.8%) I=0.85***
T  n=2030 (75.8%) I=1.65***
F  n= 647 (24.2%) I=0.45***
J  n=2129 (79.5%) I=0.97
P  n= 548 (20.5%) I=1.11
ISTP
n = 116
(4.3%)
I = 3.79***
++++
ISFP
n = 43
(1.6%)
I = 1.07
++
INFP
n = 83
(3.1%)
I = 0.58***
+++
INTP
n = 140
(5.2%)
I = 2.29***
+++++
Pairs and temperaments
IJ n=1675 (62.6%) I=1.18***
IP n= 382 (14.3%) I=1.39***
EP n= 166 ( 6.2%) I=0.77*
EJ n= 454 (17.0%) I=0.59***
ST n=1423 (53.2%) I=1.73***
SF n= 350 (13.1%) I=0.44***
NF n= 297 (11.1%) I=0.46***
NT n= 607 (22.7%) I=1.49***
SJ n=1542 (57.6%) I=1.05
SP n= 231 ( 8.6%) I=1.51*
NP n= 317 (11.8%) I=0.93
NJ n= 587 (21.9%) I=0.81***
TJ n=1668 (62.3%) I=1.57***
TP n= 362 (13.5%) I=2.14***
FP n= 186 ( 6.9%) I=0.58***
FJ n= 461 (17.2%) I=0.41***
IN n= 686 (25.6%) I=1.03
EN n= 218 ( 8.1%) I=0.55***
IS n=1371 (51.2%) I=1.34***
ES n= 402 (15.0%) I=0.68***
ET n= 437 (16.3%) I=1.13***
EF n= 183 ( 6.8%) I=0.31***
IF n= 464 (17.3%) I=0.55***
IT n=1593 (59.5%) I=1.89***
ESTP
n = 50
(1.9%)
I = 1.33
++
ESFP
n = 22
(0.8%)
I = 0.49*
+
ENFP
n = 38
(1.4%)
I = 0.40***
+
ENTP
n = 56
(2.1%)
I = 1.40
++
ESTJ
n = 248
(9.3%)
I = 1.10
+++++++++
ESFJ
n = 82
(3.1%)
I = 0.29***
+++
ENFJ
n = 41
(1.5%)
I = 0.23***
++
ENTJ
n = 83
(3.1%)
I = 1.01
+++
Jungian types (E)
       n    %    Index
E-TJ  331 (12.4) 1.07   
E-FJ  123 ( 4.6) 0.27***
ES-P   72 ( 2.7) 0.87   
EN-P   94 ( 3.5) 0.70*  
Jungian types (I)
       n    %    Index
I-TP  256 ( 9.6) 2.79***
I-FP  126 ( 4.7) 0.69***
IS-J 1212 (45.3) 1.27***
IN-J  463 (17.3) 1.00   
Dominant types
        n    %    Index
Dt. T  587 (21.9) 1.47***
Dt. F  249 ( 9.3) 0.39***
Dt. S 1284 (48.0) 1.24***
Dt. F  557 (20.8) 0.94
Note: Total n = 2,677. *p < 0.05; **p <0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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Table 11: Type distribution of atheist church-leavers compared to continuing 
churchgoers (males)
The 16 complete types Dichotomous preferences
ISTJ
n = 3,158
(40.3%)
I = 1.56***
++++++++++
++++++++++
++++++++++
++++++++++
++++++++++
ISFJ
n = 229
(2.9%)
I = 0.42***
+++
INFJ
n = 136
(1.7%)
I = 0.29***
++
INTJ
n = 1,169
(14.9%)
I = 0.91
++++++++++
+++++
E  n=1639 (20.9%) I=0.69***
I  n=6199 (79.1%) I=1.13***
S  n=5094 (65.0%) I=1.26***
N  n=2744 (35.0%) I=0.72***
T  n=7016 (89.5%) I=1.31***
F  n= 822 (10.5%) I=0.33***
J  n=5784 (73.8%) I=0.97
P  n=2054 (26.2%) I=1.10
ISTP
n = 632
(8.1%)
I = 3.20***
++++++++
ISFP
n = 73
(0.9%)
I = 0.58*
+
INFP
n = 144
(1.8%)
I = 0.31***
++
INTP
n = 658
(8.4%)
I = 1.81***
++++++++
Pairs and temperaments
IJ n=4692 (59.9%) I=1.08**
IP n=1507 (19.2%) I=1.31***
EP n= 547 ( 7.0%) I=0.76**
EJ n=1092 (13.9%) I=0.67***
ST n=4682 (59.7%) I=1.59***
SF n= 412 ( 5.3%) I=0.38***
NF n= 410 ( 5.2%) I=0.29***
NT n=2334 (29.8%) I=0.97
SJ n=4154 (53.0%) I=1.18***
SP n= 940 (12.0%) I=1.81***
NP n=1114 (14.2%) I=0.83**
NJ n=1630 (20.8%) I=0.66***
TJ n=5310 (67.7%) I=1.19***
TP n=1706 (21.8%) I=1.89***
FP n= 348 ( 4.4%) I=0.36***
FJ n= 474 ( 6.0%) I=0.31***
IN n=2107 (26.9%) I=0.82***
EN n= 637 ( 8.1%) I=0.52***
IS n=4092 (52.2%) I=1.41***
ES n=1002 (12.8%) I=0.89
ET n=1399 (17.8%) I=0.94
EF n= 240 ( 3.1%) I=0.27***
IF n= 582 ( 7.4%) I=0.36***
IT n=5617 (71.7%) I=1.45***
ESTP
n = 188
(2.4%)
I = 2.19**
++
ESFP
n = 47
(0.6%)
I = 0.42***
+
ENFP
n = 84
(1.1%)
I = 0.32***
+
ENTP
n = 228
(2.9%)
I = 0.89
+++
ESTJ
n = 704
(9.0%)
I = 1.10
+++++++++
ESFJ
n = 63
(0.8%)
I = 0.22***
+
ENFJ
n = 46
(0.6%)
I = 0.22***
+
ENTJ
n = 279
(3.6%)
I = 0.56***
++++
Jungian types (E)
       n    %    Index
E-TJ  983 (12.5) 0.86   
E-FJ  109 ( 1.4) 0.22***
ES-P  235 ( 3.0) 1.19   
EN-P  312 ( 4.0) 0.60***  
Jungian types (I)
       n    %    Index
I-TP 1290 (16.5) 2.30***
I-FP  217 ( 2.8) 0.37***
IS-J 3387 (43.2) 1.31***
IN-J 1305 (16.6) 0.74***
Dominant types
        n    %    Index
Dt. T 2273 (29.0) 1.34***
Dt. F  326 ( 4.2) 0.30***
Dt. S 3622 (46.2) 1.31***
Dt. F 1617 (20.6) 0.71***
Note: Total n = 7,838. *p < 0.05; **p <0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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7.4 Psychological type analysis of the theist church-leavers
The present study also collected data from theist church-leavers, i.e. those who
no longer attend church yet still retain some sort of belief in God.  It was difficult to 
predict whether this group would be more similar to the continuing churchgoers or to 
the atheist church-leavers.  In order to explore this issue, the theist church-leavers 
were compared to the continuing churchgoers in the same manner that the atheist 
church-leavers were compared to the continuing churchgoers in the previous section.
Table 12 compares the type distribution of the 1,134 female theist church-
leavers with the type distribution of the 1,137 female continuing churchgoers. These 
data demonstrated that the female theist church-leavers displayed a significant over-
representation of introversion over extraversion (I = 1.12), intuition over sensing (I = 
1.25), thinking over feeling (I = 1.11) and perceiving over judging (I = 1.27).  Also of 
note was the highly significant over-representation of the TP combination (I = 1.46) 
and the highly significant under-representation of the FJ combination (I = 0.83).  In 
terms of the 16 discrete types, only two types were significantly over-represented 
among the female theist church-leavers: INTP (I = 2.04) and INTJ (I = 1.41) and only 
two were significantly under-represented: ESFJ (I = 0.49) and ESTJ (I = 0.61).  There 
were no significant differences in the percentages of the other twelve types.
Table 13 compares the type distribution of the 843 male theist church-leavers 
with the type distribution of the 1,189 male continuing churchgoers. These data 
demonstrated that the male theist church-leavers displayed a significant over-
representation for introversion over extraversion (I = 1.10), thinking over feeling (I = 
1.08) and perceiving over judging (I = 1.16).  There was no significant difference 
between sensing and intuition.  Also of note was the very highly significant over-
representation of the TP combination (I = 1.50) and the significant under-
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representation of the FJ combination (I = 0.82).  In terms of the 16 discrete types, only
two types were significantly over-represented among the male theist church-leavers: 
INTP (I = 1.92) and ISTP (I = 1.65) and only three were significantly under-
represented: ESFJ (I = 0.45), ENTJ (I = 0.67),  and ESTJ (I = 0.70).  There were no 
significant differences in the percentages of the other eleven types.  
Two conclusions can be drawn from these results.  First, the way in which the 
theist church-leavers differ from the continuing churchgoers is different from than the 
way in which the atheist church-leavers differ from the continuing churchgoers.  
Although both types of church-leavers had very highly significant over-
representations of introversion and thinking among both females and males (as 
compared to the female and male churchgoers), the two types of church-leavers 
tended in different directions with regard to the sensing-intuition and judging-
perceiving dimensions.  The atheist church-leavers had an over-representation of 
sensing (very highly significant for both females and males), whereas the theist 
church-leavers had an over-representation of intuition (very highly significant for 
females but not significant for males).  Also, neither the female nor the male atheist 
church-leavers differed significantly from the female and male churchgoers on the 
judging-perceiving dimension, whereas both the female and male theist church-
leavers had a significant over-representation of perceiving (highly significant among 
females).
Second, when it comes to the TP versus FJ connection to religiosity, the theist 
church-leavers seem to occupy a “middle ground” between the continuing 
churchgoers and the  atheist church-leavers.  Although both types of church-leavers 
had significant over-representations of the TP combination and under-representations 
of the FJ combination, the over-representation of TP among the atheist church-leavers 
was higher (2.14 versus 1.46 for females; 1.89 versus 1.50 for males) and the under-
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representation of FJ among the atheist church-leavers was lower (.41 versus .83 for 
females; .31 versus .82 for males).  This indicates that churchgoers, as a whole, tend 
towards FJ, that atheist church-leavers, as a whole, tend toward TP, and that theist 
church-leavers, as a whole, lie somewhere in-between.
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Table 12: Type distribution of theist church-leavers compared to continuing 
churchgoers (females)
The 16 complete types Dichotomous preferences
ISTJ
n = 240
(21.2%)
I = 1.07
++++++++++
++++++++++
+
ISFJ
n = 158
(13.9%)
I = 0.87
++++++++++
++++
INFJ
n = 118
(10.4%)
I = 1.17
++++++++++
INTJ
n = 134
(11.8%)
I = 1.41**
++++++++++
++
E  n= 333 (29.4%) I=0.80***
I  n= 801 (70.6%) I=1.12***
S  n= 574 (50.6%) I=0.84***
N  n= 560 (49.4%) I=1.25***
T  n= 578 (51.0%) I=1.11*
F  n= 556 (49.0%) I=0.91*
J  n= 870 (76.7%) I=0.94**
P  n= 264 (23.3%) I=1.27**
ISTP
n = 16
(1.4%)
I = 1.23
+
ISFP
n = 15
(1.3%)
I = 0.88
+
INFP
n = 67
(5.9%)
I = 1.10
++++++
INTP
n = 53
(4.7%)
I = 2.04**
+++++
Pairs and temperaments
IJ n= 650 (57.3%) I=1.08*
IP n= 151 (13.3%) I=1.29*
EP n= 113 (10.0%) I=1.23
EJ n= 220 (19.4%) I=0.68***
ST n= 325 (28.7%) I=0.93
SF n= 249 (22.0%) I=0.74***
NF n= 307 (27.1%) I=1.11
NT n= 253 (22.3%) I=1.47***
SJ n= 515 (45.4%) I=0.83***
SP n=  59 ( 5.2%) I=0.91
NP n= 205 (18.1%) I=1.43***
NJ n= 355 (31.3%) I=1.16*
TJ n= 473 (41.7%) I=1.05
TP n= 105 ( 9.3%) I=1.46**
FP n= 159 (14.0%) I=1.16
FJ n= 397 (35.0%) I=0.83**
IN n= 372 (32.8%) I=1.32***
EN n= 188 (16.6%) I=1.13
IS n= 429 (37.8%) I=0.99
ES n= 145 (12.8%) I=0.58***
ET n= 135 (11.9%) I=0.83
EF n= 198 (17.5%) I=0.78**
IF n= 358 (31.6%) I=0.99
IT n= 443 (39.1%) I=1.24***
ESTP
n = 11
(1.0%)
I = 0.69
+
ESFP
n = 17
(1.5%)
I = 0.90*
++
ENFP
n = 60
(5.3%)
I = 1.50*
+++++
ENTP
n = 25
(2.2%)
I = 1.47
++
ESTJ
n = 58
(5.1%)
I = 0.61**
+++++
ESFJ
n = 59
(5.2%)
I = 0.49***
+++++
ENFJ
n = 62
(5.5%)
I = 0.83***
++++++
ENTJ
n = 41
(3.6%)
I = 1.17
++++
Jungian types (E)
       n    %    Index
E-TJ   99 ( 8.7) 0.76*  
E-FJ  121 (10.7) 0.62***
ES-P   28 ( 2.5) 0.80   
EN-P   85 ( 7.5) 1.50*  
Jungian types (I)
       n    %    Index
I-TP   69 ( 6.1) 1.77**
I-FP   82 ( 7.2) 1.05
IS-J  398 (35.1) 0.98
IN-J  252 (22.2) 1.29** 
Dominant types
        n    %    Index
Dt. T  168 (14.8) 0.99
Dt. F  203 (17.9) 0.75***
Dt. S  426 (37.6) 0.97
Dt. F  337 (29.7) 1.34***
Note: Total n = 1,134. *p < 0.05; **p <0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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Table 13: Type distribution of theist church-leavers compared to continuing 
churchgoers (males)
The 16 complete types Dichotomous preferences
ISTJ
n = 251
(29.8%)
I = 1.15
++++++++++
++++++++++
++++++++++
ISFJ
n = 43
(5.1%)
I = 0.73
+++++
INFJ
n = 53
(6.3%)
I = 1.04
++++++
INTJ
n = 141
(16.7%)
I = 1.03
++++++++++
+++++++
E  n= 196 (23.3%) I=0.77***
I  n= 647 (76.7%) I=1.10***
S  n= 424 (50.3%) I=0.98
N  n= 419 (49.7%) I=1.02
T  n= 622 (73.8%) I=1.08**
F  n= 221 (26.2%) I=0.83**
J  n= 610 (72.4%) I=0.95*
P  n= 233 (27.6%) I=1.16*
ISTP
n = 35
(4.2%)
I = 1.65*
++++
ISFP
n = 10
(1.2%)
I = 0.74
+
INFP
n = 39
(4.6%)
I = 0.79***
+++++
INTP
n = 75
(8.9%)
I = 1.92***
+++++++++
Pairs and temperaments
IJ n= 488 (57.9%) I=1.05
IP n= 159 (18.9%) I=1.29*
EP n=  74 ( 8.8%) I=0.96
EJ n= 122 (14.5%) I=0.69***
ST n= 350 (41.5%) I=1.10
SF n=  74 ( 8.8%) I=0.64***
NF n= 147 (17.4%) I=0.97
NT n= 272 (32.3%) I=1.05
SJ n= 356 (42.2%) I=0.94
SP n=  68 ( 8.1%) I=1.21
NP n= 165 (19.6%) I=1.14
NJ n= 254 (30.1%) I=0.96
TJ n= 476 (56.5%) I=0.99
TP n= 146 (17.3%) I=1.50***
FP n=  87 (10.3%) I=0.84
FJ n= 134 (15.9%) I=0.82*
IN n= 308 (36.5%) I=1.11
EN n= 111 (13.2%) I=0.84
IS n= 339 (40.2%) I=1.09
ES n=  85 (10.1%) I=0.70*
ET n= 120 (14.2%) I=0.75**
EF n=  76 ( 9.0%) I=0.81
IF n= 145 (17.2%) I=0.84
IT n= 502 (59.5%) I=1.21***
ESTP
n = 16
(1.9%)
I = 1.74
++
ESFP
n = 7
(0.8%)
I = 0.58
+
ENFP
n = 31
(3.7%)
I = 1.09
++++
ENTP
n = 20
(2.4%)
I = 0.72
++
ESTJ
n = 48
(5.7%)
I = 0.70*
++++++
ESFJ
n = 14
(1.7%)
I = 0.45**
++
ENFJ
n = 24
(2.8%)
I = 1.06
+++
ENTJ
n = 36
(4.3%)
I = 0.67*
++++
Jungian types (E)
       n    %    Index
E-TJ   84 (10.0) 0.68**  
E-FJ   38 ( 4.5) 0.71
ES-P   23 ( 2.7) 1.08   
EN-P   51 ( 6.0) 0.91  
Jungian types (I)
       n    %    Index
I-TP  110 (13.0) 1.82***
I-FP   49 ( 5.8) 0.78
IS-J  294 (34.9) 1.06
IN-J  194 (23.0) 1.03 
Dominant types
        n    %    Index
Dt. T  194 (23.0) 1.06
Dt. F   87 (10.3) 0.74*
Dt. S  317 (37.6) 1.06
Dt. F  245 (29.1) 1.00
Note: Total n = 843. *p < 0.05; **p <0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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7.5 Psychological type analysis of the Christian converts
Data was also collected from Christian converts, i.e. individuals who did not 
attend church as children but do attend now as adults because they converted to 
Christianity.  It was predicted that these churchgoers would be similar to the 
continuing churchgoers in terms of psychological type.  In order to test this 
hypothesis, the Christian converts were compared to the continuing churchgoers in the
same manner as the samples in the previous two Sections.
Table 14 compares the type distribution of the 78 female Christian converts 
with the type distribution of the 1,137 female continuing churchgoers. These data 
demonstrated that there were no significant differences on any of the four dimensions 
of psychological type.  There was insufficient data from the female Christian converts
to make a proper comparison at the level of the 16 discrete types since for this 
analysis, at least 5 cases per type are necessary.
Table 15 compares the type distribution of the 101 male Christian converts 
with the type distribution of the 1,189 male continuing churchgoers. These data 
demonstrated that there were no significant differences on any of the four dimensions 
of psychological type.  There was insufficient data from the female Christian converts
to make a proper comparison at the level of the 16 discrete types (for this analysis, at 
least 5 cases per type are necessary).
The results from these two tables indicate that the prediction regarding the 
Christian converts was correct:  the psychological type profile of the Christian 
converts was very similar to the psychological type profile of the continuing 
churchgoers for both the females and the males.  This indicates that one of the reasons
why Christian converts might start attending church is that the overall atmosphere 
they find there matches their own personality preferences.
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Table 14: Type distribution of Christian converts compared to continuing churchgoers
(females)
The 16 complete types Dichotomous preferences
ISTJ
n = 15
(19.2%)
I = 0.98
++++++++++
+++++++++
ISFJ
n = 10
(12.8%)
I = 0.80
++++++++++
+++
INFJ
n = 8
(10.3%)
I = 1.15
++++++++++
INTJ
n = 5
(6.4%)
I = 0.77
++++++
E  n=  30 (38.5%) I=1.05
I  n=  48 (61.5%) I=0.97
S  n=  49 (62.8%) I=1.04
N  n=  29 (37.2%) I=0.94
T  n=  38 (48.7%) I=1.06
F  n=  40 (51.3%) I=0.95
J  n=  62 (79.5%) I=0.97
P  n=  16 (20.5%) I=1.12
ISTP
n = 3
(3.8%)
i/d
++++
ISFP
n = 1
(1.3%)
i/d
+
INFP
n = 2
(2.6%)
i/d
+++
INTP
n = 4
(5.1%)
i/d
+++++
Pairs and temperaments
IJ n=  38 (48.7%) I=0.92
IP n=  10 (12.8%) I=1.25
EP n=   6 ( 7.7%) I=0.95
EJ n=  24 (30.8%) I=1.07
ST n=  25 (32.1%) I=1.04
SF n=  24 (30.8%) I=1.04
NF n=  16 (20.5%) I=0.84
NT n=  13 (16.7%) I=1.10
SJ n=  44 (56.4%) I=1.03
SP n=   5 ( 6.4%) I=1.12
NP n=  11 (14.1%) I=1.11
NJ n=  18 (23.1%) I=0.86
TJ n=  30 (38.5%) I=0.97
TP n=   8 (10.3%) I=1.62
FP n=   8 (10.3%) I=0.85
FJ n=  32 (41.0%) I=0.98
IN n=  19 (24.4%) I=0.98
EN n=  10 (12.8%) I=0.87
IS n=  29 (37.2%) I=0.97
ES n=  20 (25.6%) I=1.16
ET n=  11 (14.1%) I=0.98
EF n=  19 (24.4%) I=1.09
IF n=  21 (26.9%) I=0.85
IT n=  27 (34.6%) I=1.10
ESTP
n = 0
(0.0%)
i/d
ESFP
n = 1
(1.3%)
i/d
+
ENFP
n = 4
(5.1%)
i/d
+++++
ENTP
n = 1
(1.3%)
i/d
+
ESTJ
n = 7
(9.0%)
I = 1.06
+++++++++
ESFJ
n = 12
(15.4%)
I = 1.46
++++++++++
+++++
ENFJ
n = 2
(2.6%)
i/d
+++
ENTJ
n = 3
(3.8%)
i/d
++++
Jungian types (E)
       n    %    Index
E-TJ   10 (12.8) 1.11  
E-FJ   14 (17.9) 1.05   
ES-P    1 ( 1.3) 0.42   
EN-P    5 ( 6.4) 1.28   
Jungian types (I)
       n    %    Index
I-TP    7 ( 9.0) 2.62*   
I-FP    3 ( 3.8) 0.56  
IS-J   25 (32.1) 0.90    
IN-J   13 (16.7) 0.97
Dominant types
        n    %    Index
Dt. T   17 (21.8) 1.46
Dt. F   17 (21.8) 0.91
Dt. S   26 (33.3) 0.86
Dt. F   18 (23.1) 1.04
Note: Total n = 78. i/d = insufficient data. 
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Table 15: Type distribution of Christian converts compared to continuing churchgoers
(males)
The 16 complete types Dichotomous preferences
ISTJ
n = 25
(24.8%)
I = 0.96
++++++++++
++++++++++
+++++
ISFJ
n = 4
(4.0%)
i/d
++++
INFJ
n = 4
(4.0%)
i/d
++++
INTJ
n = 19
(18.8%)
I = 1.15
++++++++++
+++++++++
E  n=  37 (36.6%) I=1.22
I  n=  64 (63.4%) I=0.91
S  n=  49 (48.5%) I=0.94
N  n=  52 (51.5%) I=1.06
T  n=  75 (74.3%) I=1.09
F  n=  26 (25.7%) I=0.81
J  n=  70 (69.3%) I=0.91
P  n=  31 (30.7%) I=1.29
ISTP
n = 1
(1.0%)
i/d
+
ISFP
n = 2
(2.0%)
i/d
++
INFP
n = 4
(4.0%)
i/d
++++
INTP
n = 5
(5.0%)
I = 1.07
+++++
Pairs and temperaments
IJ n=  52 (51.5%) I=0.93
IP n=  12 (11.9%) I=0.81
EP n=  19 (18.8%) I=2.05**
EJ n=  18 (17.8%) I=0.85
ST n=  40 (39.6%) I=1.05
SF n=   9 ( 8.9%) I=0.65
NF n=  17 (16.8%) I=0.94
NT n=  35 (34.7%) I=1.13
SJ n=  41 (40.6%) I=0.91
SP n=   8 ( 7.9%) I=1.19
NP n=  23 (22.8%) I=1.33
NJ n=  29 (28.7%) I=0.91
TJ n=  56 (55.4%) I=0.98
TP n=  19 (18.8%) I=1.63*
FP n=  12 (11.9%) I=0.97
FJ n=  14 (13.9%) I=0.71
IN n=  32 (31.7%) I=0.96
EN n=  20 (19.8%) I=1.26
IS n=  32 (31.7%) I=0.86
ES n=  17 (16.8%) I=1.17
ET n=  25 (24.8%) I=1.31
EF n=  12 (11.9%) I=1.06
IF n=  14 (13.9%) I=0.68
IT n=  50 (49.5%) I=1.00
ESTP
n = 4
(4.0%)
i/d
++++
ESFP
n = 1
(1.0%)
i/d
+
ENFP
n = 5
(5.0%)
I = 0.28***
+++++
ENTP
n = 9
(8.9%)
I = 0.81
+++++++++
ESTJ
n = 10
(9.9%)
I = 1.21
++++++++++
ESFJ
n = 2
(2.0%)
i/d
++
ENFJ
n = 4
(4.0%)
i/d
++++
ENTJ
n = 2
(2.0%)
i/d
++
Jungian types (E)
       n    %    Index
E-TJ   12 (11.9) 0.82
E-FJ    6 ( 5.9) 0.93
ES-P    5 ( 5.0) 1.96
EN-P   14 (13.9) 2.09
Jungian types (I)
       n    %    Index
I-TP    6 ( 5.9) 0.83
I-FP    6 ( 5.9) 0.79
IS-J   29 (28.7) 0.87
IN-J   23 (22.8) 1.02
Dominant types
        n    %    Index
Dt. T   18 (17.8) 0.82
Dt. F   12 (11.9) 0.86
Dt. S   34 (33.7) 0.95
Dt. F   37 (36.6) 1.26
Note: Total n = 101. i/d = insufficient data. *p < 0.05; **p <0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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7.6 Psychological type analysis of the unchurched atheists
Data was also collected from unchurched atheists, i.e. those atheists who did 
not attend church as children.  It was predicted that these atheists would be similar to 
the atheist church-leavers in terms of psychological type.  In order to test this 
hypothesis, the two types of atheists were compared with each other to see what types,
if any, were over-represented or under-represented among the unchurched atheists as 
compared to the atheist church-leavers.
Table 16 compares the type distribution of the 1,780 female unchurched 
atheists with the type distribution of the 2,677 female atheist church-leavers. These 
data demonstrated that the female unchurched atheists displayed no significant 
differences as compared to the female atheist churchleavers on extraversion versus 
introversion, sensing versus intuition, and judging versus perceiving.  However, the 
female unchurched atheists did display a highly significant over-representation of 
thinking over feeling (I = 1.02).  In terms of the 16 discrete types, the female 
unchurched atheists had a significant over-representation of ISTJ (I = 1.08) and a 
significant under-representation of ESFJ (I = 0.53).  There were no significant 
differences in the percentages of the remaining fourteen types.
Table 17 compares the type distribution of the 5,343 male unchurched atheists 
with the type distribution of the 1,189 male atheist church-leavers. These data 
demonstrated that the male unchurched atheists displayed no significant differences as
compared to the male atheist churchleavers on sensing versus intuition and judging 
versus perceiving.  However, the male unchurched atheists did display a significant 
over-representation of introversion over extraversion (I = 1.02) and a highly 
significant over-representation of thinking over feeling (I = 1.02).  In terms of the 16 
discrete types, the male unchurched atheists had a significant over-representation of 
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INTJ (I = 1.11) and significant under-representations of ESTJ (I = 0.86), ISFJ (I = 
0.79) and ESFP (I = 0.53).  There were no significant differences in the percentages of
the remaining twelve types.
The results from these two tables indicate that the prediction regarding the 
unchurched atheists was mostly correct.  The psychological type profile of the 
unchurched atheists was very similar to the psychological type profile of the atheist 
church-leavers for both the females and the males, with the exception of a small (but 
still statistically relevant) over-representation of thinking over feeling for both the 
male and female unchurched atheists and a small (but still statistically relevant) over-
representation of introversion over extraversion for the male unchurched atheists.
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Table 16: Type distribution of unchurched atheists compared to atheist church-leavers
(females)
The 16 complete types Dichotomous preferences
ISTJ
n = 723
(40.6%)
I = 1.08*
++++++++++
++++++++++
++++++++++
++++++++++
+
ISFJ
n = 123
(6.9%)
I = 0.91
+++++++
INFJ
n = 69
(3.9%)
I = 0.77
++++
INTJ
n = 217
(12.2%)
I = 0.95
++++++++++
++
E  n= 370 (20.8%) I=0.90
I  n=1410 (79.2%) I=1.03
S  n=1207 (67.8%) I=1.02
N  n= 573 (32.2%) I=0.95
T  n=1413 (79.4%) I=1.02**
F  n= 367 (20.6%) I=0.95**
J  n=1402 (78.8%) I=0.99
P  n= 378 (21.2%) I=1.04
ISTP
n = 93
(5.2%)
I = 1.21
+++++
ISFP
n = 32
(1.8%)
I = 1.12
++
INFP
n = 48
(2.7%)
I = 0.87
+++
INTP
n = 105
(5.9%)
I = 1.13
++++++
Pairs and temperaments
IJ n=1132 (63.6%) I=1.02
IP n= 278 (15.6%) I=1.09
EP n= 100 ( 5.6%) I=0.91
EJ n= 270 (15.2%) I=0.89
ST n=1009 (56.7%) I=1.07*
SF n= 198 (11.1%) I=0.85
NF n= 169 ( 9.5%) I=0.86
NT n= 404 (22.7%) I=1.00
SJ n=1042 (58.5%) I=1.02
SP n= 165 ( 9.3%) I=1.07
NP n= 213 (12.0%) I=1.01
NJ n= 360 (20.2%) I=0.92
TJ n=1158 (65.1%) I=1.04
TP n= 255 (14.3%) I=1.06
FP n= 123 ( 6.9%) I=0.99
FJ n= 244 (13.7%) I=0.80*
IN n= 439 (24.7%) I=0.96
EN n= 134 ( 7.5%) I=0.92
IS n= 971 (54.6%) I=1.07*
ES n= 236 (13.3%) I=0.88
ET n= 275 (15.4%) I=0.95
EF n=  95 ( 5.3%) I=0.78*
IF n= 272 (15.3%) I=0.88
IT n=1138 (63.9%) I=1.07**
ESTP
n = 26
(1.5%)
I = 0.78
++
ESFP
n = 14
(0.8%)
I = 0.96
+
ENFP
n = 29
(1.6%)
I = 1.15
++
ENTP
n = 31
(1.7%)
I = 0.83
++
ESTJ
n = 167
(9.4%)
I = 1.01
+++++++++
ESFJ
n = 29
(1.6%)
I = 0.53**
++
ENFJ
n = 23
(1.3%)
I = 0.84
+
ENTJ
n = 51
(2.9%)
I = 0.92
+++
Jungian types (E)
       n    %    Index
E-TJ  218 (12.2) 0.99 
E-FJ   52 ( 2.9) 0.64**
ES-P   40 ( 2.2) 0.84 
EN-P   60 ( 3.4) 0.96
Jungian types (I)
       n    %    Index
I-TP  198 (11.1) 1.16
I-FP   80 ( 4.5) 0.95
IS-J  846 (47.5) 1.05
IN-J  286 (16.1) 0.93
Dominant types
        n    %    Index
Dt. T  416 (23.4) 1.07
Dt. F  132 ( 7.4) 0.80*
Dt. S  886 (49.8) 1.04
Dt. F  346 (19.4) 0.93
Note: Total n = 1,780. *p < 0.05; **p <0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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Table 17: Type distribution of unchurched atheists compared to atheist church-leavers
(males)
The 16 complete types Dichotomous preferences
ISTJ
n = 2,227
(41.7%)
I = 1.03
++++++++++
++++++++++
++++++++++
++++++++++
++
ISFJ
n = 123
(2.3%)
I = 0.79*
++
INFJ
n = 94
(1.8%)
I = 1.01
++
INTJ
n = 881
(16.5%)
I = 1.11*
++++++++++
+++++++
E  n=1027 (19.2%) I=0.92*
I  n=4316 (80.8%) I=1.02*
S  n=3459 (64.7%) I=1.00
N  n=1884 (35.3%) I=1.01
T  n=4860 (91.0%) I=1.02**
F  n= 483 ( 9.0%) I=0.86**
J  n=3992 (74.7%) I=1.01
P  n=1351 (25.3%) I=0.96
ISTP
n = 441
(8.3%)
I = 1.02
++++++++
ISFP
n = 49
(0.9%)
I = 0.98
+
INFP
n = 77
(1.4%)
I = 0.78
+
INTP
n = 424
(7.9%)
I = 0.95
++++++++
Pairs and temperaments
IJ n=3325 (62.2%) I=1.04**
IP n= 991 (18.5%) I=0.82
EP n= 360 ( 6.7%) I=0.91
EJ n= 667 (12.5%) I=1.02*
ST n=3230 (60.5%) I=1.01
SF n= 229 ( 4.3%) I=0.82*
NF n= 254 ( 4.8%) I=0.91
NT n=1630 (30.5%) I=1.02
SJ n=2802 (52.4%) I=0.99
SP n= 657 (12.3%) I=1.03
NP n= 694 (13.0%) I=0.91*
NJ n=1190 (22.3%) I=1.07*
TJ n=3703 (69.3%) I=1.02
TP n=1157 (21.7%) I=0.99
FP n= 194 ( 3.6%) I=0.82*
FJ n= 289 ( 5.4%) I=0.89
IN n=1476 (27.6%) I=1.03
EN n= 408 ( 7.6%) I=0.94
IS n=2840 (53.2%) I=1.02
ES n= 619 (11.6%) I=0.91
ET n= 887 (16.6%) I=0.93
EF n= 140 ( 2.6%) I=0.86
IF n= 343 ( 6.4%) I=0.86*
IT n=3973 (74.4%) I=1.04***
ESTP
n = 150
(2.8%)
I = 1.17
+++
ESFP
n = 17
(0.3%)
I = 0.53*
ENFP
n = 51
(1.0%)
I = 0.89
+
ENTP
n = 142
(2.7%)
I = 0.91
+++
ESTJ
n = 412
(7.7%)
I = 0.86**
++++++++
ESFJ
n = 40
(0.7%)
I = 0.93
+
ENFJ
n = 32
(0.6%)
I = 1.02
+
ENTJ
n = 183
(3.4%)
I = 0.96
+++
Jungian types (E)
       n    %    Index
E-TJ  595 (11.1) 0.89*
E-FJ   72 ( 1.3) 0.97
ES-P  167 ( 3.1) 1.04
EN-P  193 ( 3.6) 0.91
Jungian types (I)
       n    %    Index
I-TP  865 (16.2) 0.98
I-FP  126 ( 2.4) 0.85
IS-J 2350 (44.0) 1.02
IN-J  975 (18.2) 1.10*
Dominant types
        n    %    Index
Dt. T 1460 (27.3) 0.94*
Dt. F  198 ( 3.7) 0.89
Dt. S 2517 (47.1) 1.02
Dt. F 1168 (21.9) 1.06
Note: Total n = 5,343. *p < 0.05; **p <0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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7.7 Psychological type analysis of the unchurched theists
Data was also collected from unchurched  theists, i.e. those who did not attend 
church as children, do not attend church now, but believe in some sort of God.  It was 
predicted that these individuals would be similar to the theist church-leavers in terms 
of psychological type.   In order to test this hypothesis, the two types of theists were 
compared with each other to see what types, if any, were over-represented or under-
represented among the unchurched theists as compared to the theist church-leavers.
Table 18 compares the type distribution of the 270 female unchurched theists 
with the type distribution of the 1,134 female theist church-leavers. These data 
demonstrated that the female unchurched theists displayed no significant differences 
as compared to the female theist churchleavers on extraversion versus introversion, 
sensing versus intuition, and judging versus perceiving.  However, the female 
unchurched theists did display a significant over-representation of thinking over 
feeling (I = 1.16).  In terms of the 16 discrete types, the female unchurched theists had
a significant over-representation of INTJ (I = 1.57) and a significant under-
representation of ISFJ (I = 0.51).  There were no significant differences in the 
percentages of the remaining fourteen types.
Table 19 compares the type distribution of the 240 male unchurched theists 
with the type distribution of the 843 male theist church-leavers. These data 
demonstrated that the male unchurched theists displayed no significant differences as 
compared to the male theist churchleavers on extraversion versus introversion and 
thinking versus feeling.  However, the male unchurched theists did display a 
significant over-representation of intuition over sensing (I = 1.16) and perceiving over
judging (I = 1.27).  In terms of the 16 discrete types, the male unchurched theists had 
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a significant over-representation of INFP (I = 1.89).  There were no significant 
differences in the percentages of the remaining fifteen types.
The results from these two tables indicate that the prediction regarding the 
unchurched theists was mostly correct.  The psychological type profile of the 
unchurched theists was very similar to the psychological type profile of the theist 
church-leavers for both the females and the males, with the exception of a small (but 
still statistically relevant) over-representation of thinking over feeling for the female 
unchurched theists and small (but still statistically relevant) over-representations of 
intuition over sensing and perceiving over judging for the male unchurched theists.
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Table 18: Type distribution of unchurched theists compared to theist church-leavers 
(females)
The 16 complete types Dichotomous preferences
ISTJ
n = 55
(20.4%)
I = 0.96
++++++++++
++++++++++
ISFJ
n = 19
7.0%)
I = 0.51**
+++++++
INFJ
n = 27
(10.0%)
I = 0.96
++++++++++
INTJ
n = 50
(18.5%)
I = 1.57**
++++++++++
+++++++++
E  n=  68 (25.2%) I=0.86
I  n= 202 (74.8%) I=1.06
S  n= 119 (44.1%) I=0.87
N  n= 151 (55.9%) I=1.13
T  n= 159 (58.9%) I=1.16*
F  n= 111 (41.1%) I=0.84*
J  n= 196 (72.6%) I=0.95
P  n=  74 (27.4%) I=1.18
ISTP
n = 6
(2.2%)
I = 1.58
++
ISFP
n = 4
(1.5%)
i/d
++
INFP
n = 21
(7.8%)
I = 1.32
++++++++
INTP
n = 20
(7.4%)
I = 1.58
+++++++
Pairs and temperaments
IJ n= 151 (55.9%) I=0.98
IP n=  51 (18.9%) I=1.42*
EP n=  23 ( 8.5%) I=0.85
EJ n=  45 (16.7%) I=0.86
ST n=  80 (29.6%) I=1.03
SF n=  39 (14.4%) I=0.66**
NF n=  72 (26.7%) I=0.99
NT n=  79 (29.3%) I=1.31
SJ n= 100 (37.0%) I=0.82*
SP n=  19 ( 7.0%) I=1.35
NP n=  55 (20.4%) I=1.13
NJ n=  96 (35.6%) I=1.14
TJ n= 126 (46.7%) I=1.12
TP n=  33 (12.2%) I=1.32
FP n=  41 (15.2%) I=1.08
FJ n=  70 (25.9%) I=0.74**
IN n= 118 (43.7%) I=1.33***
EN n=  33 (12.2%) I=0.74
IS n=  84 (31.1%) I=0.82*
ES n=  35 (13.0%) I=1.01
ET n=  28 (10.4%) I=0.87
EF n=  40 (14.8%) I=0.85
IF n=  71 (26.3%) I=0.83
IT n= 131 (48.5%) I=1.24**
ESTP
n = 4
(1.5%)
i/d
++
ESFP
n = 5
(1.9%)
I = 1.24
++
ENFP
n = 11
(4.1%)
I = 0.77
++++
ENTP
n = 3
(1.1%)
i/d
+
ESTJ
n = 15
(5.6%)
I = 1.09
++++++
ESFJ
n = 11
(4.1%)
I = 0.78
++++
ENFJ
n = 13
(4.8%)
I = 0.88
+++++
ENTJ
n = 6
(2.2%)
I = 0.61
++
Jungian types (E)
       n    %    Index
E-TJ   21 ( 7.8) 0.89  
E-FJ   24 ( 8.9) 0.83
ES-P    9 ( 3.3) 1.35   
EN-P   14 ( 5.2) 0.69  
Jungian types (I)
       n    %    Index
I-TP   26 ( 9.6) 1.58*
I-FP   25 ( 9.3) 1.28
IS-J   74 (27.4) 0.78*
IN-J   77 (28.5) 1.28*
Dominant types
        n    %    Index
Dt. T   47 (17.4) 1.18
Dt. F   49 (18.1) 1.01
Dt. S   83 (30.7) 0.82*
Dt. F   91 (33.7) 1.13
Note: Total n = 270. i/d = insufficient data. *p < 0.05; **p <0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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Table 19: Type distribution of unchurched theists compared to theist church-leavers 
(males)
The 16 complete types Dichotomous preferences
ISTJ
n = 59
(24.6%)
I = 0.83
++++++++++
++++++++++
+++++
ISFJ
n = 7
(2.9%)
I = 0.57
+++
INFJ
n = 11
(4.6%)
I = 0.73
+++++
INTJ
n = 45
(18.8%)
I = 1.12
++++++++++
+++++++++
E  n=  53 (22.1%) I=0.95
I  n= 187 (77.9%) I=1.02
S  n= 102 (42.5%) I=0.84*
N  n= 138 (57.5%) I=1.16*
T  n= 178 (74.2%) I=1.01
F  n=  62 (25.8%) I=0.99
J  n= 156 (65.0%) I=0.90*
P  n=  84 (35.0%) I=1.27*
ISTP
n = 10
(4.2%)
I = 1.00
++++
ISFP
n = 5
(2.1%)
I = 1.76
++
INFP
n = 21
(8.8%)
I = 1.89*
+++++++++
INTP
n = 29
(12.1%)
I = 1.36
++++++++++
++
Pairs and temperaments
IJ n= 122 (50.8%) I=0.88
IP n=  65 (27.1%) I=1.44**
EP n=  19 ( 7.9%) I=0.90
EJ n=  34 (14.2%) I=0.98
ST n=  85 (35.4%) I=0.85
SF n=  17 ( 7.1%) I=0.81
NF n=  45 (18.8%) I=1.08
NT n=  93 (38.8%) I=1.20
SJ n=  85 (35.4%) I=0.84
SP n=  17 ( 7.1%) I=1.88
NP n=  67 (27.9%) I=1.43**
NJ n=  71 (29.6%) I=0.98
TJ n= 129 (53.8%) I=0.95
TP n=  49 (20.4%) I=1.18
FP n=  35 (14.6%) I=1.41
FJ n=  27 (11.3%) I=0.71
IN n= 106 (44.2%) I=1.21*
EN n=  32 (13.3%) I=1.01
IS n=  81 (33.8%) I=0.84
ES n=  21 ( 8.8%) I=0.87
ET n=  35 (14.6%) I=1.02
EF n=  18 ( 7.5%) I=0.83
IF n=  44 (18.3%) I=1.07
IT n= 143 (59.6%) I=1.00
ESTP
n = 1
(0.4%)
i/d
ESFP
n = 1
(0.4%)
i/d
ENFP
n = 8
(3.3%)
I = 0.91
+++
ENTP
n = 9
(3.8%)
I = 1.58
++++
ESTJ
n = 15
(6.3%)
I = 1.10
++++++
ESFJ
n = 4
(1.7%)
i/d
++
ENFJ
n = 5
(2.1%)
I = 0.73
++
ENTJ
n = 10
(4.2%)
I = 0.98
++++
Jungian types (E)
       n    %    Index
E-TJ   25 (10.4) 1.05
E-FJ    9 ( 3.8) 0.83
ES-P    2 ( 0.8) 0.31
EN-P   17 ( 7.1) 1.17
Jungian types (I)
       n    %    Index
I-TP   39 (16.3) 1.25
I-FP   26 (10.8) 1.86**
IS-J   66 (27.5) 0.79*
IN-J   56 (23.3) 1.01
Dominant types
        n    %    Index
Dt. T   64 (26.7) 1.16
Dt. F   35 (14.6) 1.41
Dt. S   68 (28.3) 0.75**
Dt. F   73 (30.4) 1.05
Note: Total n = 240. i/d = insufficient data. *p < 0.05; **p <0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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7.8 Conclusion
One of the primary research goals of this project was to compare the 
psychological type profile of continuing churchgoers with that of atheist church-
leavers.  As expected, the data demonstrated that the greatest differences exist in the 
thinking-feeling and judging-perceiving dimensions with continuing churchgoers 
tending more towards feeling and judging (FJ) and atheist church-leavers tending 
more towards thinking and perceiving (TP).  This supports the notion that 
psychological type does indeed play a role in why certain individuals are more likely 
than others to stop attending church and to become atheists.  Individuals with 
combined preferences for thinking and perceiving (TP) are minorities in church 
congregations and are therefore more likely than other types to feel out of place.  In 
addition, TP types are also non-comformists who prefer to make decisions based on 
logical reasoning as opposed to shared social values.  Such types are thus more likely 
to stop attending church and to explore alternative worldviews instead.
The data reported in this chapter also demonstrated that there is not as 
profound a difference in psychological type between theist church-leavers and 
continuing churchgoers as there is between atheist church-leavers and continuing 
churchgoers.  This indicates that  psychological type plays a greater role in why those 
who go on to become atheists stop attending church than it does among those who 
remain theists.  Finally, the data demonstrated that when it comes to their overall 
psychological type profile, Christian converts are similar to continuing churchgoers, 
unchurched atheists are similar to atheist church-leavers and unchurched theists are 
similar to theist church-leavers.
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8 ANALYSIS OF OTHER THEORIES
This chapter will address the second research question:  Is there evidence to 
support any of the other theories about why certain individuals are more likely than 
others to give up their childhood religious beliefs and to become atheists?  The seven 
“other” theories considered in the study were:  selfishness, arrogance, anger at God, 
poor father-child relationships, lower religious emphasis during childhood, 
deliberation in the pursuit of truth, and higher intelligence.  Section 8.1 will look at 
each theory separately and report on the independent t-tests and chi square tests that 
were used to measure the statistical significance of various factors selected to 
represent the seven theories (one factor each for for selfishness, arrogance, anger, 
deliberation, and intelligence; seven factors related to father-child relationships; and 
nine factors related to religious emphasis during childhood).  For each theory, the 
results of the statistical tests as well as the raw scores (on a scale of 0 to 50) will be 
used to determine whether the theory should be accepted or rejected.  Section 8.2 will 
then report on the binary logistic regression that was used to rank the relative 
importance of each accepted theory and thus determine which theories have the most 
validity.
8.1 Independent t-tests and chi-square tests
An independent t-test is a standard statistical test used to compare the mean 
scores of two groups on a variable that is continuous (i.e. a scale with many possible 
points).  An example of a continuous variable from this project is the scale that 
represented the strength of an individual’s relationship with his or her father (with 
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possible values between 0 and 50).  In the cases where the variable was categorical 
rather than continuous, a chi-square test was used instead.   An example of a 
categorical variable from this project was the yes or no answer to the question, “Did 
the individual attend church with his or her father?”  For both the t-tests and the chi 
square test, the statistical relevance of the difference between the means or 
percentages is indicated by p.  As mentioned in section 7.3, a p value of less than 0.05 
is seen as significant, a p value of less than 0.01 is seen as highly significant, and a p 
value of less than 0.001 is seen as very highly significant.  However, because large 
sample sizes, like the ones used in this study, can often lead to very small differences 
acheiving significant p values, attention will primarily be paid to results acheiving a p 
value of less than 0.001.
8.1.1 Analysis of selfishness
As outlined in Section 3.1.1, many conservative Christian writers have 
claimed that one of the main reasons atheists reject God is that they are selfish and 
immoral (Sproul, 1974; Stroebel, 1998; Vitz, 2008; Spiegel, 2010).  The current 
project tested this theory by including a measure of selfishness in its survey.  The 
measure was the reverse of a 10-item scale from the IPIP-NEO designed to measure 
the facet “altruism”.  In this study, the scale achieved a coefficient alpha of .82, which
is considered to be a sign of good internal consistency.  Independent t-tests were then 
used to compare the mean scores of the atheist church-leavers with the mean scores of
the continuing churchgoers with females and males being considered separately.
Table 20 presents the results of the independent t-tests.  According to the data, 
the female atheist church-leavers scored higher, on average, than the female 
continuing churchgoers on selfishness with the difference in mean scores being 
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considered very highly significant.  In addition to this, the male atheist church-leavers
also scored higher, on average, than the male continuing churchgoers on selfishness 
with the difference in mean scores being considered very highly significant.  
 However, it is important to note that the results cannot be said to indicate that 
atheists are selfish and that churchgoers are not.  Although there was a statistically 
relevant difference in their mean scores on selfishness, both the mean scores of the 
female and male atheist church-leavers as well as the mean scores of the female and 
male continuing churchgoers were on the lower side of the 50-point scale (and hence 
on the side of altruism).  Rather than the results indicating that atheists are more 
selfish than churchgoers, it would be more accurate to say that atheists are simply less
altruistic.  If selfishness was indeed a core trait of atheists, one would have expected a
much larger difference in mean scores. For this reason, the theory that some 
individual become atheists because they are selfish was rejected.
Table 20: Selfishness (atheist church-leavers versus continuing churchgoers)
Atheist church-leavers Continuing churchgoers
Factor n mean SD n mean SD t p<
Selfishness (female) 2,677 20.08 5.47 1,137 17.73 4.86 13.14 .001
(male) 7,838 21.81 5.44 1,189 19.81 5.43 11.79 .001
8.1.2 Analysis of arrogance
As outlined in Section 3.1.2, many conservative Christian writers have also 
claimed that many atheists reject God because they are arrogant (D’Souza, 2007; 
Pasquini, 2009; Hart, 2009; Markham, 2011; Stokes, 2012).  The current project 
tested this theory by including a measure of arrogance in its survey.  The measure was
the reverse of a 10-item scale from the IPIP-NEO designed to measure the facet 
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“modesty”.  In this study, the scale achieved a coefficient alpha of .83, which is 
considered to be a sign of good internal consistency.  Independent t-tests were then 
used to compare the mean scores of the atheist church-leavers with the mean scores of
the continuing churchgoers with females and males being considered separately.
Table 21 presents the results of the independent t-tests.  According to the data, 
the female atheist church-leavers scored higher, on average, than the female 
continuing churchgoers on arrogance with the difference in mean scores being 
considered very highly significant.  In addition to this, the male atheist church-leavers
also scored higher, on average, than the male continuing churchgoers on arrogance 
with the difference in mean scores being considered very highly significant. 
 However, it is important to note that the results cannot be said to indicate that 
atheists are arrogant and that churchgoers are not.  Although there was a statistically 
relevant difference in their mean scores on arrogance, both the mean scores of the 
female and male atheist church-leavers as well as the mean scores of the female and 
male continuing churchgoers were located near the center of the 50-point scale.  If 
arrogance was indeed a core trait of atheists, one would have expected a much larger 
difference in mean scores. In addition to this, it should be noted that both the male 
groups (the male atheist church-leavers and the male continuing churchgoers) scored 
higher on the arrogance scale than both the female groups.  This indicates that sex is 
also an important factor when it comes to arrogance.  For these reasons, the theory 
that some individual become atheists because they are selfish was rejected.
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Table 21: Arrogance (atheist church-leavers versus continuing churchgoers)
Atheist church-leavers Continuing churchgoers
Factor n mean SD n mean SD t p<
Arrogance (female) 2,677 26.65 7.07 1,137 24.53 6.61 8.84 .001
(male) 7,838 28.88 7.02 1,189 27.50 6.84 6.34 .001
8.1.3 Analysis of anger
As outlined in Section 3.1.3, another theory about atheists is that they are 
angry at God (Exline, Yali & Lobel, 1999; Novotni & Petersen, 2001).  Although the 
current project was unable to measure anger towards God specifically, it did measure 
a tendency towards anger in general.  The measure used in the survey was the 10-item
scale from the IPIP-NEO designed to measure the facet “anger”.  In this study, the 
scale achieved a coefficient alpha of .92, which is considered to be a sign of excellent 
internal consistency.  Independent t-tests were used to compare the mean scores of the
atheist church-leavers with the mean scores of the continuing churchgoers with 
females and males being considered separately.
Table 22 presents the results of the independent t-tests.  According to the data, 
the female atheist church-leavers scored higher, on average, than the female 
continuing churchgoers on anger with the difference in mean scores being considered 
significant.  However, no significant difference was found between the mean scores of
the male atheist church-leavers and the continuing churchgoers on anger.  Because a p
value of less than .001 was not acheived in either the comparison of females, nor the 
comparison of males, the theory that some individual become atheists because they 
are prone to anger was rejected. 
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Table 22: Anger (atheist church-leavers versus continuing churchgoers)
Atheist church-leavers Continuing churchgoers
Factor n mean SD n mean SD t p<
Anger (female) 2,677 26.50 8.18 1,137 25.88 7.92 2.16 .05
(male) 7,838 23.71 8.23 1,189 23.46 8.00 .098 NS
8.1.4 Analysis of father-child relationships
As outlined in Section 3.1.4, Paul Vitz has put forward the theory that atheists 
have fathers that are cold, distant, or absent (Vitz, 1999).  In order to test this theory, 
participants in the current study were asked to report how many years, between birth 
and age 18, they spent with their fathers.  They were also asked to report the same for 
their mothers.  Independent t-tests were used to compare the mean for the atheist 
church-leavers with the mean for the continuing churchgoers with females and males 
being considered separately.
The project also measured the overall strength of the father-child and mother-
child relationships by asking participants to rank, on a 5-point Likert scale, how 
applicable a set of 10 words or phrases were in describing their father and mother.  
The words/phrases included: caring, supportive, involved in my life, loving, close to 
me, sensitive, accepting, always there for me, someone I respected, and someone 
others respected.  The ten items for the participant’s father and the ten items for the 
participant’s mother were used to create scales labelled, “childhood relationship with 
father” and “childhood relationship with mother”.  Both scales achieved a coefficient 
alpha of .95, which is considered to be a sign of excellent internal consistency.   
Independent t-tests were used to compare the mean scores of the atheist church-
leavers with the mean scores of the continuing churchgoers with females and males 
being considered separately.
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Table 23 presents the results of the independent t-tests.  According to the data, 
there was no significant difference between the two groups, for both females and 
males, when it came to the number of years that the participants spent with their 
mothers.  However, when it came to the number of years that the participants spent 
with their fathers, a very highly significant difference was found for both males and 
females.  In both cases though, the difference amounted to less than one full year 
(about 8 months for females and 5 months for males).  It is thus important to note that,
although these differences are considered to be very highly significant in terms of 
statistics, the differences were, in fact, extremely small in terms of actual numbers.  
Of greater significance were the participants’ relationships with their parents.  
According to the data, the atheist church-leavers (both the females and males) scored 
lower, on average, than the continuing churchgoers on the 50-point scales designed to 
measure their relationships with their fathers and mothers.  In each case, the 
differences were considered very highly significant. 
Table 23: Parental Relationships (atheist church-leavers versus continuing 
churchgoers)
Atheist church-leavers Continuing churchgoers
Factor n mean SD n mean SD t p<
Years with father (female) 2,677 14.86 5.47 1,137 15.51 5.05 -3.56 .001
(male) 7,838 15.43 5.06 1,189 15.87 4.79 -2.94 .01
Relationship with father (female) 2,677 35.62 10.66 1,137 37.29 10.88 -4.27 .001
(male) 7,838 36.47 9.40 1,189 38.01 9.50 -5.16 .001
Years with mother (female) 2,677 17.15 2.69 1,137 17.31 2.56 -1.78 NS
(male) 7,838 17.17 2.73 1,189 17.29 2.76 -1.44 NS
Relationship with mother (female) 2,677 38.88 9.97 1,137 41.31 9.05 -6.98 .001
(male) 7,838 41.58 7.81 1,189 43.42 7.38 -7.86 .001
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The current project also collected data on whether or not the participants’ 
parents divorced during childhood and whether or not the participants’ had a parent 
(or parents) die during childhood.  Chi square tests were used to compare the 
differences in percentages between the atheist church-leavers and the continuing 
churchgoers, with females and males being considered separately.  Table 24 presents 
the results of the chi square tests.  In terms of divorce, the parents of both the female 
and male atheist church-leavers divorced more often than the parents of the 
continuing churchgoers, with the differences in percentages being considered very 
highly significant.  However, when it came to the death of a parent or parents, the 
only significant difference that was found was for females whose father had died.  In 
this case, the female atheist church-leavers experienced the loss of a father more often
than the female continuing churchgoers with the difference in percentages being 
highly significant.
Table 24: Parental Death & Divorce (atheist church-leavers versus continuing 
churchgoers)
Atheist 
church-leavers
Continuing 
churchgoers
Factor % % χ2 p<
Father died (female) 5.2 3.2 7.25 .001
(male) 3.9 3.7 0.16 NS
Mother died (female) 1.8 2.3 1.02 NS
(male) 1.8 1.4 0.77 NS
Parents divorced (female) 29.7 23.2 16.70 .001
(male) 25.9 17.9 35.36 .001
Looking at the results from all seven factors examined in this section, there 
appears to be some validity to the theory that the father-child relationship plays a role 
in why some individuals become atheists.  However, the strength of the relationship 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND ATHEISM 185
appears to be more important than the number of years spent together.  Also, the 
relationship with one’s mother appears to be just as important as the relationship with 
one’s father.  Finally, it should be noted that it is impossible to know from these 
results whether the weaker parental relationships led to the individuals becoming 
atheists or whether the individuals becoming atheists led to weaker parental 
relationships.  Nonetheless, the theory based on father-child relationships was 
accepted and the factor “relationship with father” was included in the  binary logistic 
regression discussed in section 8.2 below.
8.1.5 Analysis of religious emphasis in childhood
As outlined in Section 3.2.1, there is conflicting evidence when it comes to 
whether or not the degree of religious emphasis in the home during childhood plays a 
role in why certain individuals become atheists (e.g. - Hunsberger & Brown, 1984; 
Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1997).  The current project collected data on this factor by 
asking participants to state the number of years they spent attending church regularly 
as a child (from birth to age 18) with “regularly” being defined as at least six times 
per year.  The questionnaire also asked participants to rank the degree to which their 
church’s teachings and practices were emphasized in the home using the terms very 
high, high, moderate, low, or very low.  In addition to these questions, participants 
were also asked to describe the church or faith community of their childhood using 
one of the following terms: very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very
liberal.  Finally, an overall childhood religious experience score was determined based
on how the participants ranked their feelings about the  following ten items using a 
five-point Likert scale (very positive, positive, neutral, negative, and very negative): 
the other children their age, the adult members, the leadership, the teachings and 
practices, the activities they participated in, the opportunities they were given, the 
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way they were treated, the sincerity of the members, the integrity of the members, and
the overall experience that they had.  These ten items achieved a coefficient alpha of .
92, which is considered to be a sign of excellent internal consistency.  Independent t-
tests were used to compare the mean scores of the atheist church-leavers with the 
mean scores of the continuing churchgoers with females and males being considered 
separately.
Table 25 presents the results of the independent t-tests.  According to the data, 
the female atheist church-leavers had lower values, on average, than the female 
continuing churchgoers when it came to the number of years of church attendance, the
degree of religious emphasis in the home, the conservatism of their church and their 
overall church experience.  All of these differences were considered to be very highly 
significant, except for the conservatism of their church, which was considered 
significant.  According to the data, the male atheist church-leavers also had lower 
values, on average, than the male continuing churchgoers when it came to the number 
of years of church attendance, the degree of religious emphasis in the home, the 
conservatism of their church and their overall church experience.  All of these 
differences were considered to be very highly significant.  
Table 25: Religious emphasis (atheist church-leavers versus continuing churchgoers)
Atheist church-leavers Continuing churchgoers
Factor n mean SD n mean SD t p<
Years of church (male) 2,677 13.28 4.85 1,137 14.70 4.99 -8.17 .001
(female) 7,838 13.45 4.62 1,189 15.03 4.82 -11.00 .001
Degree of emphasis (male) 2,677 29.50 1.21 1,137 34.30 0.92 -11.28 .001
(female) 7,838 29.30 1.15 1,189 34.10 1.17 -13.21 .001
Conservatism of church (male) 2,677 36.60 0.95 1,137 37.30 0.91 -2.27 .05
(female) 7,838 35.40 0.94 1,189 37.20 0.92 -6.09 .001
Overall church experience (male) 2,677 30.56 7.60 1,137 37.91 7.46 -27.14 .001
(female) 7,838 31.16 7.24 1,189 38.13 7.04 -30.71 .001
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The current project also collected data on with whom the participants attended 
church, including fathers, mothers, siblings, grandparents, and other extended family. 
Chi square tests were used to compare the differences in percentages between the 
atheist church-leavers and the continuing churchgoers, with females and males being 
considered separately.  Table 26 presents the results of the chi square tests.  According
to the data, both the female and male atheist church-leavers attended church with their
fathers less often, on average, than the female and male continuing churchgoers with 
the difference in percentages being considered very highly significant for both 
females and males.  Likewise, both the female and male atheist church-leavers also 
attended church with their mothers less often, on average, than the female and male 
continuing churchgoers but the difference in percentages was very highly significant 
for the males only.  In addition to this, the female and male atheist church-leavers also
attended church with their siblings less often, on average, than the female and male 
continuing churchgoers but the difference in percentages were not very highly 
significant for either sex.  No significant differences were found with regard to 
attending church with grandparents or extended family with the exception of the 
females and their grandparents.  In that case, the female atheist church-leavers 
attended church with their grandparents more often, on average, than the female and 
male continuing churchgoers with the difference in percentages being considered 
significant.
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Table 26: Church attendance (atheist church-leavers versus continuing churchgoers)
Atheist 
church-leavers
Continuing 
churchgoers
Factor (attended with:) % % χ2 p<
Father (female) 55.5 64.4 25.59 .001
(male) 64.3 75.4 56.16 .001
Mother (female) 80.0 82.4 3.03 .05
(male) 84.5 88.9 15.99 .001
Siblings (female) 72.7 75.9 4.23 .05
(male) 76.7 79.6 4.73 .05
Grandparents (female) 30.5 27.9 2.59 NS
(male) 28.6 25.0 6.71 .01
Extended family (female) 22.5 24.8 2.48 NS
(male) 21.9 20.5 1.21 NS
It is also worth noting that the years of church, degree of religious emphasis, 
conservatism of church, overall church experience all differed according to which 
denomination the participants attended as children.  According to the data, the 
denominations in which atheist church-leavers spent the most amount of years were  
Worldwide Church of God (15.38), Mormon (14.98), Jehovah’s Witnesses (14.84), 
Pentecostal (14.10), and Mennonite (14.06), whereas the denominations in which 
atheist church-leavers spent the least amount of years were United Church of Canada 
(11.28), Anglican (11.58), Churches of Christ (12.91), Baptist (13.14), and Eastern 
Orthodox (13.17).  The denominations for which the atheist church-leavers reported 
the highest levels of religious emphasis were Worldwide Church of God (4.49), 
Jehovah’s Witnesses (4.31), Seventh Day Adventists (3.97), Mormons (3.96), and 
Pentecostal, whereas the denominations for which the atheist church-leavers reported 
the lowest levels of religious emphasis were United Church of Canada (2.31), 
Anglican (2.34), Methodist (2.71), Lutheran (2.75), and Presbyterian (2.77).  The 
denominations that the atheist church-leavers considered to be the most conservative 
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were Jehovah’s Witnesses (4.62), Worldwide Church of God (4.62), Mormon (4.57), 
Pentecostal (4.44), and Seventh Day Adventist (4.41), whereas the denominations that
the atheist church-leavers considered to be the most liberal were the United Church of
Canada (2.32), Anglican (2.98), Lutheran (3.20), Methodist (3.21), and Presbyterian 
(3.27).  Finally, the denominations for which the atheist church-leavers reported the 
most positive church experiences were United Church of Canada (33.13), Methodist 
(33.09), Presbyterian (32.82), Anglican (32.40), and Lutheran (32.05), whereas the 
denominations for which the atheist church-leavers reported the most negative church 
experiences were Jehovah’s Witnesses (27.20), Eastern Orthodox (27.88), Pentecostal 
(29.11), Roman Catholic (30.00), and Baptist (30.05).    
The pattern that emerges from these statistics is that atheist church-leavers 
report more positive experiences among liberal denominations but at the same time, 
lower degrees of religous emphasis.  Conversely, they report more negative 
experiences among conservative denominations but at the same time, higher degrees 
of religious emphasis.  This means that if both low levels of religious emphasis and 
negative church experience are factors that influence church-leaving, they must be 
factors that operate in different situations and not factors that work together.  To put it 
more clearly, negative church experiences appear to be a factor in conservative 
churches but not in liberal churches, whereas low levels of religious emphasis appears
to be a factor in liberal churches but not in conservative churches.
Looking at the results from all nine factors examined in this section, there 
appears to be some validity to the theory that religious emphasis in childhood plays a 
role in why some individuals become atheists.  Individuals who went on to become 
atheists reported much lower degrees of religious emphasis in the home, had fewer 
years of church attendance (about one and a half years less on average), and were less 
likely to have attended church with their fathers.  This was especially true for 
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individuals who attended liberal churches.  However, for individuals who attended 
conservative churches, there appears to be some validity to the related theory that 
negative church experience also plays a role in why some individuals become atheists.
For these reasons, both the theory based on religious emphasis during childhood and 
the theory based on negative church experiences were accepted and the factors “years 
of church” and “overall church experience” were included in the binary logistic 
regression discussed in section 8.2 below.
8.1.6 Analysis of deliberation
As outlined in Section 3.2.2, there is evidence that many individuals stop 
believing in God as a result of their deliberation in pursuing truth (Babinski, 1995 ; 
Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1997).  Although the current project was unable to measure 
deliberation in pursuing truth specifically, it did measure deliberation in general.  The 
measure used in the survey was the 10-item scale from the IPIP-NEO designed to 
measure the facet labelled “deliberation”.  In this study, the scale achieved a 
coefficient alpha of .84, which is considered to be a sign of good internal consistency. 
Independent t-tests were then used to compare the mean scores of the atheist church-
leavers with the mean scores of the continuing churchgoers with females and males 
being considered separately.
Table 27 presents the results of the independent t-tests.  According to the data, 
the female atheist church-leavers scored higher, on average, than the female 
continuing churchgoers on deliberation with the difference in mean scores being 
considered significant.  In addition to this, the male atheist church-leavers also scored 
higher, on average, than the male continuing churchgoers on deliberation with the 
difference in mean scores being considered highly significant.  However, because a p 
value of less than .001 was not acheived in either the comparison of females, nor the 
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comparison of males, the theory that some individual become atheists because they 
are more deliberate was rejected. 
Table 27: Deliberation (atheist church-leavers versus continuing churchgoers)
Atheist church-leavers Continuing churchgoers
Factor n mean SD n mean SD t p<
Deliberation (female) 2,677 34.83 6.68 1,137 34.27 6.84 2.34 .05
(male) 7,838 34.85 6.18 1,189 34.20 6.77 3.11 .01
8.1.7 Analysis of intelligence
As outlined in Section 3.2.3, there is conflicting evidence when it comes to the
claim that atheists are more intelligent and/or more educated (e.g. Nyborg, 2009; 
Spencer, 2009).  Although the current project was unable to measure IQ, it did 
measure general intellect.  The intelligence measure used in the survey was the 10-
item scale from the IPIP-NEO designed to measure the facet labelled “intellect”.  In 
this study, the scale achieved a coefficient alpha of .84, which is considered to be a 
sign of good internal consistency.  
Table 28 presents the results of the independent t-tests.  According to the data, 
the female atheist church-leavers scored higher, on average, than the female 
continuing churchgoers on intellect with the difference in mean scores being 
considered very highly significant.  In addition to this, the male atheist church-leavers
also scored higher, on average, than the male continuing churchgoers on intellect with
the difference in mean scores being considered very highly significant.  Because even 
small differences in intelligence are considered to be practically significant, the theory
based on intelligence was accepted and the factors “intellect” was included in the 
binary logistic regression discussed in section 8.2 below.
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Table 28: Intellect (atheist church-leavers versus continuing churchgoers)
Atheist church-leavers Continuing churchgoers
Factor n mean SD n mean SD t p<
Intellect (female) 2,677 42.27 5.16 1,137 38.38 6.51 17.91 .001
(male) 7,838 43.18 4.69 1,189 41.57 5.97 8.88 .001
8.1.8 Conclusion
Based on the results discussed in this section, the theories based on selfishess, 
arrogance, anger, and deliberation were rejected but the theories based on father-child 
relationships, childhood religious emphasis, and intelligence were accepted.  The 
factors father-child relationship, years of church attendance, overall church 
experience, and intellect were selected to represent these theores in the binary logistic 
regression that follows in section 8.2
8.2 Binary Logistic Regression
In the previous section, it was determined that the more negative an 
individual’s relationship with his or her father, the fewer the years that he or she 
attended church, the more negative his or her experience at church, and the higher his 
or her level of intellect, the greater the chances that that individual will become an 
atheist church-leaver.  It was also determined in chapter seven that having a 
psychological preference for thinking (T) combined with a psychological preference 
for perceiving (P), also increases the chances that an individual will become an atheist
church-leaver.
In order to determine which of the five factors mentioned above is the 
strongest predictor of atheist church-leaving, a binary logistic regression test was 
preformed using the combined data from both the males and females in Group One 
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(the continuing churchgoers, n = 2,326) and Group Two (the atheist church-leavers, n 
= 10,515).  This binary logistic regression considered all five variables together in a 
single model.  Table 29 presents the results of this test.  
Table 29: Binary logistic regression results
B S.E. Wald p< Exp(B)
Preference for TP .695 .086 66.0 .001 2.00
Intellect .098 .005 406.7 .001 1.10
Relationship with father .009 .003 10.5 .01 1.01
Years of church attendance -.055 .250 107.9 .001 0.95
Overall church experience -.140 .004 1095.0 .001 0.87
The B value in the table, along with the standard error, were used to determine 
the relationship between the variable and the likelihood that a participant belonged to 
the atheist church-leaver group.  The results were as expected with the exception of 
the relationship with father variable.  When all five variables were considered 
together, a preference for TP, a higher intellect, fewer years of church attendance and 
a more negative church experience all still indicated a higher chance of being an 
atheist church-leaver.  However, a negative relationship with one’s father did not.  
Instead, when the other four factors were controlled for, a positive relationship with 
one’s father actually became a predictor, albeit a very minor one.
The Wald statistic and the p value were used to determine whether or not the 
variable is statistically relevent when it comes to predicting whether or not an 
individual is likely to be an atheist church-leaver.  In this case, all the variables were 
demonstrated to be very highly significant, with the exception of relationship with 
father.
The Exp(B) value represents an odds ratio and was used to determine which 
variable was the strongest predictor of atheist church-leaving.  When all five variables
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were considered together, having a psychological preference for TP stood out as being
the strongest predictor.   According to the data, the odds of an individual with a 
psychological preference for TP becoming an atheist church-leaver as opposed to a 
continuing churchgoer was two to one (2:1), after the other four variables were taken 
into consideration.
This last finding – that having a psychological preference for TP is the 
strongest predictor of an individual becoming an atheist church-leaver – is extremely 
significant in that it demonstrates that psychological type does play a major role in 
atheist church-leaving and in fact, probably plays a greater role than the various other 
theories that have been put forward over the years by both Christian and non-
Christian writers.  Future research on church-leaving should therefore focus on 
psychological type and other models of personality in addition to continuing to 
investigate other, more well-established theories.
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9 ANALYSIS OF WORLDVIEW-LEVEL BELIEFS
This chapter will address the third research question, the first part of which 
was: Do atheists share a common worldview?  Section 9.1 will address this part of the
question by reporting on the descriptive statistics and independent t-tests that were 
used to compare the worldview-level beliefs of atheists with the worldview-level 
beliefs of theists.  The second part of the question was:  Do the different terms used 
by atheists for self-description (atheist, agnostic, freethinker, humanist, or skeptic) 
reflect major differences in worldview-level beliefs?  Section 9.2 will address this part
of the question by reporting on the descriptive statistics and independent t-tests that 
were used to compare the worldview-level beliefs of atheists with each other based on
the primary term used for self-description (atheist, agnostic, freethinker, humanist, or 
skeptic).  Throughout this chapter, greater attention will be given to the patterns that 
emerge in the descriptive statistics as opposed to the results from the independent t-
tests.  This is due to the fact that the current study was based on large sample sizes 
and as mentioned earlier, large sample sizes often result in differences that can be 
considered very highly significant statistically-speaking even when they are not really
that significant practically-speaking.  For example, if sample sizes are large enough, 
the difference between 95% and 94% and the difference between 95% and 12% might
both be considered very highly significant (the highest level of statistical significance)
even though the second difference is obviously the more significant one overall.
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9.1 Worldview-level beliefs of atheists versus theists
According to the literature reviewed in chapter two, a worldview has six major
components: ontology, cosmology, teleology, axiology, praxeology, and epistemology.
In the current study, participants were given three statements related to each 
component and were asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with the 
statements using a five-point Likert scale: strongly agree, agree, not sure, disagree, 
and strongly disagree.  These statements were based on the secular humanist 
manifestos discussed in Section 2.2.  For each set of three items, two were worded to 
match the secular humanist position and one was worded to match the opposite of the 
secular humanist position. For the worldview comparisons, the six original sample 
groups were combined into three, with females and males considered together:  Group
One (the continuing churchgoers) and Group Four (the Christian converts) were 
combined as “Churchgoing Christians” (n = 2,505); Group Two (the atheist church-
leavers) and Group Five (the unchurched atheists) were combined as “Atheists and 
Agnostics” (n = 17,632); and Group Three (the theist church-leavers) and Group Six 
(the unchurched theists) were combined as “Spiritual but not Religious” (n = 2,487).  
The “Spiritual but not Religious” group was comprised of individuals who believe in 
some sort of God but do not attend church.  As noted in Chapter Six, members of non-
Christian religions were not placed in any of the samples due to the low number of 
responses received from such individuals. 
The hypothesis was that the atheist and agnostic participants would, as a 
whole, side with the secular humanist position for each worldview item, thus 
indicating that there is indeed such a thing as an “atheist worldview”.  It was also 
hypothesized that the churchgoing Christian participants would, as a whole, reject the 
secular humanist position on four of the six components –  ontology, cosmology, 
teleology, and epistemology – thus indicating that there is a clear difference between 
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the Christian worldview and the atheist worldview.  No prediction was made with 
regard to the spiritual but not religious individuals.
Figure 5 presents the descriptive statistics for the three items related to 
ontology.  As discussed in chapter two, ontology refers to an individual’s beliefs about
what exists and what does not.  According to the data, 89.1% of the atheists and 
agnostics either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “The natural world is all
that really exists.”; 83.7% of the atheists and agnostics agreed or strongly agreed with 
the statement, “There is no such thing as a ‘spirit world’.”; and 84.9% of the atheists 
and agnostics disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, “Humans have a 
soul that lives on after death.”  In contrast, only 5.6% the churchgoing Christians 
either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “The natural world is all that 
really exists.”; 5.4% of the churchgoing Christians agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement, “There is no such thing as a ‘spirit world’.”; and 3.8% of the churchgoing 
Christians disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, “Humans have a soul 
that lives on after death.”  For all three items, two parabolic curves can be seen, 
proceeding in opposite directions: the atheist and agnostic curve toward the expected 
secular humanist position and the churchgoing Christian curve toward the opposite 
position.  These results indicate that the majority of atheists and agnostics do share the
same worldview-level beliefs about ontology and that these beliefs are in direct 
opposition to the shared worldview-level beliefs of most churchgoing Christians.  
However, according to the data, the spiritual but not religious do not belong to either 
camp.  Instead, the results indicate that the spiritual but not religious individuals hold 
a variety of different positions when it comes to their worldview-level beliefs about
 ontology.  Independent t-tests confirmed that the differences in mean scores on the 
three items related to ontology were all statistically very highly significant (p < .001) 
when it came to the atheists and agnostics versus the churchgoing Christians.
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   The natural world is all that really exists:
   There is no such thing as a “spirit world”:
   Humans have a soul that lives on after death (reverse item):
Figure 5: Statements about ontology (atheists versus theists)
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Figure 6 presents the results for the three items related to cosmology.  As 
discussed in chapter two, cosmology refers to an individual’s beliefs about how the 
world came to be.  According to the data, 94.7% of the atheists and agnostics either 
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “Nature exists without a creator.”; 
91.3% of the atheists and agnostics agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “The
universe is self-existing.”; and 96.7% of the atheists and agnostics disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with the statement, “God created the universe.”  In contrast, only 
6.2% the churchgoing Christians either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, 
“Nature exists without a creator.”; 7.9% of the churchgoing Christians agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement, “The universe is self-existing.”; and 4.5% of the 
churchgoing Christians disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, “God 
created the universe.”  For all three items, two parabolic curves can be seen, 
proceeding in opposite directions: the atheist and agnostic curve toward the expected 
secular humanist position and the churchgoing Christian curve toward the opposite 
position.  These results indicate that the majority of atheists and agnostics do share the
same worldview-level beliefs about cosmology and that these beliefs are in direct 
opposition to the shared worldview-level beliefs of most churchgoing Christians.  
However, according to the data, the spiritual but not religious do not belong to either 
camp.  Instead, the results indicate that the spiritual but not religious individuals hold 
a variety of different positions when it comes to their worldview-level beliefs about 
cosmology.  Independent t-tests confirmed that the differences in mean scores on the 
three items related to cosmology were all statistically very highly significant (p < .
001) when it came to the atheists and agnostics versus the churchgoing Christians.
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   Nature exists without a creator:
   The universe is self-existing:
   God created the universe (reverse item):
Figure 6: Statements about cosmology (atheists versus theists)
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Figure 7 presents the results for the three items related to teleology.  As 
discussed in chapter two, teleology refers to an individual’s beliefs about the direction
our world is heading and the purpose behind it.  According to the data, 95.2% of the 
atheists and agnostics either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “Humans 
must create their own meaning in life.”; 91.9% of the atheists and agnostics agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement, “There is no preordained purpose to life.”; and 
98.0% of the atheists and agnostics disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
statement, “History is unfolding according to God’s will.”  In contrast, 30.1% the 
churchgoing Christians either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “Humans 
must create their own meaning in life.”; 12.8% of the churchgoing Christians agreed 
or strongly agreed with the statement, “There is no preordained purpose to life.”; and 
18.4% of the churchgoing Christians disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
statement, “History is unfolding according to God’s will.”  For all three items, the 
atheist and agnostic line curves in a parabolic fashion toward the expected secular 
humanist position.  However, unlike in the figures for ontology and cosmology, the 
churchgoing Christian line for the three teleology items is less steep.  This indicates 
that, although the majority of atheists and agnostics do share the same worldview-
level beliefs about teleology, churchgoing Christians are less unified when it comes to
this worldview component.  Likewise, the spiritual but not religious individuals are 
also less unified than the atheists and agnostics when it comes to this worldview 
component.  Independent t-tests confirmed that the differences in mean scores on the 
three items related to teleology were all statistically very highly significant (p < .001) 
when it came to the atheists and agnostics versus the churchgoing Christians.
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   Humans must create their own meaning in life:
   There is no preordained purpose to life:
  History is unfolding according to God’s will (reverse item):
Figure 7: Statements about teleology (atheists versus theists)
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Figure 8 presents the results for the three items related to axiology.  As 
discussed in chapter two, axiology refers to an individual’s beliefs about right and 
wrong.  According to the data, 96.8% of the atheists and agnostics, 99.1% of 
churchgoing Christians, and 95.0% of spiritual but not religious individuals either 
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “It is good to help the less fortunate.”; 
97.7% of the atheists and agnostics, 97.2% of churchgoing Christians, and 95.9% of 
spiritual but not religious individuals either agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement, “We should avoid harming others.”; and 74.8 % of the atheists and 
agnostics, 92.7% of churchgoing Christians, and 69.1% of spiritual but not religious 
individuals either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, “It is okay to lie 
for personal gain.”  As expected, these results indicate that the majority of atheists and
agnostics, the majority of churchgoing Christians, and the majority of spiritual but not
religious individuals hold similar worldview-level beliefs about axiology.  In other 
words, all three groups are in agreement about basic moral truths.  There is slightly 
less agreement when it comes to the issue of lying for personal gain but overall, the 
majority from all three groups are still in agreement on this issue.  In contrast to this 
conclusion, independent t-tests found that the differences in mean scores on the three 
items related to axiology were all statistically very highly significant (p < .001) when 
it came to the atheists and agnostics versus the churchgoing Christians.  However, as 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this statistical difference can be accounted 
for by the large sample sizes used in this study.
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   It is good to help the less fortunate:
   We should avoid harming others:
   It is okay to lie for personal gain (reverse item):
Figure 8: Statements about axiology (atheists versus theists)
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Figure 9 presents the results for the three items related to praxeology.  As 
discussed in chapter two, praxeology refers to an individual’s beliefs about what goals
are worth striving to achieve.  According to the data, 98.6% of the atheists and 
agnostics, 98.0% of churchgoing Christians, and 96.2% of spiritual but not religious 
individuals either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “We should work to 
improve society.”; 95.2% of the atheists and agnostics, 95.3% of churchgoing 
Christians, and 97.3% of spiritual but not religious individuals either agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement, “Human rights and freedoms should be 
defended.”; and 95.2 % of the atheists and agnostics, 95.3% of churchgoing 
Christians, and 98.5% of spiritual but not religious individuals either disagreed or 
strongly disagreed with the statement, “Literature, art, and music are not important.”  
As expected, these results indicate that the majority of atheists and agnostics, the 
majority of churchgoing Christians, and the majority of spiritual but not religious 
individuals hold similar worldview-level beliefs about praxeology.  In contrast to this 
conclusion, independent t-tests found that the differences in mean scores on the three 
items related to praxeology were all statistically very highly significant (p < .001) 
when it came to the atheists and agnostics versus the churchgoing Christians.  
However, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this statistical difference can 
be accounted for by the large sample sizes used in this study.
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   We should work to improve society:
   Human rights and freedoms should be defended:
   Literature, art, and music are not important (reverse item):
Figure 9: Statements about praxeology (atheists versus theists)
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND ATHEISM 207
Figure 10 presents the results for the three items related to epistemology.  As 
discussed in chapter two, epistemology refers to an individual’s beliefs about how we 
can know things.  According to the data, 94.7% of the atheists and agnostics either 
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “Reason, not revelation, allows us to 
explore life’s big questions.”; 91.3% of the atheists and agnostics agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement, “Human reason, not divine revelation, is the foundation of 
knowledge.”; and 96.7% of the atheists and agnostics disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with the statement, “God has revealed important truths to humanity.”  In contrast, only
6.2% the churchgoing Christians either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, 
“Reason, not revelation, allows us to explore life’s big questions.”; 7.9% of the 
churchgoing Christians agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “Human reason, 
not divine revelation, is the foundation of knowledge.”; and 4.5% of the churchgoing 
Christians disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, “God has revealed 
important truths to humanity.”  For all three items, the atheist and agnostic line curves
in a parabolic fashion toward the expected secular humanist position.  However, 
unlike in the figures for ontology and cosmology, the churchgoing Christian line for 
the three teleology items is less steep.  This indicates that, although the majority of 
atheists and agnostics do share the same worldview-level beliefs about teleology, 
churchgoing Christians are less unified when it comes to this worldview component.  
Likewise, the spiritual but not religious individuals are also less unified than the 
atheists and agnostics when it comes to this worldview component.   Independent t-
tests confirmed that the differences in mean scores on the three items related to 
epistemology were all statistically very highly significant (p < .001) when it came to 
the atheists and agnostics versus the churchgoing Christians. 
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   Reason, not revelation, allows us to explore life’s big questions.
   Human reason, not divine revelation, is the foundation of knowledge:
   God has revealed important truths to humanity (reverse item):
Figure 10: Statements about epistemology (atheists versus theists)
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It is clear from the data reported in this section that the vast majority of 
atheists and agnostics share the same worldview-level beliefs.  For all six worldview 
components, the beliefs of the atheists and agnostics matched those of the secular 
humanist worldview.  In the cases of ontology, cosmology, teleology, and 
epistemology, these beliefs were in direct opposition to the beliefs of the churchgoing 
Christians.  However, as expected, when it came to axiology and praxeology, the 
atheistics and agnostics had similar views to the churchgoing Christians.  The main 
conclusion from these findings is that an atheist worldview does, in fact, exist.  
Although atheism is not an organized belief system and thus does not prescribe a 
worldview to its adherents, atheists can be described as sharing the same worldview-
level beliefs.  This is important for dialogue between atheists and Christians.  
Although atheists often claim that they are unified by a single-issue – their lack of 
belief in God – discussions with Christians often end up dealing with worldview-level
questions as well.  Atheists need to realize this and be willing to share the burden of 
proof with those who hold opposing worldviews.  If discussions stick to the single 
issue of God’s existence, atheists can rightly claim that their view is a negative one 
and that therefore the burden of proof lies with the theists.  However, when 
discussions end up in the territory of worldview-level beliefs (as they so often do), 
atheists need to share the burden of proof with theists.  
9.2 Worldview-level beliefs of atheists by primary term
In the previous section, atheists and agnostics were placed in a single group 
based primarily on their agreement with the statement, “I do not believe in any sort of 
God, gods, or Higher Power” (see Section 6.6.1 for full details).  In this section, 
however, the atheist and agnostic group will be subdivided based on the one term that 
each participant indicated that they preferred the most.  The five most popular terms 
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were “atheist” (n = 10,543), “skeptic” (2,067), “agnostic” (n = 1,625), “humanist” 
(1,565), and “freethinker” (n = 1,360).  This section will compare the worldview-level
beliefs of these five subgroups with each other to see if they all share a single, 
common worldview (as suggested in section 9.1 above) or whether one or more 
should be viewed as a distinct worldview.
Figure 11 presents the descriptive statistics for the three items related to 
ontology.  As discussed in chapter two, ontology refers to an individual’s beliefs about
what exists and what does not.  Overall, the atheists who preferred the term “atheist”, 
“skeptic”, “humanist” or “freethinker” offered very similar responses to all  three 
questions, whereas those who preferred the term “agnostic” stood out as being quite 
different.  Whereas the vast majority of the atheists, skeptics, humanists, and 
freethinkers were very clear on where they stood when it came to their ontological 
beliefs (as evidenced by the steep parabolic curves pointing in the expected 
directions), the agnostics were much more neutral, indicating that many agnostics are 
uncertain about their ontological beliefs.  Independent t-tests comparing the two 
largest groups (the atheists and the skeptics) partially contradicted these findings.  The
t-tests found that the differences in mean scores between those who preferred the term
“atheist” and those who preferred the term “skeptic” were actually very highly 
significant (p < .001) for the statements, “There is no such thing as a ‘spirit world’.” 
and “Humans have a soul that lives on after death.”.  However, as mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, this statistical difference can be accounted for by the large 
sample sizes used in this study.
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   The natural world is all that really exists:
   There is no such thing as a “spirit world”:
   Humans have a soul that lives on after death (reverse item):
Figure 11: Statements about ontology (atheists by primary term)
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Figure 12 presents the results for the three items related to cosmology.  As 
discussed in Chapter Two, cosmology refers to an individual’s beliefs about how the 
world came to be.  Overall, the atheists who preferred the term “atheist”, “skeptic”, 
“humanist” or “freethinker” offered very similar responses to all  three questions, 
whereas those who preferred the term “agnostic” stood out as being quite different.  
Whereas the vast majority of the atheists, skeptics, humanists, and freethinkers were 
very clear on where they stood when it came to their cosmological beliefs (as 
evidenced by the steep parabolic curves pointing in the expected directions), the 
agnostics were much more neutral, indicating that many agnostics are uncertain about 
their cosmological beliefs.  Independent t-tests comparing the two largest groups (the 
atheists and the skeptics) contradicted these findings.  The t-tests found that the 
differences in mean scores between those who preferred the term “atheist” and those 
who preferred the term “skeptic” were actually very highly significant (p < .001) for 
all three statements.  However, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this 
statistical difference can be accounted for by the large sample sizes used in this study.
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   Nature exists without a creator:
   The universe is self-existing:
   God created the universe (reverse item):
Figure 12: Statements about cosmology (atheists by primary term)
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Figure 13 presents the results for the three items related to teleology.  As 
discussed in Chapter Two, teleology refers to an individual’s beliefs about the 
direction our world is heading and the purpose behind it.  Overall, the atheists who 
preferred the term “atheist”, “skeptic”, “humanist” or “freethinker” offered very 
similar responses to all  three questions, whereas those who preferred the term 
“agnostic” stood out as being somewhat different.  Whereas the vast majority of the 
atheists, skeptics, humanists, and freethinkers were very clear on where they stood 
when it came to their teleological beliefs (as evidenced by the steep parabolic curves 
pointing in the expected directions), the agnostics were slightly less clear.   
Independent t-tests comparing the two largest groups (the atheists and the skeptics) 
partially contradicted these findings.  The t-tests found that the differences in mean 
scores between those who preferred the term “atheist” and those who preferred the 
term “skeptic” were actually very highly significant (p < .001) for the statements, 
“Humans must create their own meaning in life.” and “History is unfolding according 
to God’s will.”.  However, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this 
statistical difference can be accounted for by the large sample sizes used in this study.
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   Humans must create their own meaning in life:
   There is no preordained purpose to life:
  History is unfolding according to God’s will (reverse item):
Figure 13: Statements about teleology (atheists by primary term)
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND ATHEISM 216
Figure 14 presents the results for the three items related to axiology.  As 
discussed in Chapter Two, axiology refers to an individual’s beliefs about right and 
wrong.  When it came to this dimension of worldview, those who preferred the term 
“agnostic” answered in a similar manner to those who preferred “atheist”, “skeptic”, 
“humanist” or “freethinker”.  This was expected given that the data from section 9.1 
demonstrated that atheists in general do not even differ from theists on this aspect of 
worldview.  Independent t-tests comparing the two largest groups (the atheists and the
skeptics) partially contradicted these findings.  The t-tests found that the difference in 
mean scores between those who preferred the term “atheist” and those who preferred 
the term “skeptic” was actually very highly significant (p < .001) for the statement, “It
is good to help the less fortunate”.  However, as mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, this statistical difference can be accounted for by the large sample sizes used 
in this study.
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   It is good to help the less fortunate:
   We should avoid harming others:
   It is okay to lie for personal gain (reverse item):
Figure 14: Statements about axiology (atheists by primary term)
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Figure 15 presents the results for the three items related to praxeology.  As 
discussed in Chapter Two, praxeology refers to an individual’s beliefs about what 
goals are worth striving to achieve.  When it came to this dimension of worldview, 
those who preferred the term “agnostic” answered in a similar manner to those who 
preferred “atheist”, “skeptic”, “humanist” or “freethinker”.  This was expected  given 
that the data from section 9.1 demonstrated that atheists in general do not even differ 
from theists on this aspect of worldview.  Independent t-tests comparing the two 
largest groups (the atheists and the skeptics) partially contradicted these findings.  The
t-tests found that the difference in mean scores between those who preferred the term 
“atheist” and those who preferred the term “skeptic” were actually very highly 
significant (p < .001) for the statements, “We should work to improve society” and 
“Litarture, art, and music are not important”.  However, as mentioned at the beginning
of this chapter, this statistical difference can be accounted for by the large sample 
sizes used in this study.
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   We should work to improve society:
   Human rights and freedoms should be defended:
   Literature, art, and music are not important (reverse item):
Figure 15: Statements about praxeology (atheists by primary term)
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Figure 16 presents the results for the three items related to epistemology.  As 
discussed in Chapter Two, epistemology refers to an individual’s beliefs about how 
we can know things.  Overall, the atheists who preferred the term “atheist”, “skeptic”, 
“humanist” or “freethinker” offered very similar responses to all three questions, 
whereas those who preferred the term “agnostic” stood out as being somewhat 
different.  Whereas the vast majority of the atheists, skeptics, humanists, and 
freethinkers were very clear on where they stood when it came to their 
epistemological beliefs (as evidenced by the steep parabolic curves pointing in the 
expected directions), the agnostics were were slightly less clear.  Independent t-tests 
comparing the two largest groups (the atheists and the skeptics) partially contradicted 
these findings.  The t-tests found that the difference in mean scores between those 
who preferred the term “atheist” and those who preferred the term “skeptic” was 
actually very highly significant (p < .001) for the statement, “God has revealed 
important truths to humanity.”.  However, as mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, this statistical difference can be accounted for by the large sample sizes used 
in this study.
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   Reason, not revelation, allows us to explore life’s big questions.
   Human reason, not divine revelation, is the foundation of knowledge:
   God has revealed important truths to humanity (reverse item):
Figure 16: Statements about epistemology (atheists by primary term)
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It is clear from the data reported in this section that there is very little 
difference in worldview-level beliefs between atheists who actually use the term 
“atheist” as their primary self-descriptor and those who prefer to use the terms 
“skeptic”, “humanist” or “freethinker” instead.  However, it is also clear that those 
who prefer the term “agnostic” do in fact differ when it comes to their worldview.  In 
contrast to other atheists, agnostics are often neutral and/or uncertain when it comes 
worldview-related positions.  The findings reported in this section confirm the main 
conclusion from the previous section that an atheist worldview does, in fact, exist.  
The only added caveat is that agnostics should not be included with atheists when it 
comes to worldview.  
PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE AND ATHEISM 223
CONCLUSION
This project set out to explore the relationship between psychological type and
atheism, particularly with regard to why some individuals stop attending church as 
adults while others do not.  It also explored seven existing theories on why certain 
individuals become atheists and compared those theories to the psychological type 
theory.  Finally, it explored the relationship between several terms related to atheism 
and worldview-level beliefs.  In the end, four major conclusions were reached.
The first conclusion is that atheist church-leavers do in fact differ from 
continuing churchgoers when it comes to psychological type and that this likely plays 
a role in why some individuals stop attending church.  Atheist church-leavers are far 
more likely to tend towards thinking (T) and perceiving (P), whereas continuing 
churchgoers are far more likely to tend towards the opposite preferences: feeling (F) 
and judging (J).  This was demonstrated most clearly by the fact that the percentage of
atheist church-leavers with the thinking-perceiving (TP) combination was 
approximately twice as high as the percentage of continuing churchgoers with that 
particular combination.  Compared to the continuing churchgoers sample, the TP 
combination was over-represented in the atheist sample by a factor of 2.14 for the 
females and 1.89 for the males.  Statistically, these figures can be considered very 
highly significant (p < .001).
This first conclusion supports existing research in two major ways.  First, it 
supports the growing body of research that indicates a preference for feeling (F) and 
judging (J) among Christian churchgoers and among those with high congregational 
satisfaction and very positive attitudes towards Christianity.  Second, it supports the 
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existing research surveyed in Caldwell-Harris (2012) that indicates a tendency 
towards logical reasoning and noncomformity among atheists.  Taken together, a 
convincing explanation for why certain individuals become atheist church-leavers 
emerges.  A person with innate preferences for thinking (T) and perceiving (P) is 
likely to feel out of place in a church environment, where the majority of individuals 
have preferences for feeling (F) and judging (J) instead.  This is likely to lead to lower
congregational satisfaction and a higher likelihood of leaving altogether.  In addition 
to this, a person with innate preferences for thinking (T) and perceiving (P) is more 
likely than others to be attracted to the logical reasoning and noncomformity found in 
atheism.  Again, this leads to a higher likelihood of the person leaving church and 
embracing atheist beliefs instead.
The second conclusion is that psychological type likely plays a larger role in 
why some individuals become atheists than other commonly cited factors.  The results
of the current study demonstrated that four factors commonly cited by conservative 
Christians (selfishness, arrogance, anger, and poor father-child relationships) do not 
appear to play a role in why some individuals become atheists.  On the other hand, 
several other factors (less religious emphasis in childhood, negative church 
experiences, and higher intellect) do appear to play a role, but, when compared to 
psychological type, the results of the current study demonstrated that those factors are 
not as important.
The third conclusion is that psychological type theory confirms what is already
known about religious differences from other personality models and is a better model
for future research.  The results from the current study show a strong tendency 
towards thinking (T) and perceiving (P) among atheists, thus supporting the existing 
research that links low religiosity with the related traits of low agreeableness and low 
conscientiousness in the Big Five models of personality and psychoticism in the 
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Eysenck model.  However, psychological type theory has the added benefit of using 
terminology that is far less value-laden.  Therefore, it is able to serve as an ideal 
model of personality for future research on religious differences.
The fourth conclusion is that there is such a thing as an atheist worldview, so 
long as it is understood to be the worldview held by most atheists as opposed to the 
worldview prescribed by atheism.  The results from the current study indicated that 
atheists, as a whole, do tend to agree with one another on worldview-level beliefs and 
that, on most worldview components, these beliefs are in direction opposition to the 
worldview-level beliefs of churchgoing Christians.  It was also determined that the 
exact term used by an atheist for self-description – whether it be “atheist”, 
“humanist”, “freethinker”, or “skeptic” – does not matter when it came to worldview-
level beliefs.  In other words, atheists, humanists, freethinkers, and skeptics can in fact
be considered to be a single group.  
This last conclusion is particularly important for discussion between atheists 
and Christians.  Atheists often claim that they are unified by a single-issue:  their lack 
of belief in God.  However, the results of the current study indicate that they are 
united by much more.  When discussion with Christians ventures into the territory of 
worldview-related beliefs (which it usually does), atheists need be willing to share the
burden of proof rather than fall back on the claim that theirs is solely a negative view 
that need not be defended.
It should be noted that, although the topic of this thesis relates more directly to
the field of the psychology of religion, it was conducted under the direction of the 
Warwick Religions and Education Research Unit (WRERU) at the Centre for 
Educational Studies.  Much of the information included in this paper is beneficial to 
those working in the field of education.  Classrooms today have a wide-range of 
students from various religious backgrounds and it is very common to find individuals
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who currently attend Christian churches but are tending towards atheist beliefs.  An 
understanding of how such individuals differ from their peers in terms of innate 
personality preferences can particularly benefit teachers who are involved in 
discussions related to religion.
Although a general picture has emerged from this project on the role that 
psychological type plays in why certain individuals become atheists, additional 
research is needed in order to further clarify this picture.  For this, the following 
recommendations are given based on two weaknesses in the study:  First, the current 
project relied entirely on data that was collected online using a snowball sampling 
method.  Future studies could benefit from targeting more specific groups and by 
collecting the data in person.  This will ensure that geography is more adequately 
controlled for at the same time as allowing for greater diversity within the samples 
when it comes to individual interests.  Second, the current project focused entirely on 
Christian churches and did not distinguish between denominations. Future studies 
could benefit from looking at atheists who grew up in other religious environments 
and by looking separately at atheists who grew up in different Christian 
denominations.
These weakness aside, the current study has made a very valuable contribution
to the Psychology of Religion research community.  The main strength of the study 
was the fact that such an extremely large number of individuals (n = 23,697) ended up
participating in the research, resulting in very large sample sizes.  This, combined 
with the fact that the survey included such a wide variety of questions, means that a 
very solid set of data was obtained.  This thesis has only scratched the surface when it 
comes to the various ways in which the data can be analyzed.  Thus, the data set will 
remain a valuable resource for further research for many more years to come.
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APPENDIX A
Personality and Belief in God Survey
Principal Researcher: Matthew Baker, University of Warwick (Coventry, UK)
The following survey is completely voluntary and is made up of questions about your 
personality, life experiences, and belief (or lack of belief) in God. Your responses are 
anonymous and we have no way of linking them back to you. There are six sections 
and the entire survey should take about 30 minutes to complete.  You must be at least 
19 years of age to participate.
If you have any questions about the survey, please write to: 
matthew.baker@warwick.ac.uk.  
To begin, please select the phrase that best describes your current view:
__ I do not believe in any sort of God, gods, or Higher Power
__ I believe in a personal, creator God
__ I believe in some other kind of God, gods, or Higher Power
__ I'm really not sure
Section 1 of 6  (atheist version)
1.  Which of the following terms would you feel comfortable using to describe 
yourself? (Select as many as apply):  
__ atheist   __ agnostic   __ bright   __ freethinker   __ humanist   __ skeptic
2.  Which ONE of the following terms do you use the most in order to describe 
yourself?
__ atheist   __ agnostic   __ bright   __ freethinker   __ humanist   __ skeptic
Other (please specify) : ___________________
3.  Are you currently a member of an atheist, humanist, or other like organization?  
__ Yes   __ No
4.  Please rate your agreement to the following statements:
I often attend atheist-related meetings and events. SD D N A SA
I have read a lot of books about atheism. SD D N A SA
I spend a lot of time on atheist-related websites. SD D N A SA
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I listen to a lot of atheist-related podcasts. SD D N A SA
I have a lot of atheist friends. SD D N A SA
I openly discuss my atheist views with theists. SD D N A SA
My family knows that I am an atheist. SD D N A SA
Section 1 of 6  (all other versions)
1.  Which one of the following terms best describes you?
__ Christian   __ Muslim   __ Jew   __ Hindu   __ Buddhist   __  Spiritual 
__ Don't know
Other (please specify) : ___________________
2.  How often do you CURRENTLY attend a church or other formal place of worship 
(mosque, synagogue, temple, etc.)?
__ usually every week
__ at least six times a year
__ at least once a year
__ rarely or never
3.  If you currently attend a church or place of worship at least once a year, please 
indicate the denomination or faith community:  
__ Anglican/Episcopalian __ Lutheran __ Reformed/Presbyterian
__ Baptist __ Mennonite __ Seventh-Day Adventist
__ Buddhist __ Methodist/Wesleyan __ Sikh
__ Catholic __ Mormon/LDS __ United Ch. of Canada
__ Churches of Christ __ Muslim __ W.W. Church of God
__ Hindu __ Non-denominational __ Other Christian
__ Jehovah's Witnesses __ Orthodox __ Other non-Christian
__ Jewish __ Pentecostal/Charismatic __ n/a
4.  How would you describe this church or faith community?
__ very conservative   __ conservative   __ moderate   __ liberal   __ very liberal   
__ n/a
Section 2 of 6
1.  For how many years, from BIRTH TO AGE 18, did you regularly attend a church 
or other place of worship (at least six times a year)? ___ 0-18 (If 0, please skip ahead 
to Section 3)
2.  Which term below best describes the denomination or faith community you 
belonged to during this time (if you belonged to more than one, please choose the one 
which you feel had the greatest impact on your life):  
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__ Anglican/Episcopalian __ Lutheran __ Reformed/Presbyterian
__ Baptist __ Mennonite __ Seventh-Day Adventist
__ Buddhist __ Methodist/Wesleyan __ Sikh
__ Catholic __ Mormon/LDS __ United Ch. of Canada
__ Churches of Christ __ Muslim __ W.W. Church of God
__ Hindu __ Non-denominational __ Other Christian
__ Jehovah's Witnesses __ Orthodox __ Other non-Christian
__ Jewish __ Pentecostal/Charismatic __ n/a
3.  How would you describe this church or faith community?  
__ very conservative   __ conservative   __ moderate   __ liberal   __ very liberal
4. Who attended this church or place of worship with you? (Select as many as apply)  
__ father   __ mother   __ sibling(s)   __ grandparent(s)   __ other extended family
5.  During the period in which you belonged to this church or faith community, to 
what degree were its teachings and practices emphasized in your home?  
__ very high   __ high   __ moderate   __ low   __ very low
6.  Please rate your agreement with the following:
Thinking back on my childhood experiences as part of this church or faith community,
I have positive feelings about...
the other children my age SD D N A SA
the adult members SD D N A SA
the leadership SD D N A SA
the teachings and practices SD D N A SA
the activities I participated in SD D N A SA
the opportunities I was given SD D N A SA
the way I was treated SD D N A SA
the sincerity of the members SD D N A SA
the integrity of the members SD D N A SA
the overall experience that I had SD D N A SA
Section 3 of 6
1.  I am:  __ male   __ female   __ transgendered
2.  My age is:  __ drop-down menu (19-99)
3.  I would classify myself as:
__ Asian   __ Black   __ Hispanic __ Middle Eastern
__ Native American __ Pacific Islander __ White
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4.  I currently reside in: 
 __ USA   __ Canada   __ United Kingdom
Other (please specify) : ___________________ (drop down menu?)
5.  My birth order is:  
__ firstborn   __ middleborn   __ lastborn   __ only child
6.  I have completed a:
__ Bachelor's degree   __ Master's degree   __ Doctoral degree
7.  Compared to other people my age, I would say that my income level is:
__ much lower than average
__ lower than average
__ about average
__ higher than average
__ much higher than average
__ n/a
8.  I am currently: 
__ single   __ married / living common law    __ separated / divorced    __ widowed
9.  My sexual orientation is:  
__ straight   __ gay   __ bisexual
Section 4 of 6
The following list contains pairs of characteristics.  For each pair, select the 
characteristic which is closer to the real you, even if you feel both characteristics 
apply to you.  Select the characteristic that reflects the real you, even if other people 
see you differently. 
 
1.  Do you tend to be more... 
__ active __ reflective
2.  Do you tend to be more interested in...
__ facts __ theories 
3.  Do you tend to be more concerned for...
__ harmony __ justice 
4.  Do you tend to be more...
__ happy with routine __ unhappy with routine 
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5.  Do you tend to be...
__ emotional __ unemotional
6.  Are you more...
__ private __ sociable 
7.  Are you more...
__ inspirational __ practical 
8.  Are you more...
__ analytic __ sympathetic 
9.  Are you more...
__ structured __ open-ended 
10.  Are you mostly...
__ contented __ discontented
11.  Do you prefer...
__ having many friends __ a few deep friendships 
12.  Do you prefer...
__ the concrete __ the abstract 
13.  Do you prefer...
__ feeling __ thinking 
14.  Do you prefer...
__ to act on impulse __ to act on decisions 
15.  Do you mostly...
__ feel secure __ feel unsecure
16.  Do you...
__ dislike parties __ like parties 
17.  Do you...
__ prefer to design __ prefer to make 
18.  Do you...
__ tend to be firm __ tend to be gentle 
19.  Do you like to be...
__ in control __ adaptable 
20.  Do you tend to...
__ stay stable __ have mood swings
21.  Are you...
__ energized by others __ drained by too many people 
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22.  Are you...
__ conventional __ inventive 
23.  Are you...
__ critical __ affirming 
24.  Are you happier...
__ working alone __ working in groups
25.  Do you tend to...
__ get angry quickly __ remain placid
26.  Do you tend to be more...
__ socially detached __ socially involved 
27.  Do you tend to be more concerned...
__ for meaning __ about details
28.  Do you tend to be more...
__ logical __ humane 
29.  Do you tend to be more...
__ orderly __ easygoing 
30.  Do you tend to feel...
__ guilty about things __ guilt-free
31.  Are you more...
__ talkative __ reserved 
32.  Are you more...
__ sensible __ imaginative 
33.  Are you more...
__ tactful __ truthful 
34.  Are you more...
__ spontaneous __ organized 
35.  Are you more...
__ at ease __ anxious about things
36.  Are you mostly...
__ an introvert __ an extrovert 
37.  Are you more focused on...
__ present realities __ future possibilities 
38.  Are you mostly...
__ trusting __ skeptical 
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39.  Are you mostly...
__ leisurely __ punctual 
40.  Do you tend to...
__ stay calm __ panic easily
41.  Do you...
__ speak before thinking __ think before speaking 
42.  Do you prefer to...
__ improve things __ keep things as they are 
43.  Do you...
__ seek for truth __ seek for peace 
44.  Do you...
__ dislike detailed planning __ like detailed planning 
45.  Do you...
__ frequently get irritated __ rarely get irritated
46.  Are you...
__ happier with uncertainty __ happier with certainty 
47.  Are you...
__ up in the air __ down to earth 
48.  Are you...
__ warm-hearted __ fair-minded 
49.  Are you mostly...
__ unbothered by things __ easily bothered
50.  Are you...
__ systematic __ casual 
Section 5 of 6
Below are phrases describing people's behaviours. Please use the given scale to 
describe how accurately each statement describes you.  Describe yourself as you 
generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future or think you should be. Describe
yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the 
same sex as you are, and roughly your same age. 
(items will be randomly mixed)
Believe in the importance of art. SD D N A SA
Have a rich vocabulary. SD D N A SA
Enjoy examining myself and my life. SD D N A SA
Enjoy discussing movies and books with others. SD D N A SA
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Try to examine myself objectively. SD D N A SA
Am not interested in abstract ideas. SD D N A SA
Try to avoid complex people. SD D N A SA
Avoid philosophical discussions. SD D N A SA
Am not interested in theoretical discussions. SD D N A SA
Do not like poetry. SD D N A SA
Get angry easily. SD D N A SA
Get irritated easily. SD D N A SA
Get upset easily. SD D N A SA
Am often in a bad mood. SD D N A SA
Lose my temper. SD D N A SA
Rarely get irritated. SD D N A SA
Seldom get mad. SD D N A SA
Am not easily annoyed. SD D N A SA
Keep my cool. SD D N A SA
Rarely complain. SD D N A SA
Make people feel welcome. SD D N A SA
Anticipate the needs of others. SD D N A SA
Love to help others. SD D N A SA
Am concerned about others. SD D N A SA
Have a good word for everyone. SD D N A SA
Look down on others. SD D N A SA
Am indifferent to the feelings of others. SD D N A SA
Make people feel uncomfortable. SD D N A SA
Turn my back on others. SD D N A SA
Take no time for others. SD D N A SA
Don't think that I'm better than other people. SD D N A SA
See myself as an average person. SD D N A SA
Am just an ordinary person. SD D N A SA
Consider myself an average person. SD D N A SA
Would like to have more power than other people. SD D N A SA
Believe that I am better than others. SD D N A SA
Like to attract attention. SD D N A SA
Am more capable than most others. SD D N A SA
Am likely to show off if I get the chance. SD D N A SA
Boast about my virtues. SD D N A SA
Avoid mistakes. SD D N A SA
Choose my words with care. SD D N A SA
Stick to my chosen path. SD D N A SA
Jump into things without thinking. SD D N A SA
Make rash decisions. SD D N A SA
Like to act on a whim. SD D N A SA
Rush into things. SD D N A SA
Do crazy things. SD D N A SA
Act without thinking. SD D N A SA
Often make last-minute plans. SD D N A SA
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Section 6 of 6
1.  For how many years, from birth to age 18, did you share a home with your 
FATHER?
___ drop-down menu (0-18)
2.  For how many years, from birth to age 18, did you share a home with your 
MOTHER?
___ drop-down menu (0-18)
3.  If any of the following events apply, please indicate your age at the time of the 
event. Otherwise, please skip ahead.
My parents separated (and/or divorced) when I was ___ years old 0-29, 30+
My father died when I was ___ years old 0-29, 30+
My mother died when I was ___ years old 0-29, 30+
4.  As a child, my FATHER was:
(rate your agreement; if n/a, please skip this question)
caring SD D N A SA
supportive SD D N A SA
involved in my life SD D N A SA
loving SD D N A SA
close to me SD D N A SA
sensitive SD D N A SA
accepting SD D N A SA
always there for me SD D N A SA
someone I respected SD D N A SA
someone others respected SD D N A SA
5.  As a child, my MOTHER was:
(rate your agreement; if n/a, please skip this question)
caring SD D N A SA
supportive SD D N A SA
involved in my life SD D N A SA
loving SD D N A SA
close to me SD D N A SA
sensitive SD D N A SA
accepting SD D N A SA
always there for me SD D N A SA
someone I respected SD D N A SA
someone others respected SD D N A SA
